

U.S. Lifts Veil of Secrecy at Battered Laotian Base

[From Tribune Wire Service]

LONG CHENG, Laos, Jan. 19—The United States today lifted its 10-year veil of secrecy from this strategic Laotian government base while bitter fighting raged around it.

Newsmen were given an American-sponsored look for the first time of the battered stronghold where the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency had trained, advised, and paid Meo irregulars for the last decade.

Military spokesmen said government troops had dislodged guerrillas from much of the five-mile-long skyline ridge overlooking the base, and expressed optimism the base would be secure within a few days.

Fire on Helicopter

However, the chartered helicopter that brought newsmen to the base came under mortar fire from Communist positions only a mile away as it landed on the central part of the ridge.

Acting defense minister, Prince Sisouk Na Champassack, flew to Long Cheng. He said, "the situation is much better now." Sisouk had said two weeks ago that he did not know whether government troops being besieged by North Vietnamese guerrillas could hold on to the base 80 miles

lar forces at Long Cheng, said the guerrillas had lost about 8,000 men in and around Long Cheng. However, he said government troops had suffered heavy losses when the Communist poured in more than 6,000 rounds of 130 mm artillery the last three weeks.

Government forward forces still were in a eyeball to eyeball confrontation with North Vietnamese who had threatened and attacked the base since capturing the strategic Plain of Jars, 20 miles to the north.

Heavy Resistance Told

Sisouk said, "We are still meeting heavy resistance on the skyline."

American planes were attacking guerrillas along about one-fourth of the ridge and rifle fire crackled as soldiers moved thru heavily damaged buildings in the town of Long Cheng. Government units were carrying out mopping operations in Long Cheng town against groups of North Vietnamese infiltrators.

Pao expressed optimism the base and the town of Long Cheng would be completely secured within a few days. However, it appeared unlikely that Americans would be able to move back soon any of their secret equipment into Long Cheng.

U. S. Equipment Moved

The equipment included some sophisticated cryptographic machines. It was removed to the rear weeks ago. Many buildings on the base and in the adjacent town of Long Cheng have been leveled.

Maj. Chanh led four battalions in an assault on the guerrillas on the ridge Sunday. He told newsmen there had been hand-to-hand fighting.

Chanh said his base had suffered 28 killed and 69 wounded, at "Charlie Whisky," a high ground from where he directed the assault.

A runway at the base still was not in use by U. S. or Laotian planes.

"We think it is still serviceable but we don't want to risk losing a million dollar airplane," said a U. S. official at Long Cheng. He said the airstrip still was threatened by North Vietnamese guns.



of Vientiane
Yang Pao, commander
Meo Tribesmen and regu-

JAN 1972

'U.S. finally lifts veil on CIA base in Laos

Daily World Foreign Department
from combined news services

The Nixon Administration on Jan. 19 finally lifted the veil of secrecy that shrouded operations in Laos of the Central Intelligence Agency during the past quarter of a century. But only a peek was allowed the journalists in Laos granted permission to approach Long Cheng, and the peek was accompanied by the usual U.S. briefing that attributes every advance by patriotic forces to "North Vietnamese."

Thus, a United Press International dispatch datelined Long Cheng purports to describe the fighting for this "stronghold where the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had trained, advised and paid Meo irregulars for the past decade."

But the dispatch is full of references to "North Vietnamese" troops, mortars, 130-mm guns, and "infiltrators." No mention is made of the Pathet Lao, the striking force of the Neo Lao Haksat (Laotian Patriotic Front), although repeatedly throughout that past ten years foreign newspapermen and foreign diplomatic officials who have visited the liberated areas of Laos have reported no evidence of the presence of North Vietnamese forces.

On the contrary, their reports have detailed the remarkable defensive and offensive power of the indigenous forces, tempered and strengthened through more than two and a half decades of fighting against French and Japanese colonialists and so-called "special forces" and Thai mercenaries trained, equipped and armed and commanded by the CIA.

Base captured by Lao

The UPI dispatch of Jan. 19 reports fighting inside the CIA base, declaring that "its fate was still in doubt."

The Neo Lao Haksat announced on Jan. 17 that its troops had overrun Long Cheng and captured the stronghold.

The UPI report, quoting CIA puppet commanders, places these commanders on Skyline Ridge overlooking the base and on high ground adjacent to the ridge, indicating that the Neo Lao Haksat claim was correct but that the CIA puppet commanders of Meo tribesmen and Thai mercen-

aries are attempting to recapture the base.

Other developments

Other developments relating to the Indochina war:

1 — TASS reports that at a press conference in Hanoi, the information bureau of the Neo Lao Haksat on Jan. 18 accused Thai authorities of violating the Geneva Agreements on Laos and with cooperating closely with the CIA in carrying out the aggression in Laos. Correspondents were shown captured Thai uniforms, documents, identification cards and personal effects. The Lao spokesmen charged that Thailand has been turned into a U.S. airbase for raids on the Indochina countries and for training mercenaries and Lao puppet troops for the aggression against Laos.

Chemical warfare reported

2 — The Kao San Pathet Lao news agency reported Jan. 18 that Muongkham District in Xiengkhouang Province was repeatedly raided by U.S. Airforce planes in 1971, killing 50 civilian residents of the village of Bantong, 40 residents of Bano and another 100 in other villages and hamlets. It said hundreds of peasants had been poisoned by chemicals sprayed by U.S. planes on Dec. 17, 1971.

3 — President Ton Duc Thang of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam sent a message to Prince Souphanouvong, chairman of the Neo Lao Haksat, expressing full solidarity with and support by the Vietnamese people for the struggle of the Lao people.

4 — Publication by the "New Yorker Magazine" of an article by Seymour Hersh that the U.S. Defense Department's secret report on the Songmy massacre on Jan. 19, 1971, in which 347 civilian women, old men and children, and

on the same day, of another 100 civilians in Mikhe village, is receiving widespread attention throughout the world.

The Pentagon has freed all personnel implicated in the Songmy massacre except Lieut. William Calley, who is at liberty at an Army base at President Nixon's personal order.

French speak out

5 — At a press conference in Tokyo, Maurice Schumann, French minister for foreign affairs, declared his government and people dislike "Vietnamization" and see an agreement recognizing the Vietnamese people's right to self determination as the only way to achieve peace in Vietnam.

6 — In Saigon, according to a Liberation press agency report relayed by TASS, the secret police of the Nguyen Van Thieu clique have seized Huinh Tan Mam, leader of the South Vietnamese students' movement and chairman of the General Union of Students of Saigon. The agency said Huinh Tan Mam was seized while on his way home from school on Jan. 5, and that all attempts by students to locate him at police stations and prisons have proved futile.

7 — The U.S. Airforce stepped up raids in Laos and South Vietnam Jan. 19, and the U.S. Command said the heaviest B-52 raids in two years had been directed against installations of the liberation forces in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. The U.S. Command also claimed a U.S.F-4 missile-firing jet fighter had shot down a North Vietnamese MIG-21 over North Vietnam. About one-third of the U.S. B-52s were involved in the raids.

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Mortar Fire Hits Laos Major as He Tells of Toll at Key Base

BY JACK FOISIE

Times Staff Writer

LONG CHENG, Laos—Maj. Chanh had just recounted his losses—28 killed and 69 wounded. Then an enemy mortar round burst into his position and he became the 70th.

That's the way it was Wednesday on "Skyline Ridge," as correspondents made their first visit to this key base and its environs. Built in 1961, Long Cheng was long a secret base because of the presence of large numbers of Central Intelligence Agency workers.

The ridge, rising sharply 2,000 feet out of Long Cheng Valley, has been a battleground for the past week in one of the most vicious fights of the Laos war. The North Vietnamese seized the ridge a week ago, and since then the troops of fabled Meo Gen. Vang Pao have been battling to get it back. He is assisted by American advisers, calling in waves of bombers.

Much of Long Cheng base in the valley has been evacuated as the enemy continues to pound it with long range artillery. The airstrip—for a decade the most important in north Laos—cannot be used until the enemy is driven off Skyline Ridge. "So he won't be looking down our throat," the talkative Vang Pao explained.

An air of confidence is returning at Vang Pao's headquarters. More than half of the four-mile-long ridge is back in friendly hands.

But a big fight is still continuing on Skyline Ridge. Our Air America chopper spirals out of the valley and hurriedly drops us on "Charlie Whiskey," the high point in the center of the ridge.

Maj. Chanh commands Group Mobile 30, with about 700 men strung out for more than a mile in holes dug by hand or formed out of bomb craters.

Until 12 days ago, Chanh had his troops in an easy job near Vientiane, the Lao administrative capital about 80 miles to the south of Long Cheng.

That Chanh's unit could be transferred to the embattled Long Cheng ridge line indicates a change in Laos unity and

also the importance attached to this northern stronghold just below the Plain of Jars. In past years, regional commanders refused to turn over their troops to help Vang Pao. Laotian elite despise him because he is a Meo tribesman and a former French army sergeant.

Troops Encouraged

Chanh, a paratrooper, is too busy to spell his long last name. He moves among his men, cheering them up. His troops took "Charlie Whiskey" with the losses Chanh described. He points out where the enemy is dug in on the next ridge. He looks concerned about his visitors.

"They mortar us about very 10 minutes," he explained. "That is why we are so well dug in."

Sure enough, without a whirl of warning, there is a smash close by. A boy-soldier (we learned later he is 14) is splashed with shrapnel. He wraps a shred of parachute silk around his head and plods off to see the aid man.

There is another smash. This time it is Maj. Chanh who suffers a minor head wound from shrapnel. Lao soldiers do not wear steel helmets.

American planes are overhead dropping supplies. The chutes are red, blue and yellow, to designate what is being dropped—ammunition, food and water, special needs. After several days of such air drops, the ridge is as colorful as a quilt, for the silk is snared by the troopers for bedding.

In Long Cheng Valley itself, four miles long and a mile wide, there is some activity again. American choppers swoop down to the valley floor off and on, dropping supplies to Lao soldiers for a hut by

hut wipeout of enemy snipers. Large American transport planes circle overhead to drop supplies.

The bright sunshine bounces off the tin roofs of a thousand huts which once housed families of Lao fighters but are now abandoned.

There is evidence of hasty evacuation of the base as we chopper into the valley for a brief and cautious look. Bombs and napalm pods have been left behind. The wood and stone houses of CIA personnel have been looted. The wreckage of a plane leaves an ugly scar.

Standing serene and un-



KEY BASE — Long Cheng, long secret because of CIA presence. Another base is Ban Son.

Times map

molested on a small knoll in the valley is a Buddhist temple, its fading paint still able to glow when struck by the sun.

We chopper over to an artillery base west of Skyline Ridge. It is known as Firebase Thunder and is rustic compared to Vietnamese war standards. There are four large American guns, manned

Thai artillery in the area but we are not shown them.

The Lao point their artillery in different directions and fire one gun at a time, much to the distress of their mass fire advisers. They are firing now at a ridge they previously held. When enemy pressure became too great a few days ago, this artillery battery was evacuated by American "hook" helicopters based in nearby Thailand.

Spacious Quarters

Back to the Vang Pao headquarters we fly. It overlooks Long Cheng and is housed in a spacious home built for the Lao king so he could see war activity in comfort. Now the windows in the house are broken by the concussion of shelling.

Vang Pao, in a nonmilitary bush suit, snorts when asked if the enemy will try to regain Skyline Ridge.

"He will try, maybe for a month more," Vang Pao said. "But we have hurt him bad, maybe 8,000 dead or wounded. He will not have Long Cheng."

Other sources of casualty figures are not so high. Both sides have lost many hundreds.

Outnumbered

Vang Pao has about 3,000 men for the immediate defense of Long Cheng. It is believed he is outnumbered by the North Vietnamese about two to one. The enemy troops are still pressing forward but with less gusto in the past several days. B-52 and other American and Lao bombers have hurt them.

STATINTL

C.I.A.-Aided Laos Base Hit Hard

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY
Special to The New York Times

LONG TIENG, Laos, Jan. 19 —The long-secret military base maintained here by the United States Central Intelligence Agency to help Laotian irregulars battle the North Vietnamese is badly damaged and has been put out of effective action by the Communists even though the Laotians have re-occupied most of a high ridge that commands it.

The United States and Laotian Governments lifted a 10-year veil of secrecy from the base and allowed a group of newsmen to charter a helicopter today to land on it and observe military operations. Long Tieng came under heavy attack on Dec. 31 by a North Vietnamese force of 6,000 to 9,000 men.

The base consists of a mile-long paved runway, with reloading facilities and stores of bombs for the small Laotian T-28 bombers, a complex of communications buildings at either end and a large cluster of villages that housed 30,000 civilians before the attack began and they fled. By Jan. 12 all this was in imminent danger of falling to the largest North Vietnamese attack ever launched against it.

By that time the C.I.A. and the Laotians had moved most of their electronic and reconnaissance equipment from the base.

Since then, however, a force of about 6,000 Laotians has retaken most of a key position on what is known as Skyline Ridge, overlooking the base from the north. Included in the force are perhaps 2,000 of the Meo tribesmen for whose clandestine operations the base was originally built and 1,000 Thai "volunteers," in addition to regular Laotian troops.

Despite the advance atop the ridge, the helicopter that carried reporters and some United States officials to the central part of it came under mortar

attack from North Vietnamese troops only a mile away. Sporadic sniper fire ricocheted in the deserted streets of Long Tieng and made it unsafe for planes to land there.

High-ranking American officials, who acceded to requests for the visit to the base on condition that they not be identified, said the Laotians had suffered at least 600 killed,



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wounded or missing in the continuing conflict around the base.

Maj. Gen. Vang Pao, commander of the military region and of the Meos in the C.I.A.-supported irregular forces, was ebullient today as he was calling in American and Laotian air strikes on North Vietnamese positions on the craggy limestone pinnacles that dominate the eastern end of the base.

He quoted casualty statistics that appeared to be wildly optimistic—8,000 of the enemy killed—but he is usually either elated or despondent. American officials said they estimated that North Vietnamese casualties had been heavy and might have reached 600 to 700 killed in the current fighting, the heaviest in Indochina at the moment.

At the general's headquarters on a hill overlooking the south side of the Long Tieng complex, a handful of young Americans in civilian clothes were planning B-52 raids on the Communist positions around the base.

A visitor on a wide-ranging tour encountered no Americans in ground combat anywhere on or near the base. But the skies were filled with American planes—cargo aircraft dropping arms and food by parachute, and helicopters—operating for the C.I.A. and the Laotians by the

charter line Air America—plus occasional United States Air Force jet bombers from Thailand.

Official Explains Change

A ranking American official, asked to explain why reporters were suddenly given a guided tour, replied: "This is a North Vietnamese invasion of Laos, and there's no point in keeping you people from seeing it for yourselves. This year they've brought in a lot more troops, heavier equipment, and showed more determination than they ever have before—for what political objective I just don't know."

Both the Americans and the Laotians here—the Laotians have made the defense of the spectacularly beautiful mountain valley their primary effort by bringing troops from all over the country—expect the North Vietnamese drive to intensify.

In the steep, trackless jungled hills to the north the North Vietnamese are believed to have moved 6,000 to 9,000 first-line combat troops across the Plaine des Jarres. They have used powerful artillery with a 20-mile range to commanding advantage.

Usable but Cluttered

The attacks have halted in the past two days, but fear of them prevents the Air America planes from landing on the airstrip, which is still usable but cluttered with ordinance for the T-28's, which now operate from Vientiane.

Some of them were dropping cluster bombs—antipersonnel devices that break into small bomblets and explode like firecrackers—on remaining Communist positions at the southern end of the valley.

The North Vietnamese have also been harassing the Laotian forces that have been driving them out of bunkers on the ridge by firing mortars at them, mostly at night.

Two mortar rounds aimed at a helicopter landing position wounded three Laotian soldiers; 28 have been killed and almost 70 wounded in the action there this week.

One of the wounded was a boy who was struck in the head by a piece of shrapnel. He said he was 14 years old but was part of the regular Laotian armed forces. He was flown out in a helicopter. "A sergeant dug in. He sleep much at night," he said.

SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.

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The Holocaust at Long Cheng

By Holger Jensen

LONG CHENG (Laos) (AP) — What once was a CIA base now is a ghost town slowly being reduced to rubble by North Vietnamese artillery.

The ridgetop above it is a holocaust of bomb strikes and incoming mortars.

For seven days, outnumbered Laotian government troops supported by American air power have been battling Communist-led forces for control of this valley, 78 miles north of Vientiane.

The outcome still is in doubt.

Sniper fire echoes in the ruins of abandoned homes and offices that still bear "Happy New Year" signs. Automatic weapons chatter when government troops engage small bands of infiltrators in house-to-house combat.

A man can't tell where the fire is coming from unless he is hit.

Heavier fighting rages on the bomb-cratered lunar landscape known as Skyline Ridge. Laotian troops have dislodged the enemy from their fortified bunkers on the ridgetop, but they must endure constant mortar fire and repel periodic counterattacks.

Once so top secret that it did not appear on maps, Long Cheng is a secret no more.

But it retains a symbol of U.S. involvement in the Laotian war and a focal point in the biggest dry season offensive ever launched by North Vietnam in this landlocked country.

Four miles long and a mile wide, the Long Cheng Valley served as a Central Intelligence Agency listening post in the mountainous and military region.

It was headquarters for Gen. Van Pao's army of tough CIA-supported Meo tribesmen irregulars and a refugee camp for 35,000 Meo civilians escaping the enemy's annual incursion into the Plain of Jars.

The valley floor is littered with villas and villages, military compounds bristling with radio antennas, refugee hovels and a hillside house belonging to Kin Savang Vathana.

There is an air strip where fixed-wing aircraft no longer land because of enemy fire.

The refugees were evacuated last week after the Communist command's unprecedented 72-hour attack that captured the Plain of Jars and the resulting advance southward by the Communist troops.

Major fighting erupted here Jan. 12, and Thai mercenaries and Royal Laotian reinforcements from other military regions were flown in last Sunday. These reinforcements, along with

air strikes, helped avert the immediate fall of Long Chen.

Yesterday, the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane agreed to let newsmen visit Long Chen if they would pay to charter Air America planes and helicopters.

They were greeted by a host of Laotian generals watching the war from the king's villa and conferring with a number of unidentified Americans.

Some of the Americans wore civilian clothes. Others were armed and wearing camouflage fatigues. Under the agreements they could not be photographed or named, nor could their respective government agencies be disclosed.

Sipping peach juice, Gen. Vang Pao greeted visitors warmly and told them Long Cheng had been hit by 6624 enemy artillery rounds in the past three weeks. He

claimed his forces had won "a great victory . . . We killed 8000 and wounded 6000 to 7000."

At the same time, Vang Pao claimed his forces suffered 16 dead and 85 wounded.

Body bags lying on the airport runway back at Ban Son and large numbers of bandaged government troops raised doubts about his statistics.

Vang Pao also insisted he had 8000 troops fighting in the Long Cheng area.

The Americans here said it was more like 3000. They estimated enemy strength at 3000 and said 500 to 600 probably had been killed so far.

Vang Pao insisted: "The enemy cannot take Long Cheng."

But he added: "They will try until February. They have supplies for one month and in small groups they are strong. We can hold them off."

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Newsmen Allowed To Visit CIA Base

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Jan. 19—In an unprecedented move, the U.S. mission to Laos today allowed a selected group of journalists to visit the long-secret Central Intelligence Agency base at Long Cheng.

The 14 journalists were the first ever authorized to visit the embattled headquarters of the Meo troops of Gen. Vang Pao and their CIA advisers.

Ranking CIA personnel here were reported to have suggested the trip over the objections of others in the U.S. mission.

Preparations for the flight to the base 80 miles north of here were conducted in flight secrecy to forestall a rush by journalists applying for seats on the plane.

Left Out

The original list of those authorized to go left out two major dailies and an international news service.

The Agence France Presse correspondent here charged that he had been discriminated against, saying that he had requested permission to visit Long Cheng long before most of those selected to make the trip. He charged that some reporters who had not even asked to visit the base were invited in a blatant attempt to repay articles favorable to the U.S. mission here.

The Washington Post was not on the original list but after a protest, this writer was offered a seat on the plane.

Sought After

Norman Barnes, director of the U.S. Information Service in Laos, refused to comment on charges of favoritism, but noted that some 30 journalists are in Laos covering the Pathet Lao-North Vietnamese offensive against Long Cheng and that only a limited number of airplane seats were available.

A visit to Long Cheng is one of the most sought-after press trips in Indochina because of past U.S. efforts to keep the base's existence a secret. Until Tuesday night all requests were routinely denied.

U.S. spokesmen in Vientiane have consistently said the base was a Royal Lao government base, and referred requests to Laotian officials. These officials, in turn, have redirected requests to the CIA representative here.

The location of the base in a mountain valley surrounded by hostile forces has made unauthorized visits almost impossible. Those who have made their way in by plane have been detained, questioned and returned to Vientiane on the next flight with hardly more than a glance at the base.

During the first half of the 1960s, U.S. officials denied that the base even existed. Later a very few journalists were allowed to visit under extremely restrictive "ground rules."

Secret Briefing

The newsmen authorized to make today's trip were first given a secret briefing outlining rules for reporting on the visit. Highly reliable sources said Tuesday that the group would be briefed at the base by Hugh Tovar, first secretary of the U.S. embassy who has been identified by Radio Pathet Lao as the CIA station chief for Laos.

Knowledgeable sources here said that every effort has been made to keep CIA advisers now directing Long Cheng's defenses away from the visiting journalists. Highly reliable sources here said that at least 20 "paramilitary" advisers described as "America's answer to the mercenary" are now in Long Cheng.

Two theories are current here about why the visit was finally authorized.

"Little remains at Long Cheng since last year's near collapse, so there is nothing to see, really," a former U.S. official said.

Another American close to Long Cheng's activities said continued pressure from journalists and pessimism about Gen. Vang Pao's chances of holding out had led to the decision to "get it out of the realm of a black (clandestine) operation."

The former official added that "Long Cheng long ago ceased to be the most important base in Laos. Try getting into Nam Yu."

Nam Yu, according to reliable U.S. sources, is located near Ban Houei Sai, 210 miles northwest of Vientiane near the Chinese and Burmese borders. It supports a number of clandestine operations, including sending intelligence teams of mountain tribesmen into northern Laos, southern China and eastern Burma.

STATINTL

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STATINT

Meo Troops Battle for Ridge

Overlooking Long Cheng

By Jack Foisie
Los Angeles Times

LONG CHENG, Laos, Jan. 19—Maj. Chanh had just recounted his losses—28 killed and 69 wounded. Then an enemy mortar burst into his position and he became the seventieth.

That is the way it was Wednesday on "Skyline Ridge," an escarpment rising sharply 2,000 feet out of Long Cheng Valley which has been a battleground for the past week in one of the most vicious fights of the Laos war.

The North Vietnamese seized the ridge a week ago, and since then the troops of Meo Gen. Vang Pao have been battling to get it back. He is assisted by American advisers, calling in waves of bombers.

Much of Long Cheng base in the valley has been evacuated as the enemy continues to pound it with long-range artillery. The airstrip—for a decade the most important in northern Laos—cannot be used until the enemy is driven off Skyline Ridge. "So he won't be looking down our throat," the talkative Vang Pao explained.

An air of confidence is returning at Vang Pao's headquarters. More than half of the four-mile-long ridge is back in the hands of pro-government troops.

[A Laotian government spokesman said in Vientiane that Laotian government troops had recaptured all of Skyline Ridge, UPI reported. Gen. Thongphan Knocksy, spokesman for the Defense Ministry, said the government troops were sweeping the eastern crest of the ridge, which was captured Tuesday, to dislodge the remaining North Vietnamese forces from bunkers and trenches.]

Supplies Dropped

In Long Cheng valley itself, four miles long and a mile wide, there is some activity again. American choppers swooped down to the valley floor to drop off Laotian soldiers for a hut-by-hut wipeout of enemy snipers. Large American transport planes circled overhead to drop supplies.

The bright sunshine bounces off the tin roofs of a thousand huts—now abandoned—where the families of Lao fighters once lived.

As we fly into the valley for a brief and gingerly look, we can see evidence of hasty evacuation of the base. Bombs and napalm pods have been left behind. The wood-and-stone houses of CIA personnel have been looted. The wreckage of a plane leaves an ugly scar.

Standing serene and unmolested on a small knoll in the valley is a Buddhist tem-

ple, its fading paint still able to glow when struck by the sun.

But the big fight is on Skyline Ridge. Our Air America helicopter spirals out of the valley and hurriedly drops us on "Charlie Whiskey," the high point in the center of the ridge.

'Group Mobile 30'

Maj. Chanh commands "Group Mobile 30," with about 700 men strung out for more than a mile in holes dug by hand or formed out of craters.

Until 12 days ago Chanh and his troops had an easy job near Vientiane, the country's administrative capital 80 miles to the south of Long Cheng.

That Chanh's unit could be transferred to the embattled Long Cheng ridgeline indicates improvement in Laotian unity as well as the importance attached to this northern stronghold just below the Plain of Jars. In past years, regional commanders refused to turn over their troops to help Vang Pao. Laotian elite despise him because he is a

Meo tribesman and a former French Army sergeant.

Chanh, a paratrooper, is too busy to spell his long last name. He moves among his men, cheering them up. His troops took "Charlie Whiskey" with the losses Chanh describes. He points out where the enemy is dug in on the next ridge. He looks concerned about his visitors.

"They mortar us about every 10 minutes," he explained. "That is why we are so well dug in."

Boy Wounded

Sure enough, without a whirl of warning, there is a smash close by. A boy-soldier (we learned later he is 14) is splashed with shrapnel. The boy wraps a shred of parachute silk around his head and then plods off to see the aid man.

There is another smash. This time it is Maj. Chanh who suffers a minor headwound from shrapnel. Lao soldiers do not wear steel helmets.

Vang Pao has about 3,000 men for the immediate defense of Long Cheng. It is believed that the North Vietnamese outnumber his men about two to one. The Hanoi-directed troops are still pressing forward, but with less gusto in the past several days. B-52 and other American and Lao bombers have hurt them.

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U.S. Era at Long Cheng Base Ends

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE

Special to The Star

LONG CHENG — An era has come to an end here. What was once a thriving American base coordinating the ground and air war in north Laos and housing one of the most active American intelligence communities overseas is deserted and partly wrecked.

Signal derricks stand shorn of their sophisticated communications aeriels. Stone barracks blocks and sandbagged houses stand empty. Equipment is littered all over a case of unused windsocks, gleaming chromium pipe fittings, symbols of American plans for greater comfort. Trays of unused aerial bombs stand on asphalt which is pocked and ripped by Communist long-range artillery.

The air operations center is burned to the ground. Filing cabinets peer from wreckage.

Nervous Meo and Lao troops wander through town firing bursts from their M16 rifles, nervous of small groups of North Vietnamese troops who slip in here each night and hide, only to be rooted out again during the day. One soldier comes from the American compound clutching a table lamp and a copy of Time magazine.

And perhaps most symbolic of the great change, the American press corps is here after being excluded except for a privileged few for 10 years.

Of course, the Americans could come back here if the Vietnamese are driven further away. American helicopters still land on this strip bringing food and ammunition to allied troops while U.S. jets and Lao T28s hammer the Vietnamese positions 2,000 yards from the airstrip. But a full-scale return of Americans is unlikely.

"It will never be the same again here," an American official said. "The Vietnamese were right into Long Cheng a week ago and I am not sure the government will be able to drive them back all the way again to make Long Cheng a safe proposition for all concerned."

The Vietnamese assault of Jan. 12 and 13 seems to have been the beginning of the end for this base.

News Distorted

The Vietnamese last Saturday were in possession of all the eastern Skyline Ridge looking straight down onto Long Cheng. Their sappers were inside Long Cheng town, which clings to the Skyline's southern lower slope and even onto Long Cheng runway.

It is obvious the American briefers in Vientiane were distorting the news in saying Long Cheng had not yet fallen when in fact it had last week-end. Briefers were able to do this without actually lying because the press lacked knowledge of the terrain. American briefers completely omitted the fact the important ridge north of Skyline and its airstrip was abandoned many days ago by government forces leaving everything north of Long Cheng's runway in enemy hands.

Eyewitness accounts here say the North Vietnamese attacked the key Skyline Ridge in broad daylight. The fighting began when a water gathering party of Lao bumped into the Vietnamese infantry when they came up the steep slopes and a desperate firefight developed, clearing the Lao from a series of helicopter pads along Skyline.

Vietnamese apparently came up the Long Chen side of Skyline and the Lao fought their way out, taking heavy casualties.

The Tide Turns

Sunday the tide turned in the allies' favor. After air power had hammered Skyline East, turning it from a smiling green hill into a yellow cratered moonscape of rock and stones, an extremely gallant assault was launched by Lao irregular infantry. Across the bare saddle on Skyline the Lao, using grenades and small arms, took Charlie Echo, Charlie Whisky and Charlie Alpha helicopter pads but the North Vietnamese even now are clinging stubbornly to Charlie Tango, the last pad in their possession.

Maj. Chanh, the Lao commander in position on Skyline who led the assault, told me, "I knew we were winning when I heard the enemy say on their radio the first company gone, second company gone."

Chanh Injured

Chanh said 28 of his men were killed and 69 wounded mounting the steep bare slopes of Charlie Whisky. Standing on Charlie Whisky, Chanh said, "We are still being shelled; every 15 minutes we get two or three rounds." As he turned away and walked up the hill, Communist shell landed, wounding Chanh slightly in the back of the head.

Gen. Thao Ly who is over-all commander of the Lao irregular strike division, admitted the fighting and continuous shelling here on Skyline is taking a heavy toll. He said his irregulars had suffered 209 casualties since the first Vietnamese assault against the helicopter pads along Skyline. After he said this, a soldier crept out of a trench shaken and bleeding from a slight head wound when another Vietnamese shell arrived.

A third round came in just over the general's radio aerial and burst a few yard behind on a Skyline slope dropping toward the town.

Gen. Ly believes the North Vietnamese are quietly reinforcing their troops, holding out 300 yards along the ridge east of Charlie Whisky on Charlie Tango, while harassing the Lao troops along the ridge with shellfire to keep them from making another rush and clearing the east end of Skyline.

North Vietnamese shells occasionally dropping on Charlie Whisky seem aimed particularly at U.S. helicopters coming in and are intended to cause maximum casualties to troops unloading choppers or to hit a chopper. Below Skyline on another slope near Lao King Savang Vatthana's empty house, which like Skyline is also part of the Long Cheng complex, the Meo commander Gen. Vang Pao, is putting maximum firepower on Skyline East and on positions northeast and southeast of the Long Cheng runway.

Every few minutes the general calls in U.S. and Lao airstrikes on his radio. Beside him he has a 4-foot telescope. Peering through it he spots two North Vietnamese on a

the valley below skyline. He ranges a 4.2 mortar on them then calls in an airstrike. There is a series of flashes and smoke. Looking through the telescope afterward I can see nothing moving.

Vang Pao says there have been B52 strikes north of Skyline to hit enemy concentrations and logistics lines. Despite all this firepower some American officials think the major Hanoi attack on Long Cheng is yet to come.

"The Vietnamese are getting their stuff together now, then they will attack again," an American official said. "The North Vietnamese are holding the east end of Skyline waiting for relief."

Other U.S. officials think Hanoi has shot its bolt against Long Cheng.

The former opinion would seem correct. There is no doubt North Vietnamese are still around, as at dusk their long-range artillery fires again at Long Cheng. The North Vietnamese are regrouping, waiting favorable weather, then they'll come again the Lao general staff watching the battle here believe.

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U.S. Expanding Role in Laos Despite Curb as War Worsens

BY JACK FOISIE

Times Staff Writer

PAKSE, Laos—American participation in the Laos war continues to expand despite congressional bans on spending and other limitations imposed by the State Department and the Pentagon.

As the war worsens here, it is the character of the Americans—from Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley in Vientiane to the refugee worker here—to work harder at trying to save the situation.

While new ways to bend the bans and stretch the limitations have been devised, the basic rule that no organized American ground combat units can get involved in Laos continues to be observed.

But everything short of putting in American infantry is being done to help the reeling Royal Lao Army. This backup, formerly carried out clandestinely, is now performed in the open.

"All the secrets have been exposed in congressional investigations or by you reporters," I was told. "There's nothing left to hide."

Pakse is a case in point. A year ago a reporter arriving by Lao commercial plane or crossing from Thailand was spurned by Americans and sometimes ousted by the Lao military. Now a correspondent finds the military more relaxed and the Americans friendly and cooperative.

There are 34 Americans living here and involved, in one way or another, with helping Gen. Soutchay Vongsavanh and his 5,000 Lao troops fend off the North Vietnamese, who have been steadily advancing since mid-December and are now only 20 miles from Pakse.

The military advisers—known in Laos as "attaches"—wear the green fatigue uniform, but most other Americans are in mufti.

A good number of them are pilots who fly light planes and spot targets

for bombers. These pilot-spotters are known as "Ravens," and "Raven House" in the evening has all the camaraderie of young professional military men who recount the adventures of the day and think not of the risk to-morrow.

The air war in support of Laos troops is small-scale in comparison with the "big air war" waged by Thai-based American jets bombing the Ho Chi Minh supply network in eastern Laos. But it can still mean death for the "Ravens."

During the past 21 months, 18 American planes "based in Laos" have disappeared while on combat support missions. These include 10 "Ravens," while the others are CIA-chartered transport planes or helicopters flown by Air America or Continental Airways pilots. Twenty-eight persons have died in these mishaps.

Guerrilla Teams

Another role performed by Americans in Pakse still is somewhat secret. Former military men work with Lao guerrilla teams. They continue to masquerade as members of the U.S. Agency for International Development mission in Laos, despite a Washington announcement that this association with AID would be ended and the longstanding AID policy of not being involved in military operations would be restored.

A military adviser to the Lao forces must have infinite patience. For years Lao officers have believed

that artillery is best utilized when fired one gun at a time, and all the persuasion of Americans advocating mass fire has had little effect here on the Pakse front.

An exception to the usual lethargic Lao soldier is the Lao pilot of the "Mighty Mite" fighter-bomber, a converted American propeller-driven training plane.

Once flown by American or Thai pilots, the "Mighty Mite" air force now appears to be all-Lao here. The pilots fly with the zest of all airmen, even though their bomb loads are puny by comparison with American jets, which often on their way back from bombing the trail save a rocket or two to use in close support on the Pakse front.

11,000 Refugees

The conventional AID program continues in southern Laos, despite the prospect that the enemy may overrun Pakse and reach the east bank of the Mekong River.

A \$1.5 million expansion of the Pakse airport is nearing completion. A new dirt strip for aircraft has been built on the west side of the Mekong as a fallback position.

But mostly the AID team here, headed by Louis Connick, is occupied with finding new land for the 11,000 refugees who have fled from the agricultural-rich Boloven Plateau to the east of Pakse, an area now entirely occupied by the North Vietnamese.

Laos puppets being pushed against wall

By Richard E. Ward

As the Lao Patriotic Front (Pathet Lao) forces continue their offensive in several strategic regions of Laos a victory of unprecedented proportions for the liberation forces appears to be a certainty.

In itself this will be a major setback for the Nixon administration's mad design for "victory" in Indochina, but there is a strong possibility that a U.S. debacle in Laos may well be the prelude of the American Dienbienphu in Indochina.

Never before has the U.S. posture in Indochina so closely paralleled that of the French on the eve of their defeat in 1954. Since the beginning of U.S. armed aggression in Indochina, American strategists have scoffed at analogies with the French humiliation in Indochina. But history has shown that the U.S. with far greater manpower and material resources has done worse than the French.

This appears to be what is happening today. The Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam offered the U.S. a realistic, honorable solution for ending conflict in Vietnam in the seven-point peace plan put forward by PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh last July. However, the U.S. has not even deigned to answer it to the present day except by escalating the military struggle, by pushing its "Vietnamization" and "pacification" programs in South Vietnam, stepping up the air war throughout Indochina and attempting to strengthen the puppet forces in Laos and Cambodia.

Cambodia almost liberated

In the meantime, the pro-U.S. forces in Cambodia suffered devastating defeats and by the end of 1971, the Phnom Penh army began disintegrating, a process which is now accelerating. Despite the B-52s, the C-119 gunships and other deadly U.S. military hardware used to support the Phnom Penh forces, Cambodia is four-fifths liberated and, according to the latest reports, the pro-U.S. Cambodian troops are throwing down their guns and fleeing en masse from the combat zones.

While the Cambodian collapse was in progress, the Pathet Lao liberation forces continued their offensives which have reached the point where the CIA's army in Laos is retreating at every point where resistance is being offered, and the mercenary and puppet army, which was far stronger than the Phnom Penh army, also is beginning to crack and disintegrate.

Casual observers of the situation in Laos used to describe the struggle there as a "seesaw" battle. During the dry season Pathet Lao advances were conceded, but it was generally assumed that these gains were reversed during the wet season by use of U.S. air power supporting the CIA forces. However, this was not the real picture.

For many years the facts of the Laotian struggle were concealed from the American public—the systematic U.S. bombing of Laos which began in May 1964 and the huge CIA-directed military operations on the ground. Even more important was the incorrect portrayal of the military picture as a seesaw. U.S. airpower did cause the liberation forces to abandon some of their territorial gains, but it was not generally recognized that these were strategic retreats with losses of less significance than were annually inflicted on the pro-U.S. troops. While the CIA army was being ground to pieces, the liberated zones of Laos was being expanded and consolidated with the progressive elimination of CIA-mercenary bases from the liberated areas.

Since 1968, at least, it can be said that the tide had clearly turned and each year Pathet Lao gains were far greater than wet season advances of the pro-U.S. forces. In March 1968, the liberation forces in Laos overran an "impregnable" U.S. base on a mountain-top at Pha Thi in northern Laos, about 16 miles from the North Vietnamese border. The Pha Thi installation contained sophisticated radar equipment used by the U.S. to direct American planes to targets in North Vietnam. On one day liberation forces scaled the mountain's vertical face and the following day the base was completely annihilated with most of the personnel killed, wounded or taken prisoner. More than half of the U.S. Air Force's technicians on the base were killed, losses admitted by the U.S. only two years later.

While the U.S. has sought to use Laos as a strategic base for supporting its military operations against Vietnam, it hypocritically complains about North Vietnamese "intervention" in Laos.

Massive bombing

After the 1968 bombing halt over North Vietnam, the U.S. shifted the bulk of its aircraft to attacking Laos in a vain effort to stop the advance of the liberation forces, which have remained on the offensive to the present day.

During the summer of 1969, the U.S. attempted a desperate move, to retake the Plain of Jars which had been part of the liberated zone for years. Peaceful villages, whose inhabitants were prospering under the liberation administration, were obliterated by U.S. bombs. Thousands of the inhabitants who were unable to gain refuge in other liberated areas were forcibly seized and taken by U.S. aircraft to internment camps in the occupied zone. The commander of the CIA mercenaries, Gen. Vang Pao, moved into the empty plain and proclaimed a great victory. The U.S. transported equipment and reinforcements to the plain for several months. But when the Pathet Lao gave battle during the winter of 1970 Vang Pao's forces were smashed and retreated in panic even though they had all the air support they could use.

The Pathet Lao victory on the Plain of Jars was one of their greatest victories up to the time and was followed by important advances in the south at Saravane and other areas. The strategic Bolaven plateau. The

continued

world in revolution

Thailand

At least two U.S. B-52 bombers were damaged on Jan. 10 when guerrilla sappers with satchel charges attacked the giant U.S. airbase at Utapao, about 90 miles south of Bangkok, where some 6000 U.S. personnel are stationed. The information was supplied by Thai military spokesmen. At press time U.S. military authorities were still refusing to divulge any information on the raid. The attack came shortly after a visit to Thailand by Gen. Creighton Abrams, who reportedly was trying to persuade the Bangkok regime to send more Thai mercenary troops to bolster the CIA's decimated army in Laos. The Thai rulers are said to be reluctant to send more troops to Laos because of the growing strength of revolutionary forces in Thailand itself.

In a recent report on the Thai revolutionary movement in the Far Eastern Economic Review, Arnold Abrams wrote: "The guerrilla front has slipped southward through the mountains to the edge of Thailand's vast central plain. Largely unnoticed by followers of Thai affairs, and unknown to the Thai public, advance guerrilla elements have moved into the southwestern section of Phetchabun: a significant geographical junction where the northern mountains meet the central plain."

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LAOTIAN DEFENSE IS SAID TO STIFFEN

Enemy Is Reported Under
Pressure at Long Tieng

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY

Special to The New York Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, Jan. 18—North Vietnamese troops who have been staging attacks in the Long Tieng area of northern Laos since New Year's Eve are reported to have been encountering increasing pressure in recent days from the Laotian defenders.

Most of the fighting has been on a high two-mile-long ridge overlooking the American-supported base, and there the Laotians were said to be advancing slowly, trying to drive the enemy out of bunkers in the central part of the ridge.

[Government troops have retaken nearly 500 feet of the ridge in heavy hand-to-hand combat, United Press International, quoting military sources in Vientiane.]

Involved in the fighting at Long Tieng are about 6,000 North Vietnamese who began their attacks on the base after having completed a sweep across the nearby Plaine des Jarres to the northeast.

The defenders—about 4,000 Meo tribesmen in irregular units, regular Laotian forces and about 2,000 Thai volunteer soldiers paid indirectly by the United States Government—have been supported by bombing attacks from United States B-52 aircraft. The Thais were said to be manning artillery positions in support of the Laotians.

Airstrip Under Enemy Fire

With the base under continued enemy fire, the 5,000-foot airstrip is said to be usable only by helicopters and only at great risk.

Most Americans here think that the swift North Vietnamese attack across the Plaine des Jarres and against the main Government military stronghold at Long Tieng is an effort to crush the American-supported irregular forces and alter the political balance between the Government and the Communists decisively. If this succeeds, it is felt, the Government of Prince Souvanna Phouma may be forced to tell the Americans they may no longer bomb the principal Communist infiltration routes through southern Laos into South Vietnam and Cambodia.

In southern Laos, too, in the area east of Pakse, Government forces have been driven westward.

At present, American observers here say they see no indication that the Communist offensive is having the desired effect on Premier Souvanna Phouma and maintain that it will not succeed unless Long Tieng falls.

"We think now that we may have some chance, probably a little less than 50-50, of holding them off," one American observer said. But others said there were no plans at present to reposition the base, even if its position is saved, and there is the beginning of a suggestion in official circles here that the American strategy of bolstering Laotian forces with guerrillas backed by the Central Intelligence Agency is proving ineffective.

Laotian Air Force Assisting

"Air power is about the only thing keeping them going now," one source said. In addition to the B-52's, the Americans are operating C-134 gunships and F-4 Phantoms from bases in Thailand and the Laotians are dropping American bombs with their 40-plane air force.

Most supply and troop transport missions for the Laotians are performed by charter planes flown by Air America from Vientiane and Thailand. One of these planes went down a few weeks ago for unknown reasons in northern Laos in an area where 20,000 Chinese are building and defending a road from the border toward the Mekong River.

Another small Air America plane "took fire" several days ago over the same area while it was dropping leaflets in an effort to solicit information about the lost transport, an American official said today.

But he could not say whether the ground fire came from Chinese troops defending the road or from pro-Communist Pathet Lao forces in the mountainous area, which is completely under Communist control. American planes are normally forbidden to fly over the road, which has been under construction for two years.

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*International News***Demands grow for Viet peace**

Both the Italian and French peace committees have stepped up activities in support of the Indochinese people's efforts to end the U.S. aggression in their countries. The French Peace Committee called for world support of the conference, scheduled in mid-February in Versailles, to mobilize international public opinion against the Nixon Government's "automated warfare" against the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. In Rome, a meeting of the National Italian Peace Committee on Jan. 16 adopted a call to all peace partisans to expose the U.S. aggression. The meeting was followed by a demonstration of thousands of Italians demanding an end to the U.S. aggression.

In Indochina, the CIA "special forces" in Laos attempted to recapture the big base of Long Cheng, but were hurled back. Fighting continued around Pakse in southern Laos. In Saigon, President Nguyen Van Thieu's puppet commander Lt. Gen. Ngo Dzu said he expected a heavy offensive by liberation forces at Tet, which begins Feb. 15. Gen. Dzu said his troops would have to have reinforcements.

E - 144,254
S - 164,048

JAN 18 1972

In the Laos Disaster, A Crisis For Nixon

By Nasrollah S. Fatemi

UNDER THE HEADING "The Unreported War in Laos Could Become a New Vietnam," it was reported in this column last Oct. 19: "Seldom has the Senate of the United States been so disturbed and distressed as in the case of the secret war waged in Laos by the CIA. This war, which has never been reported to the public or authorized by the Congress, is run in most respects directly from the American embassy in Vientiane."

The North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao during the last four weeks have driven the Meo and Thai forces from the Plaine des Jarres and the Bolven plateau and at this time are attacking Ban Nihk, a key government position in the south, and Long Tieng, the strongest center of the CIA and Meo-Thai forces in the north. The 32,000-man Meo army of General Vang Pao is now reduced to fewer than 5,000 and the 7,500 Thai volunteers have disappeared. At present more than 80 per cent of the country is occupied by Chinese and North Vietnamese.

The Chinese have occupied the northern part and are building a new road toward Park Beng on the Mekong. This new road puts most of northern Laos under Chinese domination. The number of Chinese troops in the northern area is close to 25,000. The concentration of anti-aircraft and associated radar installations along the road, which is now spreading to central and southern Laos, makes this area one of the most heavily defended in Asia. The United States air command in Indochina has declared this area off limits to United States aircraft.

THE NORTH VIETNAMESE are capable of attacking both Vientiane and the Royal Capital. The number of Pathet Laos and North Vietnamese forces is close to 200,000. Many observers of the Indochina scene at the United Nations believe that the North Vietnamese at this time do not want to take over Laos. Their purpose is to prove that neither Vietnamization nor use of 2,161,000 tons of bombs in Indochina since January 1969 has succeeded in blunting their aggressiveness.

They also want to present President Nixon in February with a Laotian government ready to ask the United States to withdraw from Laos. The recent election of the national assembly in the cities under CIA control shows that the people of Laos are tired of war and bombs. Voters turned against old members who support war and defeated 60 per cent of them. The election showed a deep-seated dissatisfaction with war and a yearning for peace at any price.

The other reason for this attack is to secure a free corridor through the western reach of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, already protected by anti-aircraft and surface to air missiles.

I PERSONALLY BELIEVE that the North Vietnamese attacks in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam have the complete support of Communist China. Its purpose is to embarrass President Nixon during his visit to Peking, to weaken his bargaining position, and to present him with a fait accompli. In addition the Chinese are trying to prove that Washington's whole Indochina strategy, from the invasion of Cambodia and Laos to the continuous bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the intensive bombing of the north and Vietnamization, has been a dismal failure.

For three years the CIA has trained, armed, clothed, and fed the Laotian army. It has organized at a cost of more than \$100 million a year the irregular forces of General Vang Pao, the Meo commander. This irregular army was larger than the Royal Lao army. Its cost, according to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has tripled in the past two years.

At present there is no effective central government functioning Laos. The United States provides not only for all of Laos's defense needs but for day to day salaries and the cost of the government.

The total budget of the Laos government on paper is \$36.6 million. The estimated expenditures of the United States in Laos surpasses \$700 million.

WHATEVER be the speculations as to the future, two points are very clear at this juncture:

- As long as there is no settlement in Vietnam and the war is continued, Laos and Cambodia will remain a hostage available to the Chinese and the North Vietnamese. At the same time the area under government control shrinks steadily, the cost to the American taxpayer increases, the number of refugees and destroyed villages and towns soars, and the whole area plunges into chaos.

- The North Vietnamese with the support of Chinese and Soviet arms have again outmaneuvered our Pentagon strategists, have armed offensive yet, in order to show that all

our human sacrifices, \$200 billion of expenditures, and ten years of military effort have changed very little in southeast Asia. These and many other thoughts will haunt President Nixon between now and his visit to Peking. My ardent prayer is that both the President and Professor Kissinger be aware of the maze of Oriental diplomacy which has bewildered, confused, plagued, and destroyed some of the greatest diplomats and statesmen.

Any adjustment, settlement, and arrangement for the future of Asia must be based on a realistic, just, and enduring peace.

Dr. Nasrollah S. Fatemi is Distinguished Professor of International Affairs and director of the Graduate Institute of International Studies at Fairleigh Dickinson University.

STATINTL

Laotians Make Gains Despite Grave Situation

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Jan. 17—Most informed observers in this capital are frankly amazed at the Laotian army's continuing will to fight after being driven from the Bolovens Plateau during what was the heaviest combat ever faced by Laotian troops.

They are also amazed at the success this week of Gen. Vang Pao's Meo-Thai irregulars in tenaciously holding on to a 15-square-mile area around the CIA base at Long Cheng, 80 miles north of here. At last report from the U.S. embassy in Vientiane, the Communist drive to wrest control of Long Cheng from Vang Pao's Meo tribesmen and his CIA sponsors appears to be slackening after Laotian reserves and reinforcements took the offense in hand-to-hand fighting to regain tactical control of key terrain.

Skyline Ridge, a 10,000-yard strip of high ground along the north rim of Long Cheng Valley, has been the center of Laotian efforts for the past three days, with Gen. Vang Pao's troops attempting to plug enemy infiltration routes into the valley.

Sources here say the Meo-Thai forces are doing well and that a major infiltration route through the ridge at its center has been retaken. Laotian troops are continuing eastward against an enemy battalion still on the ridge and threatening the valley.

Although about 150 enemy infiltrators remain in Long Cheng Valley, it is in progovernment hands, U.S. sources say.

Late last week the Communist Radio Pathet Lao announced capture of Long Cheng village by its forces and claimed its flag was flying in the valley.

There appears no question that the government holds Long Cheng and its troops are making headway in establishing better control of the surrounding terrain.

The situation at Long Cheng remains grave, however, with upwards of 15,000 enemy troops with heavy weapons maneuvering through the valleys and gorges against the estimated 9,000 Meo, Thai and Lao troops attempting to hold the valley and its defensive network.

BATTLE CREEK, MICH.
ENQUIRER & NEWS

JAN 17 1972
E - 40,908
S - 44,235

New attacks may cast embarrassing shadows

North Vietnam's leaders, whatever we may think of them, are resilient and not lacking in shrewdness. They are aware of the threat President Nixon's Peking visit poses to their success in South Vietnam. And they now have managed, after so many defeats in battle, to launch another offensive — one which may prove embarrassing to the President as he prepares to meet with Mao and Chou En-lai.

The offensive began about two weeks before Christmas, as North Vietnamese regulars attacked suddenly and with massive force the Plain of Jars in Laos. They were opposed by native forces supported by American arms and CIA advisers, which proved to be little more of a match than the hapless Cambodians to the south. The attack was the biggest and swiftest launched by Hanoi in the long history of military contest for the Plain of Jars, which has changed hands every year in the last 10.

A few days later, an equally heavy attack was mounted on the south of Laos, it too meeting with quick and decisive success.

The purpose of the attacks seems to have been the clearing of

the Ho Chi Minh trails. And, with the help of a newly aggressive air force of Mig-21 fighters and surface-to-air missiles, Hanoi seems to have achieved its objective. The heaviest American bombing of the war — including that of North Vietnam — has been unsuccessful in countering the enemy drives.

As a result, North Vietnam will soon be prepared to attack strongly somewhere in South Vietnam. The attack could come in one of several areas, but U.S. predictions are that the Central Highlands will be the field of battle. There Hanoi's troops can be well supplied and have the least worthy South Vietnamese opposition — defense forces considered the most lackluster of all Saigon's troops.

The attack may never come. Hanoi may still be thwarted. But the probability is that it will, and that it will meet with at least limited success. That prospect is not one which President Nixon can relish. For it would place him in a weaker bargaining position both in Peking and Paris, and possible cast such a shadow on the efficacy of his Vietnamization program as to revive the war as a major issue at home.

STATINTL

NOTHING TO STOP ENEMY

Reds Near Laos River Town

BY JACK FOISIE

Times Staff Writer

PAKSE, Laos—The war is closer to this Mekong River town in southern Laos than ever before.

Both the Lao government troops and their U.S. supporters seem resigned that if the North Vietnamese want to push all the way to the banks of the Mekong in this region, nothing is going to stop them.

As in northern Laos, the North Vietnamese force moving toward Pakse—some 3,000 men—started its annual dry season offensive earlier than in past years—and the push is stronger.


The enemy recovered all of the strategic Bolovens Plateau with the taking of Paksong on Dec. 27. They advanced farther toward Pakse with the fall of Ban Nhik, a week later. Now the "front" is only 20 miles away. There have been ambushes on the road within 12 miles of town.

Doubts Showing

The signs of doubt that the Royal Lao Army can hold are beginning to show. Since Paksong fell, 11,000 new refugees have streamed into town to escape the North Vietnamese.

Many see safety only on the west side of the Mekong in this lower reach of the river where it is not the border with Thailand. A thin slice of Laos lies to the west.

On New Year's Eve a decision was made to eva-



THREATENED—With plateau in Red control following fall of Pak Song, front is now only 20 miles from Pakse.

Times map

cuate all foreign families. Fifty-three women, children and nonessential men, mostly Americans, were flown out. About 35 U.S. military, Central Intelligence Agency personnel, aid workers and others remain.

Those who carry on are realists. One of the civilians long in Laos explained why he had his "bug-out

bag" all packed:

"The Laos army in this area has never improved. Its leadership is shattered by politics and corruption is as bad as anywhere in Laos. The troops don't want to fight and have no faith that they can."

There are a few Americans who believe that this is still a Yo-Yo war. They note that Paksong also fell to the enemy last May, causing Pakse families to be evacuated then also. Last year the North Vietnamese did not drive farther west. The rains came and Lao troops walked back into Paksong and stayed until their latest withdrawal.

Peking Visit

"What may have changed the game plan," a pessimistic American official said, "is President Nixon's upcoming visit to Peking, and also that this is a presidential election year."

There is the assumption that the North Vietnamese want to occupy as much of Laos as possible. Should the Nixon visit to Peking result in Chinese pressure on Hanoi in some way.

Hanoi's leaders would also like to saddle Mr. Nixon with defeats in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam and so cause him political problems at home and abroad — dimming his chances for reelection.

It is also believed here that the North Vietnamese would like to cut Highway 13 between Pakse and the Cambodian border, and use the Mekong River, which parallels the road,

as another route for supplying Red units in Cambodia.

The faulty condition of the Lao army in the south, after more than a decade of U.S. assistance and advice, can only be explained in terms of the divisiveness and immorality in Laos.

The war here is being fought in what amounts to a fiefdom of the Champassack family, itself divided but with its leader being bumptious Prince Boun Oum. He sneers at his fellow princes of other families. The national government of Premier Souvanna Phouma, also a prince, as a result gives the 4th Military Region (southern Laos) a low priority.

It is believed that Prince Boun Oum, should he be driven across the Mekong, would prefer to salvage the west side sliver of his domain by seeking the protection of Thailand rather than remain under the nominal banner of the Vientiane government.

The Champassacks, composed of many half-brothers through various liaisons of the clan members, feud among themselves, but one or another controls, or takes a cut, of almost all trade and transportation in southern Laos.

It is well known that before North Vietnamese troops began to dominate the war in the south, the Champassack army had its "arrangements" with the Pathet Lao insurgents, so that both sides survived with minimal fighting.

17 JAN 1972

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Lao Irregulars Gain Ground In Important Ridge Battle

STATINTL

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Star

VIENTIANE — Lao irregulars and North Vietnamese infantry have been fighting at close quarters along Skyline Ridge overlooking the U.S. Air Force and CIA base at Long Cheng 75 miles north of here in the past 72 hours, well-informed military sources say.

Lao forces advanced about 200 yards at a cost of 5 dead and 22 seriously wounded against an estimated reinforced battalion of Vietnamese dug in on bunkers along 4,000 yards of the 10,000 yard ridge-line.

Thirty Vietnamese were killed in this action, sources said.

Skyline Ridge is the key to the Long Cheng Defense. The North Vietnamese seized all but the western end Friday and infiltrated into Long Cheng valley through a gap in the center.

U.S. air and Lao strikes — including, according to Lao military sources, a B52 strike north of Skyline which frightened allied troops because of its closeness to them — ham-

pered North Vietnamese positions.

The B52 strike prevented the North Vietnamese from reinforcing its units.

Following the strikes Lao irregulars with U.S. advisers on the ground, attacked and took the center of the ridge Saturday, stopping North Vietnamese infiltration into Long Cheng.

A U.S. Embassy spokesman said no Americans were killed in the action.

U.S. sources said the American ground advisers are "case officers" concerned with operational and logistic command of the Lao irregulars.

These sources said the

Americans were not in the forefront of the infantry combat, but were stationed well back, observing the fighting and calling air strikes.

These advisers are contract personnel employed by the CIA. They are armed with pistols and submachineguns as are most Americans here in Laos where Communist soldiers can appear suddenly at any airstrip in the Meo hill country.

Although Hanoi still controls the eastern 4,000 yards of the ridges, American and Lao helicopters still are able to land "at some risk," according to a U.S. spokesman.

WASHINGTON POST

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Chinese Fire Hits Plane Over Laos

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Jan. 15—An over Laos is considered some of the most hazardous in the world by seasoned pilots. Flying over the Chinese road is considered almost suicidal sources here say. The pilot was seriously wounded.

An Air America C-123 on a leaflet dropping mission over a road being built by Chinese engineers in Laos, 175 miles northwest of Vientiane, was hit by Chinese air defenses along the road, the sources say, wounding at least two of the plane's crew including the pilot.

The sources said the plane's crew was dropping leaflets over the Chinese road. The leaflets offered a substantial reward in gold for information leading to the location of wreckage and occupants of another Air America C-123 lost last month in the area and possibly hit by Chinese groundfire.

Air America announced a week ago that emergency search and rescue operations for the downed aircraft with three Americans and one Laotian aboard had been suspended though a routine area alert would be maintained.

Air America is an American airline specializing in contract work for the U.S. government, mainly the CIA. Reliable sources in Vientiane said last month that the C-123 lost near the Chinese road was on a clandestine "drop" mission, carrying supplies to an intelligence gathering base northeast of the road.

Suicidal Flights

Because of groundfire, weather and terrain, flying

"Normally the air space over the Chinese road is strictly 'off limits' to American planes, official sources here say, due to a concentration of Chinese antiaircraft weaponry along its length.

Installation of the antiaircraft weapons resulted from unauthorized bombing of the road in 1969, sources here say.

Construction of the road by Chinese engineer crews has been in progress for the past four years, having been agreed to by Laotian Prime Minister Prince Souvanna Phouma.

The road has now reached a point about 30 miles north of Pakbeng on the Mekong River. Beyond its present terminal point, a trail exists that is barely passable for wheeled vehicles, informed U.S. sources say, but they doubt it is being used for transport purposes.

Laos Army Reeling Under Viet Attacks

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE

Special to The Star

VIENTIANE—Laotian and American officials say the situation in Laos is now extremely serious as hard fighting continues in the northern half of this mountain kingdom.

Lao officials say the war is falling into the centuries-old pattern of fighting between Thais and Vietnamese for control of the east bank of the Mekhong River.

The Laotians fear this time their country will be split between their Thai and Vietnamese neighbors with the lion's share going to the North Vietnamese. The Thais are steadily being dragged into the war because of mounting Lao and Meo battle casualties.

As the Laotian and tribal units are steadily pushed west by the North Vietnamese army, the Thais are more inclined to interfere because they fear the Mekhong Valley will fall to Hanoi and their own national security will be seriously threatened. The Laotians desperately need Thai help because their heavy losses in combat are wiping out their own manpower, making it impossible for them to continue the war alone.

In this second Indochina war, which for Laos began in early 1963, Lao and Meo casualties have been horrendous, particularly in the past four years. Laotian estimates say 27,000 Lao and Meo have been killed in action or so seriously wounded as to be unable to fight again.

United States policy has been another factor causing the Thais to enter the Laotian war faster than they might have. The United States pays the Thais to fight in Laos as part of the Nixon Doctrine of using Asian troops to fight Hanoi.

The Laotians are becoming so desperate now, with casualties running at 25 dead per day in battles around Long Cheng, 75 miles northeast of here, that the Thais are very welcome.

Another factor in the Laos manpower situation is the lack of any meaningful conscription laws. Even with Thai help expected to double to 12,000 or one division by March 1, the North Vietnamese are still winning the contest.

Known Thai battle deaths in Laos since Dec. 18 are 672 killed in action.

sons. They fear the Laotians will give way to the North Vietnamese because of high casualties and because Hanoi is in the best military ground position it has been in any dry season.

The North Vietnamese are battering at Long Cheng Valley now, two months before they normally would have reached there, leaving them four months more to advance before the rainy season turns their supply routes into a morass.

The Laos dry season weather is a tremendous asset to Hanoi. The weather enters Laos from the northeast and North Vietnam making Hanoi weather forecasting for North Laos extremely accurate and allowing Hanoi to gear its offensives to cloudy, rainy, foggy weather when the U.S. Air Force is relatively ineffective.

Foggy in the Morning

From Laotian hill positions fog can be seen gathering in the valleys by 2:30 a.m. By 4 a.m. the fog has crept up the hillsides until everything is enmeshed in dripping wet clouds. This could last till 11 a.m. and North Laos skies in January and February are often overcast for days.

By March warm weather drives away the fog but it is replaced by thick dust clouds up to 10,000 feet high leaving the sun a hanging red orb in the sky with all living things gasping for breath. This dust is caused by farmers burning off land combined with high-pressure windless weather which prevents dust and smoke from moving. Then in May comes the monsoon with heavy clouds and rain, again giving Hanoi troops excellent cover and allowing them to fight with supplies they moved up in dry season.

Because of the weather and casualty factors, Ameri-

can officials say Hanoi has thrown an additional division into North Laos this year.

New Armor, Artillery

Also, the Communists have new long-range artillery and light armor, and are showing increasing willingness to use the air force of MIGs based just across the Laos border. American Embassy officials believe Hanoi will try to smash the Meo forces and allow the Pathet Lao to advance to the 1960 ceasefire line 60 miles north of here at the same time widening the Ho Chi Minh Trail system in South Laos—perhaps all the way across the Laos panhandle.

Then the North Vietnamese will wait to see the political results of their campaign, officials believe.

In internal Laotian politics, authoritative American official sources see Prince Souvanna Phouma, the Premier, at the fulcrum of power to his left is the peace faction who are aghast at Laotian losses and would like to make peace with Hanoi, call for a U.S. bombing halt in Laos and allow the Pro-Communist Pathet Lao more seats in the Vientiane government. To Souvanna's right are the generals, also aghast at territorial and manpower losses, but whose solution is to dispense with the tattered cloak of neutrality and sign open agreements for full-scale military help with South Vietnam and Thailand.

Balance Helps the Prince

American officials say that currently these two factions balance each other out, leaving Souvanna firmly in power.

But there are several imponderables. One is the makeup of the new Laotian National Assembly elected Jan. 2. Almost all incumbents lost and many new faces entered. Those political views are unknown be-

Continued

Vientiane Tranquil Despite War

By Peter Osnos

Washington Post Foreign Service

VIENTIANE, Jan. 14—Several hundred neatly dressed Laotian students paraded down Vientiane's main boulevard yesterday morning chanting slogans at impassive riot police while shoppers and office workers looked on with amusement.

The biggest Communist offensive of the Laotian war is under way, according to American military assessments, but these students were disturbed because the exclusive French lycee they attend is changing the procedure for taking exams.

Vientiane has always been strangely removed from the fighting going on around it and now, although the situation in the northeast and to the south is worse than ever, the city remains probably the quietest and least warlike capital in Southeast Asia.

Communist Pathet Lao soldiers stride purposefully across a downtown intersection from one of their villas to another and no one pays any attention. At the North Vietnamese embassy there is a reception for left-wing journalists and U.S. "aggression" is denounced.

Defense Minister-delegate Sissouk Na Champassak spends as much time in his job as minister of finance as he does on military affairs and keeps his regular tennis dates with diplomatic friends.

The ministry of defense itself, a large brick building on the outskirts of town, is a textbook of disorganization. The functionaries, closeted in small offices poring over stacks of papers are genial but bemused. From Friday evening to Monday morning, their offices are closed.

National Assembly Election

Earlier this month, there was an election in government-held areas for a new National Assembly to take office in the spring. Forty of 60 incumbents were defeated including some backed by Laos' powerful princely families.

The assembly has little authority and has changed nothing. Americans, however, pronounced themselves pleased that the

contest went off smoothly and public resentment against some of the aristocrats was expressed.

The Pathet Lao radio denounced the balloting bitterly as a fraud and a sham, but then acknowledged that even so, the people had managed to make themselves heard. That being said, the elections have been promptly forgotten.

The only real issue after all is the war. The responsibility for coping with that falls very largely on 70-year-old Prince Souvanna Phouma who for 10 years has struggled vainly to restore some semblance of meaning to the neutralist coalition established at the 1962 Geneva conference.

The currently dismal military and diplomatic situation has Souvanna more worried than ever before, confidants say, if only because the positions of all those he is trying to deal with have hardened.

Brother's Letter

The most recent letter from his Pathet Lao half-brother Prince Souphanouvong (received on Dec. 18, the day the Communist offensive began) was a virtual ultimatum for surrender and insisted that there be a complete cease-fire and a total cessation of the U.S. bombing before peace talks begin.

A bombing halt would, of course, apply to the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and the Americans, who keep what is left of Laos going with military and economic aid and advice, would scarcely agree to that.

Faced with the always present possibility that Laos might collapse, threatening President Nixon's Indochina policies, Americans, too, are very concerned about the intensity of this year's offensive.

Many, however, take the optimistic view that there are limitations to what the Communists have in mind and conditions will ease once these objectives have been achieved.

By this reckoning, what the North Vietnamese are determined to have is undisputed control of the north-vaunted Central Intelligence Agency base at Long Cheng and crippling the remnants

of Gen. Vang Pao's CIA supported Army of Meo tribesmen.

To the south, the Communists are determined that the Laotians will no longer be in a position to harass their activities on the trail from the Bolovens Plateau.

Maximum Impact

Furthermore, say the Americans, the Communists want to make their splash now so it will have the maximum impact on Mr. Nixon's visit to Peking and the first presidential primaries in the United States.

Then, it is hoped, the enemy will settle back, confident that they have bloodied the Laotians and discouraged the Americans sufficiently so that no effort will be made to reclaim their losses until next summer, at the earliest.

Those Americans willing to discuss (but never for attribution) the present grim picture and the prospects ahead are the diplomats in Vientiane and a few authorized military men from the army attache's office.

Advisers in the field, on the other hand, especially the CIA men who supervise virtually the entire effort in the northeast, will say nothing and are not friendly to outsiders.

Ban Son, 70 miles north of Vientiane, is a refugee center with an airstrip and supply depot that began operating in March, 1970, in a valley not far from Long Cheng. It was a favored place to take visiting journalists who wanted to see what the United States was doing for the thousands of displaced mountain people.

There is a primitive but clean hospital with a doctor from the U.S. Agency for International Development. There is also a small mess where advisers and pilots of CIA-operated Air America can get cheeseburgers and cold beer.

Ban Son's Function

In the past two weeks as Long Cheng has come under increasing pressure, the function of Ban Son has changed greatly. Now it is the center of the military support effort for the northeast and the CIA contingent has moved up and is stalled in trailers along the airstrip.

Huge C-130 Air America

transports (rented from the Air Force), along with a half dozen other types of smaller aircraft and vintage H-34 helicopters, stream into the valley carrying supplies, ammunition and soldiers.

Ban Son is now the official headquarters for the Second Military Region but because of its location it is almost undefendable as a military installation. For the first time in a year, it was penetrated by a guerrilla squad and struck by rockets earlier this week.

There is talk, rumor at this stage, that Ban Son will soon have to be evacuated as the enemy sweeps southward past Long Cheng. As it is, the CIA men are not spending their nights there.

Meo's Role

Over the years, as the pace of fighting in the northeast has quickened, it has been the Meos who carried the brunt for the government. Lately, their ranks have become depleted and Laotian reinforcements who have filled out the units all are very young.

At the hospital in Ban Son, there is a young Meo soldier who had his hand and part of his face blown away at Long Cheng. He is 19 and has been a soldier for three years. Another wounded soldier, a two-year veteran, was 15.

At the start of the offensive, military sources fixed the number of Meo-Laotian soldiers in the northeast at 8,000, mostly in small units guarding firebases along the Plain of Jars and around Long Cheng. Another 3,000-4,000 Thai irregulars were also on duty.

As badly as the Meos were mauled in the fighting around the plain and more recently around Long Cheng, sources report that the Thais have taken proportionately greater casualties. One fire support base on the plain had 500 Thai soldiers when the battle began, according to a Meo officer. In the end only 18 came out.

The Thais, who the Americans steadfastly maintain are all volunteers, are used primarily as artillerymen with close support troops. Their reputation as fighters is not good. They are often undisciplined

STATINTL

Big CIA base seized by patriots in Laos

Daily World Foreign Department
from combined news sources

The Laotian Patriotic Front said yesterday that "the Lao People's Liberation Army Wednesday overran Long Cheng, the last stronghold of special forces and Thai mercenaries in the Plain of Jars area."

"The enemy forces," it stated, "were annihilated in large numbers and the rest fled in panic with the Liberation Army after them."

Long Cheng was the main base of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in north central Lao. Situated 80 miles northeast of Vientiane, it was used at great cost to American taxpayers for the recruitment and training of so-called "special forces" and Thai mercenaries to raid the liberated two-thirds of Laos under control of the Laotian Patriotic Front (Neo Lao Haksat).

Charge million being deported
In Paris, a spokesman of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam charged that the U.S. and the Saigon clique were removing by force "a million inhabitants of South Vietnam from provinces to regroup them in concentration camps in provinces further south."

In Washington, President Nixon announced he was withdrawing 70,000 U.S. troops from Vietnam over the next three months, leaving an estimated 69,000 troops which Defense Secretary Melvin Laird said may not be withdrawn "until the POW situation is resolved."

Laird also said the U.S. will continue to use air power "to protect the armed forces who remain in South Vietnam."

A spokesman of the Royal Laotian U.S.-dominated puppet regime in Vientiane disputed the Pathet Lao claim to have captured Long Cheng, but admitted defenders of the CIA base had lost three peripheral positions Wednesday to the Lao liberation forces, and another the day before.

The Lao liberation forces also struck at Ban Son, 20 miles southwest of Long Cheng and a fall-back base for the CIA's spe-

cial forces and a supply point combat troops by May 1. Laird said the Saigon military forces were now operating 1,000 aircraft and are flying "all combat support sorties." He predicted the troops of the Nguyen Van Thieu clique would win 75 percent of the battles in future because "they have the training, they have the equipment, they have the capability to do the job."

Gen. Vang Pao, the U.S.-trained former French and Japanese collaborator, who commanded the Meo special forces, was reported to have fled by plane to Vientiane, abandoning his troops.

Sam Thong, another CIA strong-point seven miles northwest of Long Cheng, was also in the hands of the Lao liberation forces.

In southern Laos, liberation forces surrounded Royal Laotian Army puppet troops 15 miles from Pakse and kept up attacks on puppet positions on Highway 23. The puppet commander at Pakse, Brig. Gen. Sutchai Vongsavan, vowed to "defend Pakse at all costs."

The accusation that one million South Vietnamese were being moved by U.S. and Saigon forces was made by acting Hanoi negotiator Nguyen Van Tien at the 140th session of of the Paris talks on Vietnam. The vast deportation project would be accomplished by air transport, according to the Hanoi spokesman and his counterpart of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam.

They said they desired "to draw public attention to this crime in order to stop it." They charged President Nixon with making "propaganda and electoral publicity" in promising to wind down the war. They called on the U.S. negotiator to begin serious negotiations on the peace proposal made last year by the representative of the PRG.

In his comment on Nixon's pledge to withdraw 70,000 U.S.

OMAHA, NEBR.
WORLD HERALD

M - 125,376
S - 273,394
JAN 14 1972

Omaha World-Herald, Friday, Jan. 14, 1972

Artillery Threatens CIA Base in Laos

From World-Herald Press Services.

Communist troops in Laos packed by heavy barrages from Russian-made artillery continued to pry key areas around Long Cheng from government hands, and the Pathet Lao radio said the CIA guerrilla base had already fallen.

U.S. sources here denied the Communist claim.

A Defense Ministry spokesman said heavy fighting within 72 hours would decide the fate of the key government stronghold — the headquarters of Gen. Van Pao's Meo tribesmen — 80 miles northwest of Vientiane.

Acting defense minister Sisouk Na Champassack told United Press International that the fall of Long Cheng will pave the way for Communist infiltration into Vientiane.

In South Vietnam enemy ground forces struck hard at governmental outposts Thursday in the third day of intensified fighting, and mortar shells hit two U.S. positions at Da Nang.

In other developments, U.S. planes exchanged missiles with antiaircraft positions inside North Vietnam, and a new allied sweep was launched in southern Cambodia.

The South Vietnamese command reported 26 more enemy attacks in the past 24 hours,

making a three-day total of 86. This is the highest level of enemy action since last October, the Associated Press reported.

In the air war, two Air Force F105 fighter-bombers flying escort for B52 bombers on raids against North Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos fired three air-to-ground missiles Wednesday at a Soviet-built surface-to-air missile battery about 40 miles north of the demilitarized zone.

About 3,000 Cambodian soldiers and their families, fleeing from the fallen base at Krek, 10 miles from South Vietnam's border, jammed truck convoys entering Tay Ninh Province northwest of Saigon.

Krek was abandoned by the Cambodians after South Vietnamese troops pulled out earlier this week to take up positions closer to Saigon in expectation of enemy attacks.

The U.S. Command reported five Americans were killed in action and 47 wounded last week. The total is about the average for the past three months. Eleven Americans died from nonhostile causes.

The South Vietnamese command said 221 government troops were killed and 497 wounded last week. The allied commands reported 803 enemy killed.

PORTLAND, ORE.

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M - 245,132
S - 407,186

JAN 14 1972

McCloskey proves more than one-issue candidate during quick Oregon visit

By HARRY BODINE

of The Oregonian staff

STANDING with his back to a fireplace on the Oregon State campus in Corvallis last Sunday night, GOP presidential hopeful Paul McCloskey invited questions from 150 persons in the room.

They don't have to be friendly, he said, and the first one lofted from the audience wasn't.

"Who is paying you?" a young man asked.

McCloskey, a California congressman, replied that one third of his 1972 campaign fund so far came from Los Angeles industrialist Norton Simon, another third from contributors in the \$1,000 to \$5,000 range, the last third in small sums.

The 44-year-old challenger asked for questions at all his Oregon appearances in a two-day schedule. They ranged widely beyond his two main campaign themes — a termination of the Vietnam War and more truthfulness in government.

In essence McCloskey's view on Vietnam is that the Nixon Administration is prolonging the war to keep the Thieu government in power until the November, 1972, election.

American casualties are down, he granted, but the scope of the war through aerial bombardment is high with the civilian populations of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos — not Communist forces — taking the brunt of the bombing.

He would end the war subject to one stipulation — return of American prisoners now held by the Communists.

On truthfulness in government McCloskey believes the Nixon Administration, like the Johnson Administration, is increasing the flow of information designed to sell a viewpoint rather than inform.



BODINE

He said he was frustrated as a congressman to vote for Defense Department appropriation bills for two years not realizing each contained \$1 billion for financing a Central Intelligence Agency-directed war in Northern Laos.

The CIA, he believes, should carry out its stated purpose — gather intelligence.

The administration, McCloskey said, withheld information on the SST, on the environmental impact of the Anichitka

nuclear blast and even economic statistics routinely made available for a generation.

The country can't survive, McCloskey believes, when the average American doesn't trust his government to tell the truth or feels it's concealing the truth. Recent polls, he added, show that 60 per cent of the public doubts governmental veracity.

On other issues:

Amnesty for Armed Forces deserters — It should be granted under specified conditions only after the war ends and the last prisoner returns home. The "conditions" include two years of federal service in social or environmental fields at minimum pay.

National Defense — The nation can't afford to relax its posture nor scrap its research and development as long as other nations (the Soviets) have generals who look with favor on a "knock-out" blow against the U.S.

The Draft — It should be retained to make certain the U.S. can meet its military needs.

McCloskey scored the Nixon Administration for allowing Armed Forces morale to fall to the lowest point in the nation's history. That combined with 30,000 heroin addicts from Vietnam distress him as a former Marine Corps lieutenant colonel who earned the Navy Cross and Silver Star in Korean War combat. He wants peace, "but I'd fight to preserve human liberty again."

Land Use Policy — A national land use policy is needed. So is a national energy policy in order to conserve re-

sources and preserve American environment.

Tax Reform — Property taxes may be removed as a financial source for public schools in the aftermath of a California court decision. Congress should initiate tax from the national level with the income being the principal source of revenue.

Court Decisions — They should receive more than "minimal compliance" as on busing. So should decisions not desired by the Nixon Administration.

Civil Rights — The U.S. should practice what it preaches and enforce the laws.

The Press — It should agree with the Washington Post and dispense with background briefings that allow government officials to make statements and not be accountable for them later.

Population — It should be stabilized for the future good of the country and

its environment. Abortion should be legal with a woman having the ultimate choice of whether she bears a child.

Women's Rights — In the last year he reversed himself and voted for the Women's Rights amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Washington D.C. Crime Bill — It was necessary (McCloskey voted for it) even with "no-knock" provisions. There are times when society's welfare must come first. Wiretapping should be allowed only on a court warrant.

Cuba — The U.S. should recognize Castro.

Mideast — No quarrel with Nixon policy of an "even hand" between Israel and the Arabs. Israel must not be allowed to fall.

Parties — "Why don't you become a Democrat?" McCloskey was asked frequently in Oregon.

He has a traditional Republican distrust of government bureaucracy and a belief that an individual should be allowed to make his own decisions and control his own life, he replied.

Beyond that some of the Democratic Party's leadership doesn't inspire him.

The "Southern strategy" of the Nixon Administration is killing the GOP, he feels, citing new voter registrations.

What would a McCloskey "victory" in New Hampshire prove?

"That the Republican Party was worthwhile for the poor, young and blacks to join," he said.

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STATINTL

Lao Hunts Infiltrators Near Base

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Jan. 13—Gen. Vang Pao, commander of Meo and Thai irregulars in northeast Laos, has poured 2,000 troops into Long Cheng Valley to root out 150 Communist infiltrators operating in small groups through Long Cheng village while waiting for reinforcements.

Official U.S. sources, saying the next 48 to 72 hours will be decisive for operations against the infiltrators unless they are reinforced, categorically denied Radio Pathet Lao claims that Pathet Lao forces have captured the CIA-operated base 80 miles north of Vientiane. Calling the radio broadcasts monitored in Bangkok "propaganda to demoralize the Meo on the front line," the sources said, "There is absolutely no question of Long Cheng being occupied by Communist troops."

Reinforcements for the Communist troops are now attempting to infiltrate, but should they fail to arrive soon Vang Pao's troops will be able to corner and overwhelm those already present, the sources claim.

Twenty miles southwest of Long Cheng at Ban Son, a Communist demolition team, believed to be Pathet Lao, early this morning hit the outer perimeter of the temporary CIA headquarters with B-40 rockets and gunfire for 20 minutes inflicting light casualties on progovernment forces, informed sources in Vientiane announced.

Approximately 20 men were reported to have been in the attacking force at Ban Son, which replaced Long Cheng as the CIA field headquarters following the fall of the Plain of Jars and opening of the siege of Long Cheng in the past three weeks. No damage was inflicted on the facilities at Ban Son, the sources said, but it is believed in Vientiane that the attack, the first such in almost a year, will be the first of many in the near future and will force removal of the CIA headquarters soon.

12 JAN 1972

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STATINTL

Saigon invaders flee back from Cambodia

Daily World Foreign Department
from combined press sources

Saigon President Nguyen Van Thieu's troops yesterday gave up another Cambodian campaign and fled back to safer terrain near Saigon.

Troops of the puppet Lon Nol regime were ordered to take the place of the Saigon forces in Cambodia's rubber area, but these followed the Saigon troops in flight over the border into South Vietnam.

Alibi for the new rout was issued by Thieu's military aides, who claimed a major offensive against Saigon positions would be launched by Vietnam freedom fighters next month. Thieu himself has predicted that liberation troops will launch a general offensive throughout all Indochina to coincide with President Nixon's February visit to Peking.

Lao puppets in trouble

Simultaneously with the Saigon troops' flight from Cambodia, the Vientiane puppet government military forces reported the loss of key positions in both northern and southern Laos and said the U.S.-Vientiane military position was deteriorating badly.

Pathet Lao bomb squads on Monday penetrated the defense perimeter of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) base at Long Cheng, and Vientiane puppet troops retreated several miles after abandoning Ban Nhik, an important position 18 miles from the South Laotian center of Pakse.

The Kaosan Pathet Lao news agency, in a report yesterday relayed from Hanoi, charged that U.S. Airforce planes sprayed toxic agents over the densely populated district of Muong Kham in Xienquang Province. The agency reported many casualties among the local population, with many Lao dying almost immediately and approximately 40 more dying later from the poison.

Hanoi newspapers also reported yesterday that the People's Liberation Armed Forces of South Vietnam on Sunday and Monday attacked Saigon troop positions

nine kilometers west of Saigon and the 11th motorized regiment of the U.S. Army 37 kilometers northwest of Saigon.

Patriots' 1971 report

South Vietnam People's Liberation Army sources say that in 1971 their regular and irregular forces put out of action and took prisoner 32,620 officers and men, destroyed 420 military vehicles and damaged or sank 149 ships and boats, shot down or destroyed on the ground 77 planes, and blew up 22 depots of ammunition and materiel.

The U.S. Command at Saigon said that a U.S. Airforce F-4 Phantom fighter-bomber was the target of two missiles near Sepone, a key hub of the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. The U.S. sources said the Phantom jet ducked out of range when the rising missiles were sighted.

Elsewhere, for the fourth time this year, a U.S. Airforce jet fighter carried out a so-called "protective reaction" strike against an anti-aircraft site in North Vietnam.

Before flying back to Saigon, the Thieu regime's ambassador to the Lon Nol clique, Tran Van Phuoc, told a UPI correspondent he was angry at Cambodian press reports denouncing the behavior of the Saigon puppet troops on Cambodian soil. The Saigon troops have been accused of looting, raping and violence against Cambodians for the past two years.

Col. Thach Chanh, commander of the Lon Nol puppet force ordered to take over from the fleeing Saigon troops, said his men would be quickly overrun without support of the Saigon forces and he would rather face prison than stay in the area without support.

Report flight from CIA base

The situation at Long Cheng was still unclear. Puppet troops of Vientiane's "Royal Laotian Army" were said to have abandoned the CIA base, headquarters of the Meo puppets and Thai mercenaries under nominal command of General Vang Pao. Whether or not the CIA-trained, equipped and commanded Meo and Thai forces had also fled could not be determined from U.S. news sources.

The U.S. news sources continue to follow the customary practice of attributing all major opposition in Laos to the "North Vietnamese," a deliberately chosen usage to deny the existence of indigenous patriotic forces and to uphold the U.S. rationale for its decades'-long aggression in Indochina.

Credibility of Saigon and U.S. Command news sources is also suspect in relation to the imminence of a general offensive by patriotic forces. Hanoi newspapers, emphasizing the increase of U.S. bombing and aggressive activity, indicate that the talk of a coming offensive by patriotic forces may be a cover. The increase in U.S. bombing comes at a time of growing rapprochement between Peking and Washington, it is noted.

WHAT'S NIXON UP TO IN INDOCHINA?

By Richard E. Ward

The people of Indochina are continuing to suffer a rain of death from the air because President Richard Nixon is trying to stave off a military defeat that could endanger his reelection.

That was the real purpose behind the five days of massive U.S. bombings of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam during Christmas week, an interpretation widely voiced in the American press.

Both the President and Defense Secretary Melvin Laird have threatened North Vietnam with further massive attacks, while other Pentagon spokesmen and U.S. military sources in Saigon have said they will almost be a certainty.

With the dry season in South Vietnam coinciding with the opening of the 1972 presidential campaign and Nixon's election-oriented diplomacy, it is evident that the U.S. command has been ordered to avoid a military disaster like the 1968 Tet offensive which ended Lyndon Johnson's political career. The paranoia in Washington has become even greater after recent grave defeats suffered by the U.S.-backed forces in Cambodia and Laos.

Immediately after the attacks against North Vietnam, the U.S. air armada shifted its main thrust against Laos. But stepped up U.S. bombing has been unable to halt the advance of armed forces of the Lao Patriotic Front besieging the largest base of CIA-commanded mercenaries at Long Chieng (south of the Plain of Jars), which was reported to be on the verge of collapse Jan. 4. Already most of the Meo and Thai mercenary forces have fled the base which is undergoing withering artillery fire that U.S. aircraft have been unable to silence in two weeks of heavy bombing.

Latest reports from South Vietnam indicate that the Saigon regime and U.S. command fear that an offensive by the Liberation Armed Forces may be imminent. A Saigon newspaper generally considered to be a mouthpiece for puppet President Nguyen Van Thieu boastfully said that Saigon forces are readying a counter-offensive that would defeat an offensive by the liberation forces expected before Nixon's visit to Peking in late February.

Whether the Liberation Armed Forces are actually planning a major military drive in South Vietnam is really unknown, but what is clear is that the stepped up bombing throughout Indochina demonstrates the sorry state of the much vaunted "Vietnamization" program and that Thieu's million-man army cannot meet either a major offensive or just a sustained drive on a moderate scale by the resistance forces.

"Well-placed administration sources," Neil Sheehan wrote in the Jan. 2 New York Times, say that "the administration is trying with air power to stave off a major military setback in Indochina, particularly during



Troop replacements.

sensitive election year. . . . Thus, when the military situation turned critical in Laos and Cambodia last month, with rapid enemy advances that threatened the pro-American governments, Mr. Nixon resorted to the one major military tool left to him"—U.S. airpower.

The Nixon administration is now enmeshed in the same insane logic of its predecessor. Having pursued a military victory to the point where its leading figures cannot shake off responsibility for their failures, the administration continues to press forward with the air war, hoping that it can buy enough time to avoid further military, political and diplomatic disasters before the U.S. election.

Nixon: all's well

As the rain of death continued in Indochina, Nixon sought to deceive American opinion about the administration's true aims. During a Jan. 2 TV interview with CBS correspondent Dan Rather, the President claimed that "our goal is to end American involvement in Vietnam before the end of this year and before the election" and that "our plans are working out."

But Nixon immediately contradicted himself by stating that if the Vietnamese did not come to terms with the U.S., a residual force of up to 35,000 U.S. troops would remain in Vietnam and continued air strikes against North Vietnam would be a possibility.

Taking advantage of his large TV audience, Nixon stated the only obstacle to total U.S. withdrawal was the American prisoners being held by the "enemy." Waxing at length on the POW question in an effort to depict it as the sole issue, Nixon said nothing about the Saigon

New 'Ugly' American in Laos

STATINTL

By T.D. Allman

Far Eastern Economic Review

Vientiane, Laos

When he arrived here to assume the office that makes him the most powerful man in Laos, U.S. ambassador George McMurtrie Godley III was faced with dismayed problems. On the military front, ever-increasing American involvement had failed to halt persistently successful communist advances. With the fall of Muong Soui, U.S.-Thai-Laotian base near the Plain of Jars, morale in Vientiane crumbled and America's whole policy of fighting a secret war in Laos seemed on the verge of being discredited.

Ambassador Godley was faced with several options ranging from withdrawal to dramatic escalation. Characteristically Godley chose to escalate and ordered CIA-run mercenary forces to invade the previously untouched and communist-dominated Plain of Jars. The ploy caught the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao off balance but the cost was high. It meant a major escalation of U.S. involvement in Indochina; it turned the once heavily populated Plain of Jars into a mercilessly bombed free-fire zone; and it made refugees of about 20,000 Laotians. Most importantly, the decision sparked a Senate investigation into America's furtive yet manifold presence in Laos.

In the two and a half years since his arrival, virtually all checks on the use of U.S. air power and military support have been eliminated and American military expenditure has been pushed from about \$250 million a year to almost \$400 million. Godley, who favors a military victory over Hanoi rather than a U.S. withdrawal, also backed last winter's disastrous U.S. supported South Vietnamese invasion of Laos, authorized CIA use of Laotian bases for operations in Cambodia and once summed up his approach to the Laotian problem by telling a group of visitors that "the only good communist is one six feet under the earth."

"Runs the country"

In Vientiane, Godley is the object of ceaseless speculation and comment. Invitations to his dinner table are more coveted than those of any Laotian official because, as one foreign resident remarked, "Godley runs this country."

The American ambassador does not give on-the-record interviews, but his public remarks alone make him one of the more colorful figures in the history of American involvement in Laos. Godley has continued the U.S. policy in Laos of supporting the civilian Premier, prince Souvanna Phouma. How much the American ambassador supports Laotian aspirations for neutrality and a way out of the Indochina war, is another matter. The Ambassador is known to regard his role in Laos as doing everything possible to help the U.S. defeat the Vietnamese communists. . . .

Godley's style of public service probably assumed its defining form in the mid-1960s, when he served as U.S. Ambassador to the Congo. As in Laos, Godley had at his command a clandestine force of U.S. warplanes and mercenaries. First as Deputy Chief of Mission and later as ambassador, Godley played a crucial role in crushing the Stanleyville uprising and building up President Mobutu as a military strongman the Americans could rely on. After two years in the State Department, where Godley reputedly chafed at being behind a desk rather than in a war zone, he was named in June 1969 to the post he coveted most—Laos.

In Laos, Godley frequently says that he has been in Laos since 1969.

putting down mutinies by African tribesmen. On one occasion he grabbed a non-white fellow ambassador from a neutral country, shook him by the lapels, and shouted: "You clear everything you say to the press with me." The cause of the ambassador's ire: a report that he had discouraged a U.S. congressman from visiting the North Vietnamese Embassy. Godley's relations with the press at times are as stormy as they are with his diplomatic colleagues. When three journalists, including this reporter, walked to the CIA base at Long Cheng, near the Plain of Jars, in 1970, Godley announced he was "through with helping the press"—an ironic enough statement since most U.S. Embassy activities had been directed toward misleading reporters on American involvement in Laos. . . .

"The Colonel"

In Vientiane, Godley frequently is called "the Colonel" because of the importance he places on military tactics. Significantly, his predecessor, William Sullivan, now a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, was called "the Field Marshal" because of the political considerations to which he subordinated military activity.

This year, following the U.S. invasion of Laos, North Vietnamese troops put increasing pressure on Luang Prabang, but did not take the town. The North Vietnamese action had numerous precedents in Laotian history and virtually every ranking diplomat in Vientiane with the exception of the American ambassador regarded the communist action as a diplomatic signal through military channels that Hanoi was irritated by the invasion but would not use it as a pretext to invade the Mekong valley. Godley, on the other hand, interpreted the communist move as a major defeat for Hanoi, saying the communists tried to take the royal capital and failed.

Such lack of appreciation for the nuances of Laotian fighting and talking, which has been going on for decades, can lead to disastrous misinterpretations of the other side's motives—and make genuine communication impossible. Perhaps with this in mind, one communist diplomat said recently: "Even if a solution were possible, I do not see how we could negotiate it with a man like Godley."

Godley in fact does seem to be the wrong man in the wrong place at the wrong time, full of enthusiasm for a war which most Americans by now have come to detest, determined to win a military victory in a war which the Nixon administration says it is trying to end. On the other hand, Godley fits into an American strategy which has been described as "escalating upstream while you de-escalate downstream." According to this interpretation of the Nixon policy, U.S. involvement in Laos and Cambodia will grow, in terms of firepower and military support, while the American involvement in Vietnam is declining. The aim, in effect, is to create a screen upstream from South Vietnam to protect Saigon. The main problem of the strategy is that Laos and Cambodia must pay the price.

In executing such a strategy, Godley seems an ideal choice—at least from the Nixon administration's viewpoint. Godley, according to sources close to him, has said he would like to stay in Laos until the war is won. Whatever the outcome of the war, he may continue to dominate Laos for a long time. President Nixon reportedly has said, "I wish I had a handful of ambassadors like Mac Godley."

12 JAN 1972

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601

U.S. Jet Is Target of Missiles From Deepest Site Yet in Laos

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY
Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Jan. 11—The United States command said today that a North Vietnamese missile site near Tchepone, deeper and farther south in the Laotian panhandle than one has ever been reported before, fired two surface-to-air missiles yesterday morning at an American fighter-bomber that was attacking enemy supply trails.

The North Vietnamese first began firing the Soviet-built missiles at American planes over Laos only a year ago, but mostly from places within their own country. Tchepone is about 30 miles southwest of the North Vietnamese border and 23 miles west of Quangtri Province in South Vietnam.

The Phantom jet evaded both missiles and was not damaged, the command said. The missiles were believed to have been fired from a mobile launcher but, according to the command spokesman, the pilot did not see it and no retaliation was reported.

Tchepone, a bombed-out town on a junction of the trail system, was held briefly by South Vietnamese troops during their invasion of Laos last winter.

Air Defense Improved

American pilots have reported that the North Vietnamese air defense system on the trail network in southern Laos is better established and more extensive this year than it ever has been.

The command also announced that an Air Force Phantom that was escorting a B-52 mission as the trail was challenged and fired two missiles at a North Vietnamese air defense radar site across the border 35 miles north of the demilitarized zone, in the Bankarai Pass.

The command described the firing as a "protective reaction" strike initiated after the radar site began to track the American planes. The command holds that such radar tracking is a hostile action because it can be used to guide antiaircraft fire. The radar site is believed to have been destroyed, the command said.

In the week after Christmas, American warplanes carried out five days of large-scale raids on North Vietnamese airfields, supply depots, and antiaircraft sites, partly in retaliation for the increased challenge to U. S. aircraft over the trail.

Justification for Raids

In justifying these raids, Gen. Creighton W. Abrams issued a statement saying, in part, "the North Vietnamese have been told repeatedly that action would be taken to protect the lives of U. S. military personnel should the enemy threaten our aircraft, or engage in efforts to achieve a significant logistics buildup, or violate the DMZ."

The command has never described the results of those raids but pilots say they had been hampered by bad weather and had failed to hit many of the targets.

In the last two months the North Vietnamese have sent their MIG-21 supersonic fighters across the border over Laos to challenge American planes bombing the supply trails and supporting Laotian irregular troops farther north, on the Plaine des Jarres.


The pilots of the planes that bombed North Vietnam said they had not been engaged by enemy MIG's then, but have since reported sighting a few flying parallel to them as they drop bombs on the trail network in Laos.

Laotians Report Losses

VIENTIANE, Laos, Jan. 11 (UPI) — Government military sources today reported the loss of key positions in both northern and southern Laos and said the military situation was deteriorating rapidly.

Enemy bomb squads penetrated the defense perimeter last night at the base operated by the United States Central Intelligence Agency at Long Tieng and fighting was reported nearby, the sources said.

Government forces were said to have abandoned Ban Nhik after heavy fighting at close quarters and pulled back several miles to the west toward Pakse, the main commercial town in southern Laos.



The New York Times/Jan. 12, 1972

INCREASING ENEMY PRESSURE: Missile sites, once restricted to North Vietnam, have now been moved as far south in Laos as Tchepone (1). In northern Laos, foe penetrated defense perimeter at Long Tieng (2), while in the south Ban Nhik (3) was overrun. In Cambodia, South Vietnamese troops were withdrawing from Suong and Krek (4) apparently to bolster defenses around and Krek (4) to bolster the defenses around Saigon.

12 JAN 1972

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Town in Laotian Jungle Long a Strategic Center

By NEIL SHEEHAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 11—The remote town of Tchepone in the panhandle of southern Laos, now a bombed-out ruin, is a familiar place-name in the records of conflict in Indochina.

The town acquired the significance that has led to its devastation by American bombing chiefly because it is a road junction that now forms part of the northern reaches of the Ho Chi Minh supply network through southern Laos to South Vietnam and Cambodia. Lately American pilots have reported major improvements in the North Vietnamese air defense system in the area.

Tchepone is situated astride Route 9, which cuts across the Laotian panhandle, and on Routes 91 and 911, other unpaved roads that ultimately lead to North Vietnam. Since 1965, the North Vietnamese have also built additional jungle roads that pass through or near Tchepone.

The town first came to the attention of Washington policy-makers in 1960, when the North Vietnamese used it as one of several staging bases for the successful campaign they and their Pathet Lao allies waged against the right-wing Laotian military regime dominated by Gen. Phoumi Nosovan. That Government, which collapsed in 1962, was backed by the Eisenhower Administration.

Twin-engine Ilyushin-14 transport planes were reported to have unloaded at the airfield at Tchepone during the 1960 Soviet airlift of arms to the neutralist and Communist forces in Laos, then fighting as allies.

In 1961, the first year of the Kennedy Administration, when the situation worsened dramatically in Laos and the Vietcong guerrillas in South Vietnam began seriously to threaten the Saigon Government, Tchepone acquired more importance in Washington's eyes.

The Kennedy Administration believed that the North Vietnamese were employing Tchepone not only as a base for their operations in Laos but also as a way station to infiltrate guerrilla leaders into South Vietnam. The numbers of these guerrillas were relatively small, but the leadership quality was considered important to the Vietcong movement.

On May 11, 1961, President John F. Kennedy secretly directed the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency to conduct general commando raids against Vietnamese Communist bases and lines of communication in southeastern Laos with South Vietnamese units hired and trained by the C.I.A. On Oct. 13, 1961, he additionally ordered the Pentagon and the intelligence agency to "initiate ground actions, including the use of U.S. advisers if necessary," specifically against North Vietnamese aerial resupply missions in the Tchepone area.

The directives were disclosed in the Pentagon's secret history of United States involvement in Indochina, most of which became known last summer.

The details of the clandestine raids that were subsequently carried out are unknown, but they are not thought to have attained any real success.

Plans for Raids Prepared

Over subsequent years, the United States continued to regard Tchepone as an important North Vietnamese base in Laos. Proposals to stage raids against it with United States Army helicopters and South Vietnamese troops were drawn up as early as 1962 by American military advisers in South Vietnam.

With the growth of the Ho Chi Minh Trail network through southern Laos after the commitment of American ground combat forces to South Vietnam in 1965, Tchepone took on increasing significance.

In 1966, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, then the United States military commander in Saigon, established a base at KheSanh—the scene of a famous siege two years later, in 1968—with the hope of one day thrusting across the Laotian border to cut the Ho Chi Minh jungle roads in the vicinity of Tchepone.

When the thrust was finally made, in March, 1971, under the Nixon Administration, with South Vietnamese troops pushing into Laos, the ruins of Tchepone were occupied for less than a week before the Vietcong retreated in a disorderly retreat.

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11 JAN 1972

Lao rout CIA puppets, Hanoi cites bomb toll

Daily World Foreign Department
from combined news sources

Americans continued to remove espionage equipment from the CIA's Long Cheng base in North Central Laos Monday as regular troops of the Neo Lao Haksat closed in on the Meo puppet troops and Thai mercenaries under U.S. command there.

Sisouk Na Champasack, defense minister of the U.S.-puppet Vientiane regime, told United Press International he did not know if Long Cheng could be held. He said Pakse, the main commercial town in southern Laos, is also in danger of falling. He reported that the regular forces of the Neo Lao Haksat (Laotian Patriotic Front) had severed the main road link between Vientiane and the royal capital of Luang Prabang and control all traffic on that road.

In Hanoi, the ministry of foreign affairs of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam said U.S. bombing raids against civilian areas in Laos and the DRV had taken a toll of numerous lives, pagodas, schools and hospitals.

The DRV foreign ministry spokesman said that in an effort to save its Meo puppet and Thai mercenary forces, the U.S. Command had sharply increased the bombing of civilian areas in the vicinity of the Plain of Jars, which has been in Neo Lao Haksat hands since mid-December. The U.S. bombing raids had killed many Laotian civilians, he said, and were another gross violation of the 1962 agreement on Laos.

Sisouk told UPI the main threat to Long Cheng comes from the Pathet Lao's 130mm artillery pieces, which are within easy range of the CIA's base 12 miles from the Plain of Jars. The guns have a range of more than 16 miles. The Meo puppet troops were trained and supported at

enormous expense to American taxpayers; who also foot the bill for the Thai mercenaries and the Royal Laotian Army puppet troops.

Other Indochina developments:

SAIGON—The U.S. Command reported 154,000 U.S. troops are still in Indochina, 15,000 more than the 139,000 President Nixon claimed would be in the war zone by the end of January, 1972. The manpower count does not include 13,000 Navy personnel aboard U.S. Seventh Fleet ships in the South China Sea off the Vietnamese Coast, or 32,000 American airmen stationed in Thailand.

HANOI—Establishment of diplomatic relations with India brings to 41 the number of countries with which the Democratic Republic of Vietnam maintain diplomatic relations. In 1965 the number was only 18.

BANGKOK—Royal Thai Army Commander Gen. Prapass Charu-sathira said Monday that the sappers who raided the United States Airforce base at U-Tapao and knocked out three B-52 strato-fortresses were "Communists." The base is 80 miles south of Bangkok.

SAIGON—National Liberation forces attacked Saigon puppet troop position in Qui Nhon, South Vietnam's fourth largest city and in the so-called Iron Triangle, 29 miles northwest of Saigon, and ambushed a unit of the U.S. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. A Saigon government spokesman said a hamlet was attacked early Monday six miles from the capital.

Letters To The Editor

One Who Was There Assesses the CIA's Job in Laos

A brief article in The Washington Post of December 27 quoted Congressman G. V. Montgomery as saying "What I know about Laos is that the CIA has done a pretty lousy job and has been ineffective."

One could answer such an assertion by simply saying that as the chairman of the House Select Committee on U. S. Involvement in Southeast Asia, he should know more about Laos than that, particularly when what little he knows is manifestly wrong.

I spent 17 years as a CIA employee and left in early 1968 because of my basic opposition to United States involvement in Southeast Asia. My last four years in the agency were totally involved with Asian affairs. My knowledge of what CIA has done and has not done are obviously more detailed than Mr. Montgomery's, but it seems to me that if he is going to make public statements, he should at least take into consideration facts which have been well publicized.

It is clear (at least to me) from the Saigon dateline on the piece in question, that the congressman arrived at his remarkable conclusion after discussion with military sources in Vietnam who have been itching for at least six years to expand their own operations into Laos. Their desires in this direction must increase daily as the American role in Vietnam winds down. If they don't find something new, the time may come when they have no war at all to fight.

In order to assess CIA performance in Laos it is necessary to know what it was asked to do.

CIA involvement in Laos stems from the agreement by the U.S.A., and other powers involved, to withdraw all foreign troops from Laos. The agreement was signed in 1962. It became apparent immediately thereafter that the North Vietnamese, in violation of the agreement, were continuing to send irregular forces and supplies to the Communist Pathet Lao. Their purpose was clear—to establish a Communist government in Vientiane which would allow the North Vietnamese free access to the portion of the Ho

Chi Minh trail in Laos and the road across central Laos to Thailand. The government of the United States decided to mount an operation to thwart the North Vietnamese purpose. Because the Geneva agreement precluded the use of U.S. military forces or advisers, CIA was designated as the executive agent to handle the training and support of the non-Communist Meo tribes who lived in and around the Plain of Jars. The Meo force was the only army in Laos capable of stopping the Pathet Lao (supported by the North Vietnamese) from quickly over-running the Plain of Jars, which was essential to the Communist purpose.

The point to remember here is that the decision to act was a U.S. government decision; not one arrived at by CIA. I think the decision was wrong, just as I think almost every other decision with regard to our involvement in Indochina has been and continues to be wrong. That is not the point under discussion.

The question is: what kind of job did CIA do with the task assigned it in Laos?

The answer, based on any comparison with the U.S. military effort in Vietnam, would have to be. *A spectacular success.*

My personal knowledge of the operation ended in mid-1967, the last time I visited Long Tieng, the seat of the headquarters of Gen. Vang Pao, the Meo leader. At that time there were roughly 35,000 Meo tribesmen under arms fighting daily with the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese irregulars. This force had been fighting successfully for five years and inasmuch as they held Long Tieng until a few days ago, continued for another four years to beat off a vastly superior Communist army. The CIA contingent supporting them in Laos and in Thailand did not exceed 40 Americans, plus a small air contingent which air-delivered supplies and personnel. Imagine 40 Americans in support of 35,000 friendly tribesmen. Compare this with the situation in Vietnam in 1967 when we had about 400,000 U.S. troops fighting for, and supporting, an army of roughly 1 million Vietnamese, and they were losing at

every turn. Had the U.S. Army had the responsibility for the support of the Meo, we probably would have had a minimum of 15,000 U.S. troops in Laos. Naturally that figure would have included cooks, bakers, pastry chefs, many chauffeurs for the many generals, PX managers, laundry officers, radio and television station personnel, motion picture projectionists, historians, social scientists, chaplains and a variety of similar types essential to the conduct of a war by the U.S. military, but which the CIA operation with the Meo seemed to be able to forgo.

For eight years this ragtag force defended its area of responsibility, protecting the backside of the South Vietnamese—with no U.S. troops fighting at their side, not to say in front of them as in Vietnam. They accomplished this with the support of a handful of Americans and with the loss of perhaps three or four American lives.

Can anyone seriously suggest that this was a lousy job?

In fairness to Congressman Montgomery, it is not entirely his fault that he is not fully informed. The role of the CIA with the Meo has been an open secret for years; known to Lao of high and low degree, foreign journalists, diplomats in Vientiane and almost anyone else with the interest to find out. Given this situation it would be comic if it were not tragic that the Executive branch of the U.S. government was willing to share this secret with Lao generals known to be trafficking in opium, but not with the Congress of the United States.

Perhaps someday Mr. Montgomery and his colleagues in the Congress will establish a real CIA watchdog committee, long overdue, which will give the agency the scrutiny required. When that is done I am sure a substantial number of lousy operations will be uncovered. I am confident, however, that when they take a long hard look at the CIA operation with the Meo in the general context of the war in Southeast Asia, there will be general approval.

THOMAS F. McCOY.

Washington.

OMAHA, NEBR.
WORLD HERALD

JAN 10 1972

M - 125,376

S - 273,394

SAC Base Is a Target of Commandos

From World-Herald Press Services.

Terrorist commandos attacked the big Thai-U.S. B52 bomber base early today at Utapao, 90 miles south of Bangkok, a Thai military spokesman said. Two B52 were reported slightly damaged.

Details of the attack were sketchy, but Thai officials said an undetermined number of sappers hit the base at 2:40 a.m., the Associated Press reported. There were no reports of casualties.

It was the first attack on the base, one of the biggest U.S. installations in Asia.

The U.S. Embassy in Bangkok refused to confirm or deny that the attack had taken place. A spokesman there referred all queries to the Thai government's National Security Council.

Utapao is the headquarters for the Strategic Air Command's giant eight-engined Stratofortresses, which have been bombing Communist command targets in South Vietnam, Cambodia and along the Laotian border almost daily since 1967.

It also is the base for a wing of KC135 aerial tankers, which provide midair refueling for U.S. Air Force fighter bombers over Laos and Vietnam.

North Vietnamese sapper units armed with B40 rocket launchers and explosives made a daring commando raid Saturday night against the supersecret CIA base at Long Cheng, Laos, but were beaten

back, according to United Press International.

In Vietnam, a terrorist tossed a hand grenade filled with tiny steel balls into a bonfire at a youth rally in Qui Nhon Saturday, killing or wounding 189 persons in one of the worst terror attacks of the Indochina war, U.S. sources said.

The commando attack was the first time Communist guerrillas had succeeded in entering the defense perimeters of the Long Cheng, operated by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency about 80 miles north of the Laotian capital of Vientiane, since their 130mm guns laid

siege to the base three days ago, the sources said. Six of the Meo tribesmen who run the base for the CIA were killed. No material damage was reported. Sources in Qui Nhon City described the carnage from the grenade explosion as terrible. They said all four hospitals in Qui Central Vietnam City were filled to overflowing with victims.

As of Sunday afternoon, the sources said, the toll stood at 12 dead and 177 wounded.

N. Viets Raid Laotian Base, Driven Off

From News Dispatches

VIENTIANE, Jan. 9—North Vietnamese guerrillas armed with rocket launchers and explosives made a commando raid last night against Long Cheng, in an apparent attempt to blow up the remaining military installations at the Laotian base, military sources said today. But the guerrillas were beaten back.

The sources said this was the first time Communist commandos have succeeded in entering the defense perimeters of Long Cheng, about 60 miles north of Vientiane, since their artillery began shelling the base earlier this month.

The North Vietnamese were driven off before they could achieve their aim, leaving 12 of their dead when they withdrew, the sources said. Six pro-government Meo guerrillas were killed. No damage to the base was reported.

[On Monday, commandos attacked the big U.S.-Thai B-52 bomber base at Utapao, 90 miles south of Bangkok, a Thailand military spokesman said. One B-52 was reported damaged, but there were no reports of casualties.]

Long Cheng is run by Meo tribesmen trained and equipped by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. It has been in danger of falling since Communist forces drove Laotian troops and Thai irregulars from the Plain of Jars last month.

Defense Minister Sisouk Na Champasack said Thursday that the fall of Long Cheng could open the way for Communist infiltration into the capital.

Laotian intelligence analysts reported that about 300 North Vietnamese already had infiltrated the hills, 4 miles south-

east of Long Cheng. Laotian government troops were reported to be dug in on high ground around the beleaguered base.

Meanwhile, in South Vietnam, the government launched an investigation into one of the worst terrorist grenade attacks of the war which occurred in the coastal city of Quinhon, 275 miles northeast of Saigon, last night.

U.S. officials said reports reaching them put the toll at nine Vietnamese killed and 111 wounded, but Vietnamese authorities put the count at 12 killed and 115 wounded.

The grenade was hurled from a distance by a terrorist as 1,200 Vietnamese students and their teachers held a government-sponsored rally at a soccer stadium.

While authorities in Quinhon blamed the attack on the Vietcong, officials in Saigon said it may have been an internally inspired political plot to assassinate Col. Nguyen Van Chuc, the newly appointed chief of Binh Dinh Province and mayor of Quinhon, who was present at the rally. He was injured but reported in good condition.

In another development, more than 1,500 Vietnamese war refugees have been airlifted from northernmost Quangtri Province to Phuoc Tuy Province southeast of Saigon in what government officials described as the start of a massive resettlement program.

Sources said the Saigon regime eventually hopes to relocate up to 250,000 villagers who have already been displaced by the war and currently live in refugee camps.

9 JAN 1972

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Enemy Drive Poses Major Threat in Laos

By TILLMAN DURDIN

Special to The New York Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, Jan. 8—

The latest Communist offensive in Laos has confronted the United States-backed Government of Prince Souvanna Phouma with the most critical military situation it has faced in years.

For the moment the offensive, being pressed by North Vietnamese troops with minor assistance from Communist-led Pathet Lao units, has been checked. But the Communist effort has far from spent itself and could culminate in a drastic reverse for Government forces.

In southern Laos the drive has taken the Communists deeper into Government territory than they have ever penetrated before.

It is estimated that 4,000 North Vietnamese troops have in the last two weeks occupied all of the strategic Boloven Plateau except for a grip by Government forces on Ban Nhim at the extreme western bulge of the plateau. Laotian units

there are clinging stubbornly to the little village in the face of an assault by three North Vietnamese battalions that has been going on for two days and nights.

North Vietnamese infantry action in the Ban Nhim area is being supported by mortars and light artillery while Laotian troops are getting round-the-clock assistance from Laotian T-28 fighter-bombers flying out of an air base at Pakse, a provincial capital 20 miles to the west.

United States Air Force planes are also helping pound the area around Ban Nhim, and the combined air action is credited with causing heavy North Vietnamese casualties and blunting the Communist thrust.

In the north, after charging through the Laotian defenses guarding the Plaine des Jarres in late December, the vanguard of three North Vietnamese divisions—an estimated total of 20,000 to 25,000 men—is now

pushing toward the major Laotian mountain base, 85 miles north of Vientiane, and the area around it.

Long Tieng, the headquarters for special forces trained and financed by the United States Central Intelligence Agency, held out against last year's dry season assault by North Vietnamese invaders. Now it is being shelled by long-range artillery rockets and mortars and has been evacuated by its defenders for an alternative rear base.

The air field has been shelled and fuel dumps have been set afire. Laotian troops have moved from rear base itself, situated in a low-lying area, to dug-in positions in the surrounding hills.

Reports today said that North Vietnamese patrols had thrust around Long Tieng and clashed with Laotian troops to the southwest and southeast.

In emergency airlifts, American transport planes have brought strong Laotian reinforcements into the Long Tieng sector and are building up supplies to replace those lost at Long Tieng and in the hasty retreat from the Plaine des Jarres. Concurrently, American bombers are blasting the North Vietnamese supply route down the Ho Chi Minh Trail and across the Plaine des Jarres.

Meanwhile, troops of the Luang neutralist forces that have been fighting alongside the Pathet Lao in recent years are active in the jungle-covered hills along the highway from here to Luang Prabang, the royal capital, about 100 miles north of Vientiane. A bridge has been blown up and the road cut.

The North Vietnamese have not only thrown more troops than ever before into this dry season's campaign but have added innovations in equipment that give them a marked increase in effectiveness.

The North Vietnamese have more and better anti-aircraft guns than ever before, and MIG-21 planes. The MIG's rarely engage in combat action, but they do appear irregularly and furtively in Laotian skies. Every time they are sighted they cause an alert for American air units and Laotian air and ground forces that is a troublesome deterrent to uninterrupted pursuit of scheduled operations.

Withdrawals of United States Air Force units from Thailand and Laos are being reported.

year have lowered the strike capability of American fighters and bombers over Laos. New equipment on helicopter gunships that operate against North Vietnamese ground transport compensates to some degree for the diminished number, however.

An advantage to be added to the new strength of the North Vietnamese in numbers and equipment is the fact that this dry season they have launched their offensive earlier than ever before. The rains are still months away and thus they have plenty of time to utilize their increased capabilities to the maximum.

9 JAN 1972

STATINTL

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EDITED

by LLOYD SHEARER

THE SECRET WAR The last U.S. servicemen to be withdrawn from the war in Indochina will probably be the 32,000 American GI's stationed in five U.S. air bases in Thailand. These are the men most responsible for the air strikes in Laos, a country whose army is run by and paid for by our Central Intelligence Agency.

In April of 1971 President Nixon told the American public he expected to be held accountable for the way he conducted and ended the war in Southeast Asia.

One of these days he may be asked to explain the CIA role in Laos, a small, unfortunate kingdom of 3 million people, almost 800,000 of whom the war and our bombing have turned into refugees.

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STATINTL

Reds Testing Ground For New Laos Drive

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Star

VIENTIANE — North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces throughout Laos are shelling, probing and launching small commando attacks in preparation for the second phase of their dry season offensive, military sources said yesterday.

North Vietnamese sappers Thursday hit an ammunition dump beside Long Cheng airstrip causing a chain reaction of explosions throughout Friday and yesterday that closed the airstrip.

Friday night, sappers with 40 rocket launchers shot up a Meo training camp near Long Cheng, killing three allied soldiers.

North Vietnamese long-range 130mm artillery hammered Skyline Ridge and other Long Cheng positions daily. They fired over 600 shells over the past four days.

These 9½-ton artillery pieces must be towed by tractor, but none has been spotted to date.

Flashes seen south of the Plain of Jars are believed caused by North Vietnamese pyrotechnics to mislead American forward ground and air controllers as to the guns' location. The North Vietnamese also have introduced an early warning radar system in north Laos to help protect their artillery pieces from American air power.

North of the royal capital of Luang Prabang, Lao irregular positions are under continuous shelling and probing.

Small Pathet Lao units have cut Route 13 linking Luang Prabang and Vientiane.

In south Laos the Vietnamese are shelling Ban Nihik and probing with infantry. Ban Nihik, midway between Pakse and the Bolovens Plateau town of Paksong blocks any Hanoi advance toward the Mekong River down to the west edge of the plateau.

All these actions have been accompanied by unprecedented Communist anti-aircraft fire. A U.S. jet Ranger helicopter belonging to Lao Air Development, a U.S. company under contract to the U.S. AID mission was shot down on Route 13 while carrying a Lao general.

Four more American aircraft were hit in the Long Cheng area and one Royal Lao army helicopter was shot down at Ban Nihik.

"There are some tough clashes going on, particularly northeast of Long Cheng," a military source said.

The North Vietnamese are now bringing up their supplies, and the major attack is likely soon, the military says.

Allied forces are making preparations to meet the attack. Two new Thai units have arrived at the Long Cheng area.

American advisers have set up a new firebase near Long Cheng, named Firebase "Thunder."

New artillery pieces are rolling along Vientiane's main street heading north to replace some of the 36 artillery pieces the allies have lost in fighting since December.

The first phase of the current Communist offensive in Laos opened Dec. 18.

By Dec. 20 the Plain of Jars fell and by year's end, the North Vietnamese were in a semicircle around Long Cheng, the combined U.S. Air Force and CIA base in northeast Laos.

Long Cheng and Meo tribesmen from other CIA centers such as Pakkao, southeast of Long Cheng, fled the area.

During the first week in January, the North Vietnamese began completing the encirclement of Long Cheng, positioning their troops and bringing up supplies. "The North Vietnamese advance was so fast it surprised even them, and they outdistanced their logistic," a military source said.

In south Laos the Hanoi offensive took the western edge of the Bolovens plateau, including Paksong, and the Lao were pushed back 10 miles down the western slope of the plateau. Now the North Vietnamese are aiming to chop up the Lao on Route 23 at Ban Nihik and push them back to the banks of the Mekong River.

The attack in north Laos had one unusual characteristic. There apparently was a division of labor, with the North Vietnamese taking the east bank of the Mekong River, which flows from the Plain of

Jars into the Vientiane plain and the Pathet Lao taking the west bank.

This gives the North Vietnamese the hard core Meo tribal resistance to crack while the Pathet Lao deals with the weaker Lao army.

In the south, Hanoi is concentrating on widening the Ho Chi Minh Trail system, while the north Laos push seems political, analysts said.

The Pathet Lao on the east bank of the river will take over populated areas along Route 13, giving them population and province control, while Hanoi's troops stay out of sight in the mountains. Pathet Lao will try to advance to the Lik River, 60 miles north of Vientiane and the old 1962 cease-fire line, then ask to negotiate with the Lao government, diplomats said.

Diplomatic sources, however, believe the present government of Prince Souvanna Phouma, will neither ask the United States to stop bombing nor give the Communists a majority of seats in a new Lao government. A coup by some top Lao anxious for peace at any cost could upset this calculation.

The prospect of continued Vientiane political toughness could be compromised by the poor state of the allied troops.

The Thais are primarily mercenary rather than considering themselves fighting to defend Thailand. The individual Lao soldier's morale in most units is poor because he has no motivation to fight.

"The trouble is the individual Lao soldier feels no loyalty to the government. He has no cause to motivate him to fight," Western military sources said.

Government corruption, of ten bilking a soldier of his pay, and opulent living by officials while the soldier fights for years in jungle without money or leave combined with poor leadership in the Lao army leaves the ordinary soldier with only one interest—staying alive.

In Lao units, junior officers have told correspondents, "Why should we fight for these people. They are not going to do anything for us."

The average Laotian hates the North Vietnamese on an ethnic basis, but he has no realization what will happen to his way of life should the Pathet Lao come to power. Pathet Lao promises seem better than staying and dying in the jungles.

Rank-and-file Americans in Laos feel that unless the U.S. gets tough and forces a clean-up in the Lao government, Laos may as well be written off.

The other alternative is to get out.

Americans point out that the North Vietnamese themselves have had to get tough with the Pathet Lao lately to clean up misbehavior and make them more acceptable to the Laotian villager.

One result of this has been mass Pathet Lao defections to the government side in South Laos.

Central Intelligence Agency officials who jumped initially at the chance to use these defectors have found them just as useless as the Vietnamese at did.

American advisers are unanimous in the opinion here that no matter how much military equipment and bombing support the United States provides, unless the individual soldier fights, it is all wasted.

This problem of motivation and poor leadership leaves many Americans here pessimistic over the outcome in the next round of fighting.

Only the highest members of the U.S. mission seem oblivious. "They go on planning their interlocking fire and defenses, hoping they will hold, though they should know by now they won't," a bitter American said.

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Marquis Childs

The Hidden Toll Of U.S. Bombings

CASUALTIES for American ground forces in one week: one. Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian casualties during one week of bombing? The nameless, uncounted total of dead, maimed, napalmed may be in the hundreds or it may be thousands. No one knows.

This is the double-standard that bombing as an instrument to hold the line on Vietnamization imposes. The five days of bombing, the heaviest in three years, are justified as protection for the remaining American troops in South Vietnam. As the total drops still lower, the need for more and more bombing will be inevitable.

There have been countless news stories out of Vietnam about Vietnamese hospitals hopelessly overcrowded, about patients lying on the floor, about adequate treatment all but nonexistent, and about napalmed and wounded children being carried many miles by their parents only to find no care available. To this toll of misery must be added the refugees—in all the three states perhaps as many as \$10,000,000—who live at a bare subsistence level in crowded, festering camps.

RENEWED BOMBING will be essential as the difficulties mount for indigenous forces in the three states of Indochina. The Communist noose is being drawn tight in Cambodia. In Laos CIA supported forces have been driven back, and from the high command of the South Vietnamese armed forces has come word that they will not again sacrifice crack divisions to hold the line in Laos. That is what happened last week when the threat to Vietnam growing out of Communist successes in neighboring Laos was great.

The race to Vietnamize the war, scaling down the total of American ground forces to 35,000 by next Nov. 7, is also a race between the survival of a people and a land and total destruction. of infiltration trails, even

with hundreds of sorties as in the recent step-up, can halt the movement of men and material to the Communist cadres in the south is doubtful. Again and again the bombers have been reported as shutting off the supply line. Yet Communist mortars continue to fire.

The parallel with the bombing of Germany and Japan in World War II hardly applies. Some impact resulted when a ball-bearing factory was destroyed, although as the strategic bombing survey in 1945 revealed the effect was marginal. Indochina does not have munitions plants. It is merely a funnel for the supplies coming from China and Russia.

That raises a chilling prospect. If the funnel is to be choked off, the choking off process must begin at the mouth. That is to say, at Haiphong harbor, the port of entry for the bulk of the weapons supplied by the Soviets, and perhaps also at Hanoi which is a processing and trans-shipping point.

THE PESSIMISTS who see nothing but futility in bombing the trails believe that in a pinch, with Vietnamization seriously jeopardized, the President will sanction an all-out attack. It was Sen. Barry Goldwater, who in one of his blithe moods said that the Air Force could reduce North Vietnam to a parking lot in 24 hours if only it was given its way.

This is a most unlikely prospect at the present stage of the war. The repercussions in this country would be too great. The war would become an issue again. And, having thus far rather successfully defused it, the President is unlikely to stir up the hornets' nest of protest.

With the illusion of pinpoint bombing of military targets the American conscience appears untroubled by the casualties. According to the Senate subcommittee on refugees, one of the few groups to be concerned, the cumulative total in seven years of bombing may be as high as one million.

But if this is the callous price of bringing the boys home it must surely be of more urgent and immediate concern to President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam. He can hardly hope to keep a stable government with a people repeatedly battered by a seemingly endless war. And a stable government after 1972 is theoretically one of America's aims.

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6 JAN 1972

 International News **More U.S. raids despite world protests**

SAIGON—The U.S. Command reported a U.S. Air Force F105 jet fighter-bomber attack on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and B52 bombing raids near Khe San and in the so-called Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

U.S. military sources complained that DRV MiGs were still flying despite the massive U.S. bombing raids during the Christmas season on DRV airfields. Military sources complained the strikes apparently had done little harm to the DRV airforce. Reports from the DRV show that extensive damage was done to schools, hospitals, homes and some installations and to the civilian population.

In war operations in Laos, U.S. officials reported that secret cryptographic equipment at Long Cheng had been removed along with electronic devices used to help U.S. bombers in raids. Long Cheng is the "secret" base operated by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency which has been conducting its own war in Indochina.

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LOSS OF KEY BASE IN LAOS IS FEARED

U.S. Aides See Major Blow
if Long Tieng Is Overrun

By TERENCE SMITH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 5—United States officials said today that there was a "better than 50-50 chance" that Communist forces would overrun the strategic Laotian base at Long Tieng in the next few weeks.

The officials said this would be the deepest Communist penetration into Northern Laos in the war and would effectively eliminate Maj. Gen. Vang Pao, the Meo commander as a political and military force in Laos.

Long Tieng has served for the last several years as headquarters for General Vang Pao and his clandestine army of Meo irregulars. It has also been the main base for United States military and intelligence operations in northeast Laos.

The military base, which includes a strategically important airstrip, has been under heavy enemy artillery bombardment since last Friday.

Several regiments of North Vietnamese troops have reportedly surrounded the base and have been pounding the headquarters buildings and airstrip with 130-mm. guns—the heaviest ever used by the enemy in Laos.

Most of General Vang Pao's troops are said to have withdrawn to the hills surrounding the base. The troops, Meo tribesmen, are equipped and financed by the Central Intelligence Agency. Officials said the headquarters has been largely evacuated and that Long Tieng itself has been downgraded to a forward operations base.

Equipment Removed

Most of the advanced communications equipment that the C.I.A. and military intelligence have used to monitor North Vietnamese activity also has been removed, officials here said, although the airstrip is still functional and contact has been maintained with Vientiane, the Laotian capital.

Administration officials said that the fall of Long Tieng would be as much a political blow as a military one. Their end of the leadership of Gen-

eral Vang Pao, the short, fiery Meo mountaineer who has provided the rallying point for his people for nearly a decade.

His army, which at times has been reported to number as many as 30,000 troops, now is thought to be reduced to a few thousand. Informed sources also said that the great majority of the estimated 5,000 Thai "volunteers" fighting with the Meos have scattered in the face of the North Vietnamese offensive.

In the course of four days of bitter fighting, between Dec. 17 and 21, the Meo forces were driven from the Plaine des Jarres by the most determined North Vietnamese assault in Northern Laos. The drive was supported by tanks and, for the first time, North Vietnamese MIG fighters.

7,500 Thai Troops in Laos

The administration's analysts believe the offensive is designed in part to dissuade Thailand from military involvement in Laos. As many as 7,500 Thai troops have been fighting alongside the Laotian irregulars in recent months.

In addition the analysts see the attack as a message from Hanoi to the American Congress, to the effect that any expansion of the Nixon policy of Vietnamization outside Vietnam will be met by accelerated North Vietnamese activity.

The attacks in Laos, the intensified fighting in Cambodia and the recent aggressiveness of the North Vietnamese Air Force are all regarded here as an effort to influence Congress, particularly the Senate, to demand an end to the war. The North Vietnamese goal, officials believe, is to set the Congress to force the President to cut off all military and economic assistance to the Saigon Government.

The assault on Long Tieng is seen as an integral part of this strategy.

The base had been vigorously defended in past years mainly for fear of the political ramifications of its fall. In a report prepared last May for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, two staff members, James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, wrote that they had been advised by both American and Laotian officials "that they would consider the loss of Long Tieng to be a disastrous psychological blow."

"General Vang Pao was particularly adamant on this point," the investigators wrote, "for Long Tieng represents virtually the last foothold of the Meo people in northern Laos."

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Bombings: major escalation of war

By Richard E. Ward

U.S. aircraft engaged in massive, indiscriminate bombings of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam last week.

According to the Associated Press and other press reports, all available U.S. aircraft in the Indochina area—at least 350—are being used in the attacks, the largest since President Nixon took office and perhaps the largest single series of raids since U.S. bombings of North Vietnam began in August 1964.

In a cynical abuse of the English language, the raids have been characterized by the Nixon administration as "limited duration protective reaction strikes." But the attacks actually are new proof that Washington has not abandoned its dreams of victory in Indochina through airpower. This is the nearly unanimous view of the American press, including journalists reporting from Saigon and Washington as well as editorial commentary.

"Nearly seven years after President Lyndon B. Johnson began sustained bombing of North Vietnam... another American President is relying heavily on airpower to achieve his objectives in Indochina," wrote Neil Sheehan in the Dec. 28 New York Times. "It has been held as doctrine," continued Sheehan, "by a number of American policy makers since John F. Kennedy took office in 1961 that the threat of bombing, or bombing itself would intimidate" the North Vietnamese leaders "to order the Vietcong guerrillas in the South to halt their insurrection against the Saigon government."

"Limited duration"

It is evident that this is the doctrine still adhered to by the chief figures of the Nixon administration—Nixon himself, chief White House advisor Henry Kissinger and Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird. The latter defended the raids and threatened North Vietnam with further massive attacks in a Dec. 28 press conference where journalists forced from him an admission that the latest U.S. attacks are similar to those carried out under former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara. "The major difference," conceded Laird, "is that these are of limited duration..." Laird would not define what he considered limited duration, but it was clear that the raids constituted an effort to force Hanoi to agree to U.S. terms for a settlement in Vietnam and to compensate for some of the gravest reverses suffered by the U.S. throughout Indochina since Nixon took office.

The latest U.S. attacks against North Vietnam followed major victories by liberation forces in Laos and Cambodia and a severe deterioration of the position of the Saigon regime, the latter confronted by unprecedented political opposition.

During the past month in Laos, the forces of the Lao Patriotic Front (Pathet Lao) have made strategic gains on all major fronts. The liberation forces have recaptured the Plain of Jars, which was briefly held by the puppet forces and Thai mercenaries during the rainy season. In southern Laos, liberation forces resisted efforts of the U.S.-backed troops to retake the Bolovens plateau, once a stronghold of the pro-U.S. mercenary forces.

CIA protege Gen. Vang Pao. During the last two weeks, the largest CIA base in Laos, the top-secret installation at Long Chieng (south of the Plain of Jars), used by the

Meo troops, has come under heavy attack by the Pathet Lao.

"Communist forces in the mountain regions of northern Laos," reported D. E. Ronk from Vientiane in the Dec. 24 Washington Post, "are in a position to destroy the CIA-sponsored Meo army following last weekend's rapid rout of Gen. Vang Pao's pro-government troops from the Plain of Jars."

"Morale at Long Chieng," continued Ronk, "has plunged to its lowest point in more than a year with frightened Meo families hurriedly fleeing toward the south."

"Persistent reports from Long Chieng neither confirmed nor denied by spokesmen here, say Air America cargo planes are evacuating important equipment from the isolated base," he wrote.

"Long Chieng has a certain psychological importance for Meo tribesmen who are aligned in clans with Gen. Vang Pao and the CIA. Most knowledgeable sources here believe the fall of Long Chieng would take the binding force out of Vang Pao's army and send the troops and their families back to the hills to resume their nomadic lives."

"This would leave the entire mountainous region of northern Laos under the control of the Pathet Lao and their North Vietnamese allies."

In Cambodia, the pro-U.S. forces of Phnom Penh and Saigon troops sent to the rescue have recently suffered their greatest defeats since a CIA-backed coup toppled the neutralist government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk last year. These defeats, wrote Gloria Emerson in the Dec. 23 N.Y. Times, "are causing deep uneasiness among many Cambodian commanders, who privately admit they are no longer confident about the outcome of the war."

"Much of this anxiety results from the recent defeat of Cambodian troops trying to reopen an enemy-occupied section of Route 6... The collapse of the campaign disclosed the Cambodian army was still sickly and in deep confusion."

Puppets collapse

The defeats of the pro-U.S. forces in Cambodia have left in their wake an army on the verge of collapse and a puppet leadership fighting among themselves, according to Western press sources and first reported in the Dec. 15 Guardian by Wilfred Burchett. "While enemy forces make damaging advances in the countryside, an important contest for leadership is currently taking place among Cambodia's senior political and military leaders," Peter Osnos wrote in the Dec. 19 Washington Post.

After detailing the competition for power in Phnom Penh, Osnos wrote that "public and official morale has fallen sharply in recent weeks—lower, it is said, than at any since the war spread to the country in March 1970... Many of the young intellectuals and professionals who flocked to the government after the toppling of Prince Sihanouk are now said to be quietly bowing out as they lose faith in the ability of the regime to carry

"As for the beleaguered Cambodian army, some analysts believe that if its fortunes continue to sink

continued

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STATINTL

New U.S. bombings cannot convert defeat into victory

By Wilfred Burchett
Guardian staff correspondent

Peking, China

The resumed U.S. heavy bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam for four days last week is a vicious response to the defeats being suffered by Washington's puppet forces throughout Indochina.

Contrary to explanations from Washington, the bombings were not confined to military targets. At least one large hospital was hit, along with a number of civilian buildings.

"Nazi logic"

Nixon has been treating North Vietnam's towns and villages with Nazi-type logic: they are hostages to U.S. bombing attacks. He has escalated the air war due to the staggering defeats suffered by client troops in recent weeks in Cambodia and Laos.

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's pretext for the new bombing attacks—charging that Hanoi has violated tacit agreements on which the bombing halt was based—is sheer nonsense. These "understandings" exist only in Nixon's imagination.

Nixon's first year in office was marked by the Cambodian invasion disaster. His second was marked by the defeat of the Laos invasion. This year, resistance forces have been even stronger all over Indochina.

The military initiative now rests with the liberation armies, and the true extent of their victories has not yet been disclosed to the American people. U.S. air raids are therefore quite like the Nazi habit of shooting hostages after every military reverse in order to divert attention from their defeats.

Thai's wiped out

Most serious in this regard has been the decimation of Thai units in recent fighting around the Plain of Jars in Laos. During three days, December 18-21, seven battalions of Thai troops were completely wiped out and three more were crippled. At the same time, four battalions of the CIA-trained Vang Pao mercenaries were wiped out and six others were put out of action. The combat worth of Thai troops is now at about the same level as Lon Nol's Phnom Penh puppet army.

In Cambodia, the defeat of Lon Nol troops on Highway 6 northeast of Phnom Penh has brought the resistance forces to the very gates of the capital.

The victories of liberation forces in Cambodia and Laos are only the opening blows in their 1971-72 dry season offensive. They have repeatedly shown that the puppet troops are over-extended—the danger of which every military expert understands. Once again the U.S. finds

itself caught in the unresolvable contradiction between concentration and dispersal of forces.

This is the same sort of problem Gen. William Westmoreland found himself faced with on the eve of the 1968 Tet offensive but with one significant difference—now the offensive is spread over the whole of Indochina.

"Insolent acts"

The renewed bombing raids also fit in with the U.S.—provoked virtual suspension of the Paris talks. The DRV foreign ministry warned on Dec. 26 that the raids are "very serious acts of war. The U.S. imperialists are violating the sovereignty and security of the DRV as well as grossly violating their total commitment to cessation of its bombing of North Vietnam. These very insolent acts are a challenge to world public opinion."

Meanwhile the number of captured and killed U.S. pilots increases and Hanoi has declared absolutely that any further releases of U.S. POWs is out of the question. The foreign ministry statement continues that "The intensification of air strikes over the North not only fails to save the U.S. from repeated current setbacks in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia but also invites still further defeats and stronger condemnation from public opinion."

STATINTL

U.S. Mission in Laos Terms CIA Base No Longer Vital

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Jan. 4 —The U.S. mission in Laos has begun downgrading the military importance of the threatened Meo base at Long Cheng, according to informed U.S. sources.

Since the shift of all command and supply operations south to safer areas, the CIA-supported base is now regarded merely as a tactical position rather than a strategic area, the sources said.

However, other American sources said the downgrading is an effort by the U.S. mission to hide the significance of the partial abandonment of Long Cheng. These sources said that loss of the base, which is about 60 miles north of here, would be a benchmark in the Laotian war since it has become the most important political-military symbol in Laos with the exception of Vientiane and the royal capital of Luang Prabang.

North Vietnamese and the insurgent Pathet Lao forces have been stepping up pressure on Long Cheng since sweeping the Meo and their supporting Thai artillery units from the nearby Plain of Jars Dec. 20. The base has periodically come under heavy shelling and has on at least one occasion been subjected to a raid by a demolition team.

An all-out attempt to take the base is believed imminent. However, U.S. sources have said there is no intention to defend it against a sustained attack.

Gen. Vang Pao, commander of the Meos, has moved his headquarters to a mountain-

top 10 miles to the southwest may be trying to put pressure and CIA personnel have gone on Long Cheng from another with their electronic equipment—direction—from the northwest ment to the village of Ban Son down Route 13. in the same area.

The road is the only direct land link between Vientiane and Luang Prabang and for support units constructing traffic between the two towns came to halt this week when the Communists took positions southwest of the base.

Informed sources speculated overlooking the road at a today that Communist troops point 115 miles north of here.

4 JAN 1972

STATINTL

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**Laos CIA base abandoned**

VIENTIANE—Long Cheng, the biggest U.S. Central Intelligence Agency base in Laos and headquarters of the CIA's "Secret Army" of Meo mercenaries, was abandoned on Monday in one of the worst defeats ever suffered by the CIA in Laos. ✓

Long Cheng, 105 miles north of Vientiane, was reported under heavy artillery fire by Lao Patriotic Front forces on Sunday. American news sources said the town was deserted, with most of its buildings on fire; sophisticated U.S. electronic equipment had been dismantled and removed by CIA technicians. Gen. Vang Pao, head of the CIA "Secret Army," was said to have fled to a position 16 miles to the south of Long Cheng. In Vientiane, the forced evacuation of Long Cheng was being called a "serious setback" for the Government.

Lao Troops Quit Key Base

From News Dispatches

A Laotian government spokesman said yesterday in Vientiane that all government infantry troops had been moved out of the key base of Long Cheng in northern Laos to be deployed in nearby villages and on high ground around the besieged base.

The base, 82 miles northeast of the capital of Vientiane, was in a serious danger of being overrun by an estimated 8,000 Communist troops, the spokesman said.

Heavy Communist artillery attacks over the weekend destroyed the entire ammunition dump in the camp, which has been under intensive bombardment since last Friday

and is believed to be the main objective of a North Vietnamese offensive in northern Laos.

In Saigon, the U.S. Command announced today that an Air Force F-4 Phantom fighter-bomber had been lost over northern Laos last Friday, and that the two crewmen were still missing.

Earlier, the command announced that North Vietnamese troops had jumped a 25-man infantry patrol in jungles 40 miles northeast of Saigon yesterday and shot down three medical evacuation helicopters marked with red crosses while the craft were trying to lift out the wounded.

In addition to their red crosses, the medical helicopters were also equipped with two machine guns each.

An observation helicopter was also shot down, the command said.

The command said that one American had been killed and 14 wounded in the action, the biggest involving American ground troops in more than a month. Enemy losses in the engagement, if any, were not known.

The patrol had been providing security for a fire support base in the region, the command said.

There was no breakdown of casualties on the ground

Long Cheng is the headquarters of Gen. Van Pao's progovernment Meo guerrilla army, trained and equipped by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

The spokesman did not give the number of the troops withdrawn from the base but said only auxiliary units were left there.

The Long Cheng airstrip was vulnerable and only helicopters could get in and out with any safety, he added.

More than 30,000 civilians were evacuated from Long Cheng in the last two weeks after the North Vietnamese troops launched their offensive.

Meanwhile, Communist troops have moved back into a Cambodian rubber plantation northwest of Saigon following a partial South Vietnamese withdrawal and have launched heavy shelling attacks on allied bases in the area, military sources in Saigon said.

South Vietnamese intelligence reports indicated that the guerrillas may be in the process of moving sizable units into areas south of the plantation country around Dautieng, South Vietnam, 40 miles northwest of Saigon.

CIA Is Forced Out Of Big Laos Base

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Star Staff Writer

VIENTIANE — Long Chen, the main base in northeast Laos for U.S. military and intelligence operations has been downgraded to a forward base area for military operations, well-informed sources here say.

The reason for this change is the continuing North Vietnamese pressure on and around the base which over the week-end included a 500-shell artillery bombardment of the base by Hanoi long range artillery, probably 130mm guns with a range of 27,000 yards.

Damage Heavy

"The CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) have gone elsewhere, all the exotic crypto equipment is out," the sources said. "Long Chen is nothing more than a forward headquarters for military operations now."

Other sources confirmed a steady flow of equipment from Long Chen to other places in

the high forest-clad hills in northeast Laos.

Military sources said Hanoi artillery had done considerable damage to Long Chen. The week-end bombardment blew up the main ammunition dump, destroyed an air force fighter-bomber ramp, damaged part of the air strip and scored hits on the U.S. air operations center and CIA compound.

Only one person, a Meo was killed in the bombardment as most of Long Chen's 25,000 Meo and Lao civilians fled early last week.

Long Chen, 75 miles northeast of Vientiane, has been the U.S. military center for many years.

The base is manned by a minimum of 33 Americans with this number sometimes rising to 50. The CIA kept the U.S. contingent there engaged in monitoring Hanoi communications, supervising special military ground operations, which included American personnel, and running logistics for day to day military operations in northeast Laos around the Plain of Jars and in the Lao province bordering North Vietnam.

Used by Air Force

The U.S. Air Force used Long Chen as base for rescue helicopters for downed jets in the area. The Americans flew prop-driven divebombers on missions from Long Chen and the Air Force kept maintenance ground crews there.

The main force North Vietnamese units are now in positions about six and ten miles north and east of Long Chen and Hanoi sappers are skirmishing with the Meo within 2,000 or 3,000 yards of the airstrip.

The airstrip is still open to small U.S. aircraft and U.S. Meo headquarters personnel still are able to work there. However, sources said part of Meo Gen. Vang Pao's headquarters moved further into the Meo heartland near the village of Song Lai.

Long Chen is still considered psychologically important and its fall would still be considered a major blow to the Meo people who have fought Hanoi

U.S. Says Sudden Rains Hampered Bombing Raids

Enemy Forces Keep Up Shelling of Long Tieng, Laotians' Key Base

By IVER PETERSON

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Jan. 2—Military sources here say that a "freak weather change" plunged the North Vietnamese coast into fog and rain as the first waves of United States bombers were about to begin last week's raids against North Vietnam, forcing over a third of the attacking planes to turn back.

The sudden shift in weather is being blamed by command officers here for what they describe as the over-all disappointing results of the raids. If the weather had held, the sources say, the raids, which went on for five days, would have lasted less than three full days.


[In Laos, Agence France-Presse, reported that the enemy continued to shell Long Tieng, the key northern base where American military advisers are directing some 30,000 troops.]

Other reports of the United States command's general dissatisfaction with the bombing are beginning to come to the surface here as experts continue to analyze thousands of aerial photos taken to assess the raids' damage to North Vietnamese airfields, supply dumps and antiaircraft sites.

The five straight days of raids, which began on a Sunday, the day after Christmas, were the most sustained bombing of North Vietnam in more than three years.

The military sources said today that about 150 American fighter-bombers set out just after dawn Sunday after their pilots were told that the weather along the strike area was good.

When they were told that the sources add, the seasonal fog



The New York Times/Jan. 3, 1972
Laotian base at Long Tieng was bombarded by enemy forces' artillery.

and rain over the north had closed in and made accurate bombing almost impossible.

All but 46 planes turned back without dropping their bombs on target. The sources said that fear of hitting civilian areas was the main reason the jets did not try for their assigned targets.

After the first day, the Air Force and Navy pilots were given new targets and, in many cases, orders to strike other targets several times, the sources said.

This forced the United States command to extend the raids past the two or three days of bombing originally planned, the sources said.

Barracks Were Hit

The sources revealed that American jets did hit North Vietnamese army barracks as they went after nearby airfields and gun sites. It is believed, the sources said, that larger numbers of North Vietnamese soldiers were killed and wounded in the bombing that had been anticipated.

But the officers maintained that the pilots took extreme care to avoid civilian targets, even to the point of aborting one bomber's mission when the pilot could not see the military target clearly enough through the fog and rain.

Air Force sources said tonight that the same bad weather is still hampering the work of the planes. The United States command has prom-

ised to provide details of the results of the bombings when the analysis of the pictures is completed.

The command has already disclosed that four airfields and 11 antiaircraft gun, missile and radar sites were bombed during the raids. The antiaircraft sites were "effectively engaged," meaning destroyed, but officials would not give the degree of damage inflicted on the airfields.

The airfields and gun sites were attacked to stem the growing North Vietnamese challenge to the daily American bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and to the fighter-bombers that support Government troops around the Plaine des Jarres in northern Laos.

Other jets struck North Vietnamese supply depots to destroy war materiel destined for enemy troops in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.

United States bombing in Laos is viewed as especially important now. The North Vietnamese and their allies, the Pathet Lao guerrillas, recently opened an offensive on several fronts against American-supported Laotian and Meo tribe troops in the Plaine des Jarres and on the Boloven Plateau, in the southern panhandle.

U.S. Plane Losses High

SAIGON, Jan. 2 (AP)—Records of the United States command show that the United States closed out 1971 with the heaviest losses of tactical aircraft since the period before the bombing of North Vietnam was ordered halted on Nov. 1, 1963.

In the last three weeks of last month, 10 Air Force and Navy planes were reported lost over North Vietnam and Laos with 13 crewmen missing and six rescued.

North Vietnam reported that it had captured seven crewmen and named two it said were killed.

The combat emphasis for the Americans remained in the air as the New Year started, with B-52's committed to building up support of Laotian troops resisting a North Vietnamese offensive, military sources reported today.

The B-52's had been ordered into the area 10 days ago, when as many as 15,000 to 20,000 North Vietnamese soldiers, the equivalent of three divisions, were overrunning the Plaine des Jarres, the in-

American F-4 fighter-bombers were known to have been previously committed to northern Laos. The military sources said that the B-52's had been

summoned when North Vietnamese successes on the plain appeared to be threatening the guerrilla army of Maj. Gen. Vang Pao, based at Long Tieng, 73 miles north of Vientiane. General Pao's army is backed by the Central Intelligence Agency, which maintained sophisticated electronics equipment at Long Tieng-Cheng. The equipment has been dismantled as a precautionary move, the sources said.

Long Tieng Shelling Goes On

VIENTIANE, Laos, Jan. 2 (Agence France-Presse)—Enemy artillery continued today to bombard Long Tieng, the most important Government military base in northern Laos, while, in the Government-controlled parts of the country, legislative elections were held.

Long Tieng, 73 miles north of Vientiane, is the headquarters of the Government's Military Region II. With the aid of 30 to 40 United States military advisers, it directs 30,000 guerrilla troops equipped and trained by the Central Intelligence Agency.

North Vietnamese artillery shells, including some from 130-mm., long-range, rapid-fire guns first seen in Laos two weeks ago when enemy troops swept over the nearby Plaine des Jarres, rained into the base New Year's Eve and yesterday.

The rate of firing has dropped off since United States and Laotian planes attacked the area where the big guns are presumed to be hidden. But 60 more shells hit Long Tieng yesterday evening and there were dozens more this morning. One high-ranking Laotian officer was killed.

North Vietnamese infantry have resumed infiltration of the area around the base. Sam Thong, a smaller base six miles north of Long Tieng, has also been shelled, as has the nearby base of Thatamleung.

The Sam Thong hospital was moved this morning to the Ban Son refugee center, about 24 miles southwest of Sam Thong.

In southern Laos, the enemy was shelling the defense line that retreating Government troops recently established 21 miles east of Pakse, the country's second largest city.

STATINTL

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CIA Base in Laos Is a Ghost Town

By D. E. Ronk.

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Jan. 21—A badly demoralized army of Meo tribesmen waits at the CIA base of Long Cheng, 96 miles north of here, for Communist forces to make their next move.

Long Cheng is a virtual ghost town, after its 30,000 civilian residents fled following the loss of the Plain of Jars to Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces last month. Long Cheng is locked away deep in the mountains, most of which are now held by hostile forces poised to attack the base. Air America planes still come and go endlessly through the day, but the soldiers remain. They, too, want to leave.

U.S. source confirmed that the United States has no intention of supporting future attempts by Gen. Vang Pao to recapture the plain. There were also strong indications that the United States would write Long Cheng off if it falls before the rainy season, which begins in four months.

"The end to defending Laos is in sight," one U.S. source said.

Army Can't Hold

Lt. Nhuan, 25, a Lao officer who joined Gen. Vang Pao's army a year ago when he could find no decent work in Vientiane, said the Meo army would not hold if heavily hit by the enemy.

"We are afraid, very afraid now," he said.

Nhuan is a veteran of the Plain of Jars retreat, as well as its capture earlier this year by Vang Pao's forces.

In the past two years he has come to know the CIA-supported Meo army in the flush of success and in bitter, frightening defeat. He rambled on about the rush of artillery and soldiers that crushed the Laotians on the 30-square mile plain.

Nhuan did not look for scapegoats, just said they were overwhelmed. He did confirm what is being whispered in Laos: that Meo senior

officers were celebrating the Meo new year at Long Cheng, away from their troops on the plain, when the attack came. Nhuan said he and other junior officers and sergeants were in command.

Nhuan also noted that money problems contributed to the low morale. Thai troops get three and four times as much money as Meo troops, and are paid directly by the Americans. Meo and Lao soldiers have not been paid by their Meo officers for two or three months, which Nhuan said produced bitter tensions.

But it was not just that. Nhuan said. He spoke in awe of a tank rumbling to within 40 yards of his unit and pumping round after round into their position.

Walked Three Days

Nhuan said they left the plain Dec. 18, at least a day earlier than U.S. sources in Vientiane announced, walking three days to Ban Na, 15 miles north of Long Cheng.

After two weeks, Nhuan said he cannot remember seeing a single dead North Vietnamese, but added that only 18 of about 500 Thai artillery and infantrymen on Fire Support Base King Kong overlooking his own position made it to Ban Na with them when they retreated.

"Now everyone is waiting to leave Long Cheng," Nhuan said.

North and east of the base, and already within the outer defense perimeter, North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao commanders are grouping men, materiel and artillery. It is just a matter of time, before they attack, informed sources said.

U.S. planners have not relinquished hope for Long Cheng, but they hastened to add the question: "How important is Long Cheng, anyway?"

"The mountains up there are the key," one source

room to go and no sense in being tied to one location," a CIA planner said.

A qualified U.S. government source said: "Long Cheng can be held even at this point, so long as no one makes a big mistake when the crunch comes."

Temporary Move

Nhuan said he believed their next location would be at Ban Son, about 20 miles southeast of Long Cheng. He said the Americans took their equipment to Ban Son, but other sources said that was only a temporary emergency move.

Nhuan noted that following the retreat from the plain, Meo troops found that North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao commanders, had in what seemed almost like an afterthought, moved into small but critical positions both north and east of Long Cheng, pushing the Meo army closer to headquarters.

It was not an afterthought, but, as U.S. planners said, a coordinated effort to outflank the retreating Meo-Thai forces. The Communists also moved small commando units to within three miles of the base itself for harassment and reconnaissance.

The loss of two hills overlooking the base has put defense of Long Cheng in a "grave" condition, military observers said.

2 JAN 1972

STATINTL

Undisciplined Lao Units Fall Apart

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE

Special to The Star

VIENTIANE—Absent commanders, incompetence, lack of discipline and low morale were blamed in military post-mortems for the two major Lao government defeats in the last two weeks—at the Plain of Jars in the north and the Bolovens Plateau in the south.

"The defensive plan for the Plain of Jars would have worked," sources said, "if the maneuver elements in front of the firebases had maneuvered as they were supposed to. But they didn't move because none of the commanders were there. They were all at Long Cheng celebrating the Meo new year." Long Cheng is the headquarters of Meo Gen. Vang Pao and a major CIA base.

Defenses Ignored

A mixed force of Thais and Laotians failed to dig proper defenses around their artillery, the sources charged, and in most cases individual soldiers made no attempts to defend their positions.

These comments came as troops come trickling back, reporting high losses of men and equipment.

Thai troops, who apparently fought longer at Firebase King Kong on the northern edge of the Plain of Jars seemed to suffer most, with only 13 survivors from a 500-man force.

Eyewitnesses said North Vietnamese tanks formed a circle 40 yards from King Kong to fire into it. They were supported from Keng Mountain by North Vietnamese firing directly into Thai positions from above.

Equipment losses on the plain apparently were tremendous. In one case, an intact battery of 155 mm. howitzers was captured by the North Vietnamese. About 23 other artillery pieces on the plain were destroyed.

Government missing, dead and wounded may total more than 1,000.

A soldier from the plain reports morale was low because many received no pay for three months. The Thais were paid directly by the CIA in the field, but the Meo, whose commanders received

money from the Americans, had not been paid, one soldier said.

These factors, combined with good planning by the North Vietnamese and good troop coordination by the Communists caused the defeat of the allied force on the plain, informed sources said. The North Vietnamese meteorological service is excellent, sources said. The Vietnamese mounted their attack at the same time cloudy and rainy weather hit the area. This protected them from the air.

Military sources blamed a wrong command decision for the loss of the town of Paksong on the Bolovens Plateau in the southern panhandle of Laos.

Sources said Paksong received heavy mortar fire and a series of light probes from the North Vietnamese throughout a 24-hour period. Government troops already demoralized by heavy losses from North Vietnamese ambush the previous week, quit two important hills east of Paksong.

Then Col. Kham Kho, sector commander, gave orders to retreat though there had been no heavy North Vietnamese ground attack or any shelling on Paksong's inner perimeter.

Once again the Thais were the last to leave. Government losses totalled 35 killed and at least 30 wounded and missing.

These two defeats leave the Lao government in a weak military position unusually early in the dry season, which still has four months to run.

It means four months of dry weather to keep trails open for Hanoi logistics, and of hazy weather which gives air cover.

The North Vietnamese already have penetrated the Meo-Thai-Lao defense line northeast of Long Chen.

Pressure to Continue

All indications are that Hanoi intends to keep up the military pressure, even though this gets more difficult as the North Vietnamese troops progress into the Meo mountains south of the plain.

The North Vietnamese can't use their trucks in the trackless mountains and must resort to portage by the troops themselves.

Unless Hanoi chooses to carry everything by coolie over mountain ridges, their troop activity will be restricted to a few valleys which can easily be blocked by the Meos.

Despite all this, Americans and Meos are unsure of staying in Long Chen this year.

Some favor more mobile strategy, anyway. Others are downcast, saying gloomily that the North Vietnamese have been held for 11 years, but that now it's over for Laos.

Meo civilians have all quit Long Chen, which is their hill capital as well as Meo military headquarters, and the CIA pulled out its communications and other equipment.

At Paksong, the Lao and Thais, having discovered they quit the town prematurely, are trying to move back in.

Two-War Campaign

The two actions fought in Laos in the last two weeks have been extremely important. Two wars are being fought — one in the north where Hanoi is trying to bring political pressure on the Lao government to call off American bombing, particularly on the trail system in the south which Hanoi depends on to supply its forces in South Vietnam and Cambodia.

At the same time, Hanoi is annexing Lao territory in the north with a view to providing Laotian Communist with territory and a population power base.

In the long run this would insure Hanoi's having a friendly Communist neighbor along most of its border.

The other war in south Laos is Hanoi's attempt to widen the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex.

This widening of the trails has been spurred on by two events — the war in Cambodia and the South Vietnamese invasion last year.

The war in Cambodia has meant that Hanoi needs to put not only its troops through Laos to South Vietnam, but also its supplies which previously entered South Vietnam through the Cambodian

It also needs to send more supplies for the Cambodian war itself.

By widening the trail complex Hanoi achieves more trails and also has trails deeper in Laos and further away from a future South Vietnamese attempt to cut its logistics lines.

A greater variety of trails also spreads the U.S. Air Force over a greater number of targets at a time when fewer aircraft are available.

A Crushing Defeat

The crushing Plain of Jars defeat and the swift move toward Long Chen, puts the Lao government in the position of having to face up to the possibility of the Vietnamese reaching the edge of the Vientiane plain this year and perhaps making some Lao think they should talk with Hanoi instead of fighting. The fall of Paksong puts important high ground controlling the west entrance of the Bolovens Plateau in Hanoi hands and the plateau — which would make an excellent Hanoi sanctuary and trail area under virtual North Vietnamese control.

If in the next four months, Hanoi can take Long Chen, and push the Lao government from the West slopes of the Bolovens, the North Vietnamese will be a long way toward attaining their objectives in Laos.

THE LEGEND OF TONY POE, CIA

U.S. operations in Southeast Asia have often involved shadowy figures, perhaps none more shadowy than the elusive, Jekyll-

Hyde figure of Anthony A. Poshepny

MEN AT WAR/ BY DONALD KIRK

HE'S A ROUND-FACED, cheery man with a cherubic smile and a charming family air, it is said, a penchant for preserving the heads of his victims in formaldehyde. He's a classic Jekyll-and-Hyde who has been waging the most secret phase of America's secret war in Southeast Asia for the past ten years.

To the boys at Napoleon Cafe and the Derby King on Bangkok's Patpong Road, a watering ground for Air America pilots, CIA types, journalists and other assorted old Indochina hands, he's just plain Tony Poe, but his real name is Anthony A. Poshepny. He's a refugee from Hungary, an ex-Marine who fought on Iwo Jima and a dedicated patriot of his adopted land, the United States of America, for which he has risked his life on literally hundreds of occasions while ranging through the undulating velvet-green crags and valleys of Red China, Laos and Thailand.

He also shuns publicity and hates reporters, as I discovered in a long search for him, beginning in the Thai capital of Bangkok and extending to the giant American airbases in northeastern Thailand and to the mountains of northern Laos. The search for Tony Poe ended where it had begun, in the lobby of the Amarin Hotel on Bangkok's Ploenchit Road, a crowded, six-lane-wide avenue that runs through a residential and shopping district supported largely by rich American "farangs," the somewhat demeaning Thai term for "foreigners." There, before leaving Bangkok for the last time, I picked up a note, signed simply "Tony," stating that he had to "decline" my request for an interview. "I beelieve [sic] that you can appreciate my reason for not seeking public commentary," wrote Tony in the formal "statement style" better befitting a public official and probably suggested, if not dictated, by a superior in the Central Intelligence Agency.

"C-I-A?" asked the cute little Japanese girl at the front desk of the Amarin, enunciating each of the letters, smiling slightly with glittering white teeth, raising her eyebrows flir-

Poe is airplane pilot. He works for Continental Air Services." An assistant manager, also Japanese, showed me the registration card Tony had signed only a few days before my arrival at the Amarin last June, in the middle of my search for him. Tony, I learned, generally stayed at the Amarin, only a few blocks from the modernesque American embassy. He was a familiar, beloved character to the staff at the hotel—the opposite of his public image as a sinister, secret killer and trainer of anti-Communist guerrilla warriors.

"Anthony A. Poshepny," read the top line. "Air Ops Officer—Continental Air Services." So Tony, with a record of more combat jumps than any other American civilian in Indochina, had used Continental as his "cover" while training mountain tribesmen to fight against regular Communist troops from both China and North Vietnam. Tony's cover surprised me; I had assumed he would declare himself as some sort of U.S. government "official"—perhaps an adviser to border-patrol police units, the traditional cover under which CIA operatives masquerade in both Thailand and Laos. Still, Continental was a logical choice. Like Air America, Continental regularly ferries men and supplies to distant outposts throughout Indochina. Financed at least in part by the CIA, Continental could hardly balk at providing cover for full-time CIA professionals.

The next two lines on Poe's registration form were even more intriguing than his link with Continental, at least in terms of what he was doing at the present. After "going to," Tony had written, "Udon," the name of the base town in northeastern Thailand from which the United States not only flies bombing missions over all of Laos but also coordinates the guerrilla war on the ground. And where was Tony "coming from," according to the form? His origin was Phitsanulok, a densely jungled mountain province famed for incessant fighting between Commu-

nist-armed guerrillas, most of them members of mountain tribes, and ill-trained Thai army soldiers and policemen. Tony, it seemed, had vanished into the wilds of Phitsanulok (where the jungle is so thick and the slopes so steep as to discourage the toughest American advisers) on a mysterious training venture not known even to most American officials with top-secret security clearances, much less to the girls behind the desk of the Amarin.

"Oh, he's such a nice man," one of the girls in the hotel assured me when I asked how she liked Tony—who, I'd been warned by other journalists, might shoot on sight any reporter discovered snooping too closely into his life. "He has very nice wife and three lovely children," the girl bubbled on, pausing to giggle slightly between phrases. "He comes here on vacation from up-country." The impression Poe has made on the girls at the Amarin is a tribute both to his personality and his stealth. As I discovered while tracing him from the south of Thailand to northern Laos, he already had an opulent home in Udon for his wife, a tribal princess whom he had married a year or so ago. Mrs. Poshepny, a tiny, quick-smiling girl whom Tony had met while training members of the Yao tribe for special missions into China, liked to come to Bangkok to shop while Tony conferred with his CIA associates on the guarded "CIA floor," of the American embassy.

It was ironic that I should have learned that Tony stayed at the Amarin while in Bangkok, for it was only by chance that I had checked in there at the beginning of my search—and only during small talk with the desk clerks that I found one of Tony's registration cards.

The day after I arrived in Bangkok, local journalists gave me my first inkling of some of the rumors surrounding Tony Poe. One of the journalists; Lance Woodruff, formerly a reporter on one of Bangkok's two English-language newspapers and now with the Asian Institute of Technology in Bangkok, said Poe not only hated reporters but had been known to "do away with people he doesn't like." Woodruff compared Poe to a figure from *Terry and the Pirates* and told me the story of how Poe lined one wall of a house in northern Laos, near the Chinese border, with heads of persons he had killed. None of the contacts I met in Bangkok had the slightest clue as to Tony's whereabouts—except that he was somewhere "up-country" training tribesmen to fight the Communists,

Still unaware that Poe stayed at the Amarin, I drove to a town named Ubon some 325 miles northeast of

STATINTL

The Billions in the White House Basement

by Timothy H. Ingram

By cliché, the power of the purse is now widely referred to as Congress' only remaining lever for redressing the balance between itself and the presidency. Increasingly, Congress is recognizing that its foreign affairs and treaty-making functions are mere ornaments, and that its traditional checks on the Executive are either unrealistic or meaningless. What is left is the appropriations power, and a handful of senators and representatives are invoking it in a muted but growing struggle to revive congressional strength.

Few appreciate, however, the extent to which even the power of the purse, that bulwark of legislative authority, is already controlled by the presidency. As Congress attempts to tame the Executive by threatening to cut off funds for things like war, it finds that the Executive has already developed innumerable devices for

Timothy Ingram, formerly with public television's "The Advocates," is a Washington writer.

getting the money, anyway. And far from successfully denying the President his money, Congress is even having a hard time getting him to spend what is appropriated.

The Constitution, of course, says that the appropriations power is the exclusive prerogative of Congress. But in the vacuum created by Congressional indifference to overseeing the bureaucracy's spending habits, and by the now empty ritual of blue-penciling the President's annual budget, the Executive has amassed a mound of spending prerogatives of its own: transfer authorities, contingency funds, lump-sum appropriations, special waiver authorities, and covert financing.

A look at several discretionary spending options will give some idea of the extent of the Executive's grasp of the purse strings—and some indication of what Congress is left holding. For example, through secrecy, transfer powers, mislabelled military assistance, unauthorized commitments, and cloaked grants of excess war goods, the President and his national security managers are able to hire mercenaries, discourage a rump insurrection in Ceylon, promise South Korea \$3.5 billion, and turn over an unknown amount of equipment, helicopters, and bases to Vietnam. A simple budgetary procedure called reprogramming allows the Navy to quietly secure a behind-the-doors reversal of a congressional decision to defer production of the controversial F-14 fighter. And the pipeline, a huge reservoir of unexpended funds, permits the Pentagon to spend above the level of appropriations authorized by Congress. While lamenting the loss of its war powers, Congress consoles itself with the thought that it still maintains control over domestic priorities by its annual allotment of funds. But through impoundment, the President refuses to spend some \$12 billion in appropriated monies, placing a post mortem item veto on such programs as urban renewal, regional medical clinics, food stamps, and farm loans.

The panoply of deceptive devices available to the Executive's budgetary Houdinis was graphically illustrated in a memo submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary Laird on August 30, 1971. According to *The New York Times*, the Joint Chiefs offered several ways of by-passing the limited military appropriations authorized by Congress to generate an additional \$52 million or

more, to increase the strength of the Cambodian Army.

The first would be simply to transfer \$52 million appropriated for economic aid to the military aid program. The second would be to use economic aid money to buy all "common use" items such as trucks and jeeps, which have military as well as civilian value, thus freeing the other funds for strictly military uses. The third would be to increase procurement for the U.S. Army by \$52 million and give the materiel to the Cambodians, for "repayment" later. The fourth would be to make some exceptions in Defense Department supply regulations, declaring equipment to be "excess" and delivering it to the Cambodians.

In addition, the memo proposed, the Joint Chiefs would clandestinely provide for a mechanized brigade, an artillery brigade, and coastal patrol units, as well as ground troops and extensive logistic support. AID would help finance the paramilitary force of armed civilians, which the planners hoped would number 200,000 by mid-1973 and more than 500,000 in 1977. The CIA, with its secret budget, supposedly would help train and direct Cambodian military units, as it is now doing with Laotian and Thai troops in Laos, and would provide airlift support with its subsidized airline, Air America. The proposals represented a complete subversion of congressional authority.

But the real significance of the story was not reported: how commonplace these methods have become. The Executive devices are as widespread as they are ingenious.

Cause of Plane Loss In Laos Still Unclear

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Dec. 29—Reports that an American civilian cargo plane missing in Northwestern Laos was shot down by Chinese Communist antiaircraft fire are being discounted by Air America operators of the plane in Laos.

Air America and informed U.S. sources here said that an Air America C-123 cargo plane carrying a crew of three Americans and one Laotian is believed down on a supply flight. The U.S. sources said the flight originated at Udorn airbase, Thailand, and was en route to the area of Xieng Long, Laos, 160 miles northwest of Vientiane on the Thai-Lao border.

Air America is a charter airlines which works for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Air America spokesmen refused to confirm the plane's destination or to divulge the nature of its cargo.

There was speculation here that the plane was in fact carrying a resupply drop to a reconnaissance team located in the area where it was downed. But U.S. sources would say only that the plane was carrying rice.

The presence of a number of clandestine bases, including those for CIA-sponsored guerrillas and intelligence gathering teams in the area of the suspected crash, is believed responsible for the reluctance of most sources here to discuss the current search effort.

Air America sources say they have now reason to be-

lieve the cargo plane was downed by Chinese gunners. They noted that the air space over the area where the Chinese are building a road, which cuts from northeast Laos toward the southwest and ends at the Mekong River, 140 miles northwest of here, is strictly "off limits" to American planes.

The Chinese road also lies 30 miles or more northeast of the standard air routes to northwest Laos.

There was some speculation the plane might have been shot down by Chinese ground fire, because sources here revealed that search and rescue planes now looking for the downed aircraft had received antiaircraft flak at 2,000 feet, higher than the effective range of guns used by the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces in Laos.

No rescue planes had been hit so far, the sources said.

Laotians Abandon Town on Plateau

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Dec. 28—Government troops supported by Thai irregulars suffered their second major setback in just over a week early today when they were forced to abandon the town of Paksong in the southern panhandle after a day of fighting.

The capture of Paksong gives the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao rebels virtual control of all the Bolovens Plateau.

According to informed U.S. sources, the Lao troops may attempt to reenter the town within the next few days.

Three months ago, Paksong had been retaken by the Laotians in some of the bloodiest fighting of the decade-old Laotian war.

Small Units

Following today's withdrawal from Paksong, the Lao troops reportedly dispersed in what are called mobile defense units to avoid a large-scale confrontation with superior North Vietnamese forces.

Thai artillerymen from Paksong are said to be regrouping in Pakse, 30 miles to the west.

Incomplete reports put allied losses at 18 dead and more than 20 wounded. Total strength at the onset on the battle was about 2,500 men, including 1,000 Thais.

Thai and Laotian gunners are said to have left behind eight 155-mm. howitzers in the retreat. A large amount of equipment was also abandoned, sources say.

The defeat at the Bolovens Plateau follows by eight days the government's loss of its position on the Plain of Jars north of the capital of Vientiane. It adds to the pall of gloom hanging over the Laotian government and the U.S. mission.

U.S. Pessimism

A major attack against the CIA base at Long Cheng, southwest of the Plain of Jars, is expected any day.

A major contributing factor to the American pessimism, sources within the U.S. Mission said, is the poor showing of the Thai forces in both the Paksong and Plain of Jars action.

The Thais were brought in to beef up the Laotians and the progovernment Meo tribesmen, the sources said, "but they seem to panic earlier than others, going to pieces and running at the slightest sign of heavy action."

Other sources in the U.S. mission said, however, that the Thai troops on the Plain of Jars took a terrible beating both from North Vietnamese artillery and infantry when they were caught in their fire support bases.

U.S. spokesmen here said no information is yet available on casualties at the Plain of Jars other than that they have been classified as "heavy," a military term indicating that at least some units were rendered unable to continue fighting.


Informed sources said the situation at Long Cheng remains serious with the enemy continuing to make reconnaissance probes to the east and north of the base and also regrouping his infantry and artillery units. Probing actions have been reported less than five miles east of Long Cheng.

Other than scattered information from the U.S. Embassy spokesman, an apparent news blackout ordered by Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley continues in effect with U.S. officials refusing to meet with newsmen to discuss the war situation.

Some U.S. sources said the blackout was ordered to forestall reporting of any semiofficial assessment which would necessarily be grim.

CIA Airliner Is Lost Over Northern Laos

An Air America C-123 transport plane was missing over northern Laos, according to the airline's office here.



December 29, 1971

The Washington Post

Laotian forces have been pushed out of the town of Paksong in southern Laos on the Bolovens Plateau.

Reports from Vientiane, capital of Laos, speculated that the plane had been shot down by Chinese anti-aircraft known to be deployed in parts of northern Laos.

Air America is an airline run by the Central Intelligence Agency. It transports ferry material and men around Vietnam and Laos.

The reports from Laos by the French news agency, Agence France-Presse, said that there were four Americans, a Chinese and a Meo aboard and that the plane was 24 hours overdue at its destination.

The Chinese Communists have been building roads in northern Laos for several years and have deployed several battalions of antiaircraft to protect their roadworkers. A recent official U.S. estimate was that there were 14,000 Chinese

STATINTL

*International News***Patriotic victory in Laos**

VIENTIANE—Royal Lao Defense Minister Gen. Thongphan Knocksy said in Vientiane on Monday that forces of the Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) had captured two more bases south of the Plain of Jars and now directly threaten the big Central Intelligence Agency base at Long Cheng. Knocksy said the situation in Laos was growing "confused," and that 30,000 Meo tribesmen had already been evacuated from Long Cheng. He said that on Saturday the pro-U.S. regime had to retreat from Ban Na and Khan Kho airstrips, 14 miles northwest of Long Cheng. On Monday, LPF attacks were reported eight miles northwest of Long Cheng, headquarters for the CIA-run "Secret Army" of Meo mercenaries.

The LPF's Kaosan Pathet Lao news agency reported on Monday that the LPF had scored a tremendous victory in the Dec. 18-21 fighting, capturing the entire Plain of Jars—Muong Sui region—killing, wounding or capturing 3,300 Meo "secret Army" mercenaries, shooting down 17 planes, and capturing large stores of equipment, including tanks and heavy artillery.

On Sunday in Saigon, Rep. G. V. "Sonny" Montgomery (D-Miss), a ranking member of the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, said the "Communists" could take over Laos anytime they wanted and also accused the CIA of making a mess of things in the small, Southeast Asian country. "What I know about Laos is that the CIA has done a pretty lousy job and has been ineffective," the Mississippi Democrat said. He said he favored reducing U.S. spending in Laos and replacing the CIA with regular U.S. military advisers. Montgomery was evidently unaware military advisers of any kind are prohibited by the 1962 Geneva Agreement on Laos which the U.S. signed.

Hanoi steps up attacks

Assaults expected on three fronts

By George W. Ashworth.

Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Seizure of the Plain of Jars in Laos by the North Vietnamese appears to be the opening foray in a three-front offensive of renewed intensity.

Sources here expect that there will be a brief pause in the North Vietnamese attacks in northern Laos while forces are regrouped and supply routes are organized. After that, it is considered likely that further assault will begin in force. The rainy season is over, the "fighting season" is here.

Also expected are periodic thrusts in Cambodia, more to keep the Cambodians uncertain and uneasy than to achieve any final resolution there.

As far as South Vietnam is concerned, the enemy can be expected to build continuously now for concerted action early next year. The brunt of enemy activity in South Vietnam in the near future probably will occur in military Region II which includes much of the central highlands and the cities of Pleiku and Dalat.

The two South Vietnamese divisions on duty in Region II are considered about the most ineffectual of Saigon's regular fighting forces, and the region offers good cover and concealment plus well-established routes of movement for North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces.

Show of force expected

There has been a buildup in that area of greater intensity than at any point south; officials here consider it quite likely that Pleiku or some other town or city may be attacked in a show of force.

The fall of the Plain of Jars came as a shock to officials here, who feel that Americans in the field had led them to expect a better performance when the fighting started. It had been hoped that the forces on the plain would put up stiff fighting that would force the North Vietnamese to spend weeks, or not months, taking back the plain as part of the annual seesaw of opposing forces.

It didn't turn out that way. The plain fell to the North Vietnamese onslaught within 48 hours, with heavy losses in troops and equipment on the non-Communist side.

[Secretary of State William P. Rogers says, the United States is going to continue its policy of air activity in Southeast Asia.]

Officials here say privately that they were being assured as late as last week from the field that the defenses were in good shape.

Part of the collapse can be attributed to bad weather, and to the fact that the U.S.-allied forces, comprised of Meo irregulars and Thai troops paid for by the U.S., did not hold on nearly as well as they have in the past.

Unfamiliar operations area

The Thai troops were not overly familiar with the area of operations; they had never operated there in strength until this year, when they did so in the wake of a large buildup of Thai forces in Laos.

Beyond that, however, the U.S. and its allies did not expect enemy antiaircraft defenses and artillery and rocket bombardments of such intensity. Enemy antiaircraft capability has been increased immensely since last year, to the point that U.S. allies found it impossible to use the relatively slow and lightly equipped Lao Air Force in relative safety.

Simply put, the North Vietnamese this time were quite capable of shooting the Lao Air Force out of the air.

Consequently, without the close air support normally provided by the small A-37 attack aircraft and A-1 planes, as well as light spotter aircraft and helicopters, the non-Communist forces had extremely limited close air support.

The only planes that could fly in with fairly good chances of survival were such exotic types as the U.S. F-4 Phantoms. But such planes because of their very nature, were not able to provide the very close-in support that the non-Communist forces evidently needed.

Positions more exposed

The U.S. allies positions generally were lower and more exposed than those of the enemy, which occupied the higher western reaches looking down on the plain and foothills where the non-Communist side was ensconced.

The North Vietnamese thus were able to batter U.S. allies' positions heavily from the start, and to inflict defeat that took the form of a rather disordered retreat. Lost were about 20 artillery pieces, plus tremendous quantities of ammunition and small arms. The artillery loss could be significant, because it represents a large share of the total non-Communist inventory.

The non-Communist side will undoubtedly try to hold the line now at Long Chien, which is the headquarters of General Pao's forces as well as the American CIA officials guiding the war effort. That defense, however, will be more difficult now because of the dis-
ing on the plain.

About 10,000 non-Communists opposed 14,000 to 18,000 North Vietnamese on the plain. Recently at Long Chien there were only 5,000 or so available defenders, although more were coming in — stragglers from the defeat on the plain. Officials in the field now are trying desperately to organize for the defense of Long Chien.

Defense shift discussed

Last summer the concept was broached in several quarters of the government here of moving away from trying to retake the Plain of Jars during the rainy season and going to an organized defense in a line centered on Long Chien. In hindsight, it appears that could have been a more successful plan, given the present state of affairs. No one knows for sure, however, if even that would have worked. The Meos live in the hope that somehow the North Vietnamese will be ousted permanently at some point and the Meos can begin arming the plain again. Failure to retake it several months back could have been demoralizing.

The loss of the several U.S. Phantom jets can be attributed both to the heavier use lately of air attacks against North Vietnamese buildups, and to the North Vietnamese decision to sharply increase antiaircraft defenses both in northern Laos and in the infiltration areas. There now are 22 battalions of surface-to-air missiles in the infiltration areas as against 10 a year ago. Antiaircraft guns have doubled in number and now include a substantial element of radar-directed 53 millimeter guns as well as lesser caliber.

The impression is one of an enemy effort designed for greater capability and staying power, if not for widespread decisive actions.

The North Vietnamese would like to cause further internal difficulties for Laos and Cambodia and to intensify South Vietnamese wariness over enemy strength. Beyond that, Hanoi would undoubtedly like to convince Saigon that South Vietnamese forces will be incapable of doing much to disrupt activities outside South Vietnam after the American departure.

Renewed activity on all fronts will serve a likely Hanoi purpose of getting the war back on the U.S. television evening news shows, and on newspaper front pages to help keep public pressure on President Nixon to bring Americans home.

Washington Wire

A Special Weekly Report From
The Wall Street Journal's
Capital Bureau

HANOI'S FORCES, slowed down in South Vietnam, threaten lasting gains in Laos.

They retake the Plain of Jars two months ahead of the time U.S. officials expected; the region has changed hands annually in the war between North Vietnamese and CIA-backed guerrilla forces. Hanoi may have the plain for keeps this time. It moves up long-range artillery and tanks, sends MIGs to harass U.S. bombers. Washington steps up the bombing in efforts to stem the Red tide.

Hanoi's goals remain largely political. One hope: to force creation of a new Laotian regime that would invite the Americans out, demand an end to bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The enemy, frustrated in Vietnam, also seeks headline-making gains in Laos to revive congressional cries about widening the war. Hanoi may attempt a fresh scare just as Nixon visits Peking in February.

Some good news for the U.S.: The Reds fall back in Cambodia as Phnom Penh's army advances. Calls for premier Lon Nol's resignation slacken.

24 DEC 1971

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601

CIA Force Imperiled by Reds in Laos

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Dec. 23—Communist forces in the mountain regions of northern Laos are now in a position to destroy the CIA-sponsored, progovernment Meo army led by Gen. Vang Pao, which they rapidly routed from the Plain of Jars last weekend.

U.S. sources here said the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao threw the largest, best-armed and best-equipped force ever used in northern Laos against the positions of Meo tribesmen and their Thai irregular allies.

They not only routed Gen. Vang Pao's defense of the upland plain, but clearly indicated that their goals go beyond the seasonal exchange of territory.

The North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao appear to be moving toward Long Cheng, the main CIA base 100 miles north of Vientiane and less than 30 miles southwest of the Plain of Jars. Informed sources said about 10,000 civilians have fled Long Cheng, but could not say whether Lao or U.S. officials had ordered the evacuation.

U.S. sources said North Vietnamese trucks were rapidly moving troops and artillery southward along the eastern edge of the plain. Bad flying weather and intense anti-aircraft fire have given the Communists a reprieve from bombing and greater freedom of movement than usual.

Thai-Meo bases with about 20 howitzers have been abandoned, the sources said. The only remaining fortified positions are those ringing Long Cheng.

Lao military spokesman said the Meo-Thai force that retreated from the plain is not in a position to block the Communist movement toward Long Cheng.

Analysts here expect that the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao will swing west toward Long Cheng from the south end of the plain, making their way through extremely rugged gorges toward positions within the 12-mile range of their guns.

Communists have already taken one hilltop position within easy artillery range of Long Cheng.


Traditionally, the Communists have approached Long Cheng from the western edge of the plain south to confront the Meo-Thai artillery north of the base, particularly at Ban Na. Although Ban Na was abandoned for a time last year, it managed to stave off direct attack of Long Cheng until the advent of the monsoon rains when the Communists withdrew from the plain.

This year the Communists won the plain two months earlier than in the past, allowing far more maneuver and attack time before the rains begin.

This year, with the cloudy skies holding back U.S. and Lao air power, Communist troops have an unprecedented strategic and tactical advantage in attacking Long Cheng, military sources say.

U.S. sources here say Tuesday morning's attack on the CIA base by a Communist demolition team may have been a random and isolated one. Nevertheless, morale at Long Cheng has plunged to its lowest point in more than a year with frightened Mao families hurriedly fleeing toward the south.

Persistent reports from Long Cheng, neither con-



December 24, 1971

The Washington Post

Communist forces, fresh from a conquest on the Plain of Jars, now pose a threat to the base at Long Cheng.

firmed nor denied by spokesmen here, say Air America cargo planes are evacuating important equipment from the isolated base.

About 30,000 local tribesmen, Thai irregulars and Americans are stationed at Long Cheng, which is indefensible once the hill positions surrounding it are breached.

Long Cheng has a certain psychological importance for Meo tribesmen who are aligned in clans with Gen. Vang Pao and the CIA. Most knowledgeable sources here believe the fall of Long Cheng would take the binding force out of Vang Pao's army and send the troops and their families back

to the hills to resume their nomadic lives.

This would leave the entire mountainous region of northern Laos under the control of the Pathet Lao and their North Vietnamese allies.

Laotian regular forces on the Mekong plain to the south are not seen as competent to retake the highlands.

The fall of Long Cheng would be the fall of the "cutting edge" of the royalist forces, as the Meo have been called, and the end of the government's claims to anything in the north except the royal capital at Luang Prabang which is not threatened by Communist advances.



JOHN P. ROCHE

The Secret War in Laos

STATINTL

The "Secret War" in Laos popped up again in the Senate in a dialogue between Sen. Allen Ellender, chairman of the five-man committee that oversees U.S. intelligence operations, and Sen. J. W. Fulbright.

Fulbright inquired caustically whether Ellender was aware that the CIA had a private army in Laos, whether the watchdog committee was privy to the operation. Ellender's reply was a bit confused — the old protege of Huey Long is now 81 — but it could certainly be construed as a denial of knowledge.

Fulbright and his friends, who have been attacking executive autonomy, scored a rhetorical victory, though from another perspective one might argue that if the Senate "watchdog" goes to sleep, it is hardly a reflection on the President.

HOWEVER, the most interesting aspect of this exchange is that no literate American needs a watchdog committee to fill him in on the CIA's activities in Laos. All he needs is \$12.50 to purchase Arthur J. Dommen's "Conflict In Laos: The Politics of Neutralization" (Praeger), published last spring. If he is not feeling that strongly about the subject, he can probably get the book from a public library.

As indicated here before—in connection with the "Pentagon Papers"—there is an enormous and detailed corpus of scholarly writing on Indochina that makes most sensational "revelations" about American policy old stuff to anyone who has taken the trouble read. To cite but one example, the only thing the "Pentagon Papers" tell us about the anti-Diem coup that Robert Shaplen omitted in Chapter VI of his "The Lost Evolution" (1965) are the exact names of the players (which Shaplen, of course, knew but left out on prudential grounds).

To return to Laos, Dommen has provided readers with an inch-by-inch development of American involvement. His central thesis is that the reasonable policy for Laos is neutralization under Great-Power auspices, that (with a certain amount of wobbling) this became American and Soviet policy by 1962, but that Hanoi simply would not co-operate. As he carefully documents, from the day Ho Chi Minh and his cadres launched their insurgency against the French, the North Vietnamese set their sights on the creation of a Communist successor regime for the whole of Indochina, that is, for Annam, Tonkin, and Cochinchina in Vietnam proper, and for Laos and Cambodia.

TEMPORARILY FRUSTRATED at Geneva in 1954 because neither Moscow (which had a private deal underway with the French to scuttle the European defense community) nor Peking (which was licking its wounds from the Korean War) would support their demands, the North Vietnamese quietly proceeded to build up their forces for another round.

This involved securing the lines of communication to South Vietnam or — in terms of the topography of Indochina — the Laotian Panhandle, subsequently notable for the Ho Chi Minh Trail. And, as base areas for the Laotian guerrillas, the Pathet Lao, as well as North Vietnamese regulars, they took de facto sovereignty over the two Northern Laotian provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly.

But what interests us is the American response. Without going over familiar ground, it is fair to say that Dommen has missed nothing significant that occurred prior to 1960 (when I left the White House and access to intelligence materials). The whole story is there including the wild siege of Phou Pha Thi, the mountaintop in Sam Neua, where the U.S. had installed a beacon (right in the enemy heartland) to guide the bombers heading for North Vietnam. Also for the first time due credit has been given to Vang Pao and his Meo Army—usually dismissed as "mercenaries"—for their courage and tribal patriotism (Laos is not a "nation").

Whether our course of action was correct or incorrect is open to argument. Many of Dommen's criticisms are devastating, but he is always fair-minded in pointing out that — whether we should or should not have reacted as we did — we were up against an enemy demanding and planning total victory.

I just hope that if any of you have a senator or representative who is wandering around complaining about the "Secret War in Laos," you will send him this book for Christmas.

Troops' Families Leave Laos CIA Base

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Dec. 22—

Frightened families of CIA-supported Meo irregulars at Long Cheng, one hundred miles north of here, have been walking south from the base since yesterday morning's attack by 20 North Vietnamese commandos and in the aftermath of serious military losses on the Plain of Jars 20 miles to the northeast.

Reports reaching Vientiane from knowledgeable U.S. sources also say Air America transport planes are ferrying important equipment and material from the Meo-CIA headquarters, flying it to safety at

Luang Prabang, Vientiane and Udorn, Thailand.

A hospital at the Long Cheng base, reportedly filled to overflowing by wounded from the Plain of Jars, has also been evacuated, the sources say, though it is unclear whether it is evacuation of old patients to make room for recently wounded or a general abandonment of the hospital.

Refugee movement from Long Cheng following the attack to the northeast is confirmed by informed U.S. sources who say they have no information on evacuation of the hospital or materiel. They note, however, that the situation at Long Cheng is con-

sidered "serious—though, not desperate."

30,000 Residents

At its peak, there are about 30,000 residents of Long Cheng, most of them dependents of Meo soldiers. About 35 Americans are believed to be stationed at the base.

Along with the sapper attack yesterday, which saw three government soldiers killed, nine wounded, two American planes damaged and two structures burned, Communist forces have occupied a hilltop position less than 15 miles east of Long Cheng, informed U.S. sources said.

Capture of the hilltop, called Phou Pha Xay, puts enemy forces within easy artillery range of Long Cheng. Announcement of the loss of Phou Pha Xay, which was part of the Long Cheng defensive system, occurred during the Communist rout of Meo and Thai troops from the plain, the sources say, and was not discovered until its defenders appeared at Long Cheng yesterday.

Communist consolidation of gains made last weekend continued through Monday night when Meo and Thai irregulars abandoned their two remaining fire support bases at Sting Ray and Cobra, west and south of the plain. Communists continued ferrying troops and artillery southward along the eastern edge of the plain toward passes leading to Long Cheng.

Off the Plain

Meo and Thai irregulars are reported to be completely off the plain now, though contact with many units has not been made. No decision on where to establish new defensive positions about Long Cheng has been reached, informed sources say, since pro-government forces have not completed regrouping off the plain.

The deteriorated situation

northeast of Long Cheng, coupled with the first commando attack on Long Cheng in more than a year, is given as cause for evacuation of the base's civilian inhabitants.

Although weather over Northern Laos is now clearing, no chance is given for pro-government forces to counter-attack onto the plain and little chance that Lao and American air forces could inflict meaningful casualties on Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops because they are dispersed.

Saigon to Release

689 Political Prisoners

From News Dispatches

SAIGON, Dec. 22 — The South Vietnamese government will release 689 civilians arrested on suspicion of Communist political activity and held without trials for up to two years on Christmas Day, a spokesman announced today.

The amnesty, however, will not affect Vietnam's two most famous political prisoners—Truong Dinh Dzu and Tran Ngoc Chau he said. Both were tried and convicted by military courts.

The spokesman said the prisoners were seized under the three-year-old Phoenix program, a joint U.S.-South Vietnamese anti-insurgency operation.

The Saigon command and U.S. spokesmen here reported little military action in South Vietnam, but fighting continued in Cambodia 46 miles north of Phnom Penh.

A Cambodian spokesman said a battle for the riverside village of Peam Chhkork entered its third day. North Vietnamese forces were so close to government front lines that allied warplanes were unable to bomb and strafe effectively.

The spokesman also revealed that Cambodia had no plans for a Christmas ceasefire similar to the 24-hour truce proclaimed by South Vietnam.

DAILY WORLD
22 DEC 1971

STATINTL



Lao patriots take Plain of Jars

VIENTIANE — Lao Patriotic Front forces (LPF) captured the strategic Plain of Jars in northern Laos on Monday, and raided the "secret" headquarters of Gen. Vang Pao, head of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's "Secret Army" of Meo tribesmen and opium smugglers on Tuesday. ✓

Gen. Thongpan Knocksy, military spokesman for the pro-U.S. Government of Lao Premier Souvanna Phouma in Vientiane, said on Tuesday that the military situation in Laos was "deteriorating rapidly." Souvanna Phouma's Defense Minister, Sisouk Na Champassak, told newsmen in Vientiane on Monday that the LPF had taken the strategic, 25 by 35-mile Plain of Jars, 100 miles northeast of Vientiane, and that the situation was "terrible." ✓

Knocksy said that despite stepped-up U.S. air attacks, the LPF were continuing to advance; he said a group of LPF commandos on Tuesday raided Long Cheng, the CIA base 20 miles south of the Plain of Jars, knocked out the airfield, burned down three barracks, and spoiled the Meo tribesmen's traditional New Year celebrations.

'No Longer Guerrilla War'

By Murray Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

North Vietnam has escalated the level of warfare in Laos by massing tanks and heavy 130-mm. artillery to wipe out government forces around the Plain of Jars and challenge other positions, U.S. officials acknowledged yesterday.

"Substantial qualitative improvements" in Communist weaponry are being revealed in the offensive now rolling across Laos, State Department spokesman Charles Bray said yesterday. Other officials said, "This is no longer guerrilla warfare."

The North Vietnamese inflicted one of the heaviest defeats of the Laotian war on the U.S.-supported Royal Lao forces and Thai "irregulars" last weekend, officials in Vientiane and in Washington now concede.

Increased North Vietnamese risk-taking is evident, one official said, in what amounts to a "deliberate set of provocations" to try to push the Indochina war back into the forefront of international attention. This new venturesomeness on the part of Hanoi's leaders includes the developing use of Mig jet fighters in aerial combat as well as the introduction of heavier ground weapons, officials noted.

An estimated 15,000 Communist troops captured six major artillery firebases in a thrust that began Friday night. Lao government spokesmen claimed that the North Vietnamese lost 1,500 killed and wounded. Unofficial reports from Laos said anti-Communist casualties were expected to amount to at least 500 killed and wounded.

American attempts to try to blunt that offensive with airpower cost the loss of most of the five U.S. Air Force Phantoms shot down over the weekend in Laos and North Vietnam, U.S. officials acknowledged.

According to reports from the Laotian capitol of Vientiane, the Communist offensive is lapping at the "secret" base of Gen. Vang Pao, about 20 miles below the Plain of Jars. Vang Pao's forces are trained and equipped by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

The new pattern of warfare now emerging in Laos and in Cambodia, according to Nixon administration officials, appears designed to put maximum pressure on those two nations in advance of the U.S. President's visit to Peking on Feb. 21.

North Vietnam has served notice through its own publications, State Department officials said yesterday, that it regards Laos and Cambodia as the "weak points" in the allied position in Indochina. Instead of using the current dry season to challenge allied forces in South Vietnam, where they are strongest, these sources said, the Communist thrust aimed first at Cambodia early this month, and now at Laos.

The Communist objective, administration sources claim, is to create the greatest possible alarm in the United States about the most "tender" Indochina issues that divide President Nixon and his critics in Congress: the risk of spreading warfare in Cambodia and in Laos, the fate of U.S. prisoners and a timetable for total American troop withdrawals from the war.

Administration officials now

expect recurring Communist thrusts to be made in Laos and Cambodia, and probably some in South Vietnam also, between now and the time of President Nixon's arrival in Peking. They assume that North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong informed China's leaders of these intentions during his visit to Peking last month.

At the end of November and extending into early December, North Vietnamese troops inflicted a major defeat on a 20,000-man Cambodian force that was attempting its own offensive in northeast Cambodia. Cambodian troops were badly chopped up and fled in retreat. The defeat was a serious blow to the prestige of Premier Lon Nol and continues to reverberate in the capital of Phnom Penh.

The current Communist offensive in Laos also hit allied troops there with far heavier weight than anyone had anticipated, although an offensive in this season was expected.

State Department spokesman Bray noted yesterday that the Communist dry season offensive came earlier than usual this year, and struck during a period of "cloud cover" that "hampered our ability to provide air support."

Other officials said the Communist attackers in Laos had the advantage last weekend of extraordinarily adverse weather for flying, and pounced on allied forces around the Plain of Jars with an unprecedented array of weapons.

The loss of the Plain is a recurring event, officials noted; it has changed hands four times in the last 2 years. The significance of the Communist

offensive this year, therefore, is not so much that the area once again was recaptured as in the way that it was seized this time.

North Vietnamese forces rolled up an estimated 25 of their 130-mm. guns. They have a range of about 16 miles. They also brought in about 35 tanks, according to the same field reports.

One U.S. source said the 130-mm. weapons weigh about 10 tons each and are transported on prime movers each weighing about five tons. The guns are of Russian design, but it is unclear whether those used in Laos are of Soviet or Chinese manufacture.

In the assault, which began about 4 a.m. Friday, Washington time, Vang Pao's troops and the so-called Thai "irregulars" or "volunteers" who often fight with them were said to have been "clobbered."

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Laotians Defeated On Plain

Early Loss Seen Periling Key CIA Base

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Dec. 21—

Communist forces have recaptured the Plain of Jars in northern Laos two months earlier than in the last dry season, raising doubts here that government forces will be able to retain a toehold to retake the strategic area next year.

Some CIA sources suggest that with the added time gained from the early capture of the plain yesterday, the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces may move southwest toward Long Cheng, headquarters of the CIA and Meo tribesmen, less than 30 miles from the plain's southern edge.

[Wire services reported today that Long Cheng was attacked early today by 20 Communist commandos who damaged three aircraft and killed three Laotians.]

All U.S. government sources here indicated that Gen. Vang Pao, commander of progovernment irregular forces on the plain, had intended to maintain control of the plain through the 1971-72 dry season to relieve pressure on Long Cheng.

CIA-supported Meo and Thai irregular forces abandoned the government's remaining fire support bases on the western edge of the plain yesterday retreating under intense enemy artillery fire off the plain itself.

The 30-square-mile Plain of Jars is about 100 miles north of Vientiane. This is the fourth time it has changed hands in the last 2½ years, with government forces gaining control in the wet season

and relinquishing it in the dry season to the Communists.

Two firebases covering the plain, Sting Ray to the west and Cobra to the south, are reported to be under heavy artillery attack with little chance they can be held, sources say.

Laotian Defense Minister Sisouk Champassak put Communist losses during the first two days of fighting at 1,500 dead out of a reported 15,000 attacking. He said the government had from 6,000 to 7,000 troops on the plain during the attack. Government losses were described as heavy.

Though Communist infantrymen "paid the price of taking the plain," they apparently consider the prize worth the price, U.S. sources said.

The prize itself may only be the psychological effect on government and progovernment troops of suffering a major setback early and quickly, or this year it may be control of all the mountain region, sources here believe, including Long Cheng itself, leaving the government no toehold to mount an offensive during the next wet season.

Air cover for retreating troops and remaining positions in the west is minimal because of weather. Sources say bombing is impossible on the eastern half of the plain as Communist trucks ferry men and equipment southward under an umbrella of intense antiaircraft fire described as the heaviest ever in northern Laos.

Yesterday Defense Minister Sisouk reported the loss of two Laotian bombers to enemy ground fire, including the loss of their pilots. Sisouk also noted the presence of North Vietnamese Mig fighters slightly north and northeast of the plain, a presence U.S. sources here confirm and say appears part of the Communist strategy of keeping U.S. air support minimal.

About 20 U.S.-supplied howitzers are believed to have been lost to enemy action on the plain with only the howitzers at Cobra and Sting Ray now remaining in action. Thai gunners are reported to have spiked their weapons with phosphorous grenades to make them inoperable when abandoned.

Communist introduction of 130-mm. field guns into the attack, the first reported use of the big guns with a range of more than 20 miles, is re-

ported by the defense minister as being decisive in the battle. There have been other reports of 27 tanks being seen and heard at various locales on the plain.

Gen. Vang Pao, who visited a firebase over the weekend, according to Sisouk, called Communist artillery fire the heaviest ever in Laos and told Sisouk that during one 15-minute period 600 rounds landed within the position.


Opening their attack Saturday morning from the north northeast and southeast, Communist gunners poured a withering barrage into the nine progovernment positions.

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From The
Tennis
Courts of MIT

To The
Hills
of Indochina



The Long 92d

It has been a long, long trail awinding for the members of the 92d Congress since they convened last January. The big surprise of this protracted, eventful first session has been President Nixon's adoption of most of the economic programs put forward by the Democratic opposition: wage-price controls, lower taxes, public service jobs for the unemployed, a radically unbalanced budget. Mr. Nixon has traveled far from old conservative orthodoxy in these eleven months.

Despite enormous efforts, the Democrats have been much less successful in persuading Mr. Nixon to accept their foreign policy views. They have failed in repeated attempts to write into law a specific date for withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam, an end to the air war over North Vietnam and to the C.I.A.-financed "secret war" in Laos. Amendments sponsored by Senator Mansfield and others have failed in the face of a coalition of Speaker Albert, a minority of House Democrats and the Republicans. Theirs is the last tattered vestige of the once invincible bipartisanship in foreign policy. A victim of this pulling and hauling between Congress and the Executive has been the undernourished foreign aid program, killed outright by the Senate and then revived after prolonged parliamentary maneuvering.

In the making of social welfare policy, there has been a stalemate. The House again passed the Administration's welfare reform bill, a significant and constructive measure. But as it did in the last Congress, the bill has become stalled in the Senate Finance Committee. Congress did pass its own far-reaching program to establish a network of day care centers for children, but the President successfully vetoed it, as he also killed a Democratic bill to accelerate existing public works programs to combat unemployment.

On environmental and related issues, Congress killed the Administration-backed plan to finance the supersonic transport plane. The House has passed a comparatively weak pesticide regulation bill; agreement was at last reached on a satisfactory settlement of the long-disputed land claims of Alaskan natives, and the Senate has approved a comprehensive water pollution control bill which promptly came under heavy attack by industry and the Administration.

* * *

President Nixon opened this Congress with a call for a "second American revolution" embracing reorganization of Cabinet departments and regulatory commissions as well as Federal-state revenue sharing. Government reorganization is usually a prickly subject because established bureaucracies, interest groups and Congressional committees have vested interest in the status quo; and to no one's surprise, President Nixon last month abandoned his plan to abolish the Agriculture Department. Revenue sharing, however, has been the subject of hearings on both sides of the Capitol and some version of this reform may emerge in the next session if the President fights for it.

Congress made more headway on campaign spending reform. It agreed upon the first comprehensive bill to regulate political expenditures since the Corrupt Practices Act of 1925.

Despite President Nixon's adoption of wage-price controls and other liberal economic proposals, there naturally remains a considerable philosophical distance between the Administration and the majority of the Democrats who control Congress. This has resulted in time-consuming scrimmaging between the two parties and some acrimony, though less than might have been expected.

Having fought successfully to retain the initiative in foreign policy and having received Congress' cooperation on his tax bill and economic stabilization measures, President Nixon enters the coming campaign year having had his way on most of the issues that matter.

*Despite Its Being in the Telephone Book***CIA Is an Unlisted Number When Congress Dials**

By Flora Lewis

SO FAR as I've found in a lot of traveling, the United States is the only country in the world which lists its central intelligence agency in the telephone book, and enables anyone to call up and speak to the director's office.

But an extraordinary exchange on the floor of the Senate recently made clear how little else the people who put up the money for intelligence know about how it's spent. The debate took place on the day the military appropriations bill was finally passed so it attracted little attention, but it was revealing.

It was provoked by Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) who offered an amendment providing that not more than \$4 billion in the defense budget could go for the intelligence services, including the CIA, the National Security Agency and the intelligence branches of the various armed services. Symington's point was not only to set a limit, but to set a precedent.

CONGRESS does appropriate all the money that goes to intelligence, but it doesn't know how much, or even when and how. That's because it is hidden in the defense budget, with the result that Congress doesn't really know just what it is appropriating any military money for because it never knows which items have been selected for padding to hide extra funds for intelligence.

Evidently, Symington believes that the actual amount spent is a little over \$4 billion, instead of the \$6 billion reported in the press, because he wasn't trying to cut intelligence funds except for CIA payments to Thai soldiers in Laos. He is one of the nine senators entitled to go to meetings of the Appropriations Subcommittee on the CIA, supposedly the confidential watchdog over the agency. As he pointed out though, there hasn't been a full meeting all this year.

What he wanted to do was to establish that Congress does have some rights to monitor the intelligence empire which it created by law, and he was driven to the attempt because of exasperation at President Nixon's recent intelligence reorganization. It was an-

nounced to the public as an upgrading of CIA Director Richard Helms and a better method to avoid waste and establish political control.

Senator Symington and many other well-informed CIA watchers in Washington, are convinced that Helms has been kicked upstairs. The result, they believe, will be an increase in military influence over intelligence—which has been recognized as a danger throughout the history of intelligence because it tends to become self-serving, the doctor diagnosing himself according to the therapy he likes.

There is also a concern that the reorganization, which makes the President's National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger top dog over intelligence, will centralize the system so much that it will become a tool for White House aims, not an outside source of technical expertise.

Responsible political control over the intelligence community's actions, as distinct from its factual and analytical reports, is necessary and desirable. But despite the public impression, in the last few years the CIA has been the most honest source of information for Congress on sensitive issues such as Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, while the Pentagon, State and White House have dealt in obfuscations. Whatever his Department of Dirty Tricks might be doing, Helms has been more straightforward with his secret session testimony on what is really happening in these unhappy places than the people who do have to explain and justify their funding to Congress.

BUT, as the Senate debate showed, that isn't saying very much. Sen. Allen Ellender (D-La.), who heads the CIA subcommittee, pointed out that 20 years ago only two senators and two congressmen were allowed to know what the CIA was spending, and now there are five on each side of the Capitol.

He implied that they also knew what the CIA was spending its money for. Sen. Wil-

liam Fulbright (D-Ark.), had the wit to ask if that mean Ellender knew, before the CIA set up its secret army in Laos, that this was the purpose of the appropriation. Ellender said, "It was not, I did not know anything about it . . . It never dawned on me to ask about it."

Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), had the humor to point out that there has been a lot in the press about the CIA Laotian army in the past couple of years, and asked whether Ellender has now inquired about it. Ellender said, "I have not inquired." Cranston pointed out that since nobody else in Congress has Ellender's right to check the CIA, that meant nobody in Congress knows. Ellender replied, "Probably not."

Symington's amendment was defeated. But at least the record is now clear. A recent Newsweek article quoted a former CIA official as saying, "There is no federal agency of our government whose activities receive closer scrutiny and 'control' than the CIA."

"The reverse of that statement is true," said Symington, "and it is shameful for the American people to be misled." The record proves him right.

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STATINTL

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S - 45,674

CIA Secrets Target Of Senate Inquiries

By GEORGE KENTERA
WASHINGTON (NANA) —

Both Senate and House are showing a growing restiveness over being kept in the dark about this country's vast intelligence apparatus.

This restiveness is particularly strong in the Senate at present, but it also exists in the House — and it has been present almost since 1949, when the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was first granted power by Congress to operate without congressional review.

The mounting frustration on Capitol Hill is hardly likely to produce any legislation requiring disclosure by the Nixon administration of intelligence funding or activities.

But it is almost certain to result next year in discreet efforts, primarily by Congressional committees and subcommittees involved, to lift at least partially the curtain that now hides an intelligence effort said to cost up to \$6 billion a year.

Sen. John C. Stennis, D-Miss., powerful chairman of the Armed Forces Committee, has already felt compelled to promise a thorough committee study and, "if necessary," an investigation into intelligence operations.

In making that promise to the Senate, Stennis specifically referred to President Nixon's reorganization early this month of the U.S. intelligence system — a reorganization that some senators fear removes the system even farther from any accountability to Congress.

Two other signs point to some congressional action next year:

— Sen. Stuart Symington, the Missouri Democrat who has long protested the lack of information Congress gets about intelligence matters, reportedly is ready to press a demand that the Senate be kept informed through accounting in private session.

— And Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, Detroit Democrat and chairman of a special House subcommittee on intelligence, is quietly laying the groundwork for what is likely to be public hearings about the many-sided intelligence apparatus.

Members of Congress like Symington and Nedzi are not seeking to know all, or even a good deal, about the nation's intelligence setup. But they believe Congress as a rule ought to know something, perhaps about the intelligence budget, and they are dissatisfied with the present system, under which only a handful of senators and representatives knows any of the facts.

On the night of Nov. 23, the Senate held an extraordinary debate on an amendment by Symington to the \$70.8 billion defense appropriations bill. The amendment would have set a limit of \$4 billion for intelligence spending — by the CIA, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency and for intelligence work performed by or for the Army, Navy and Air Force.

Fifty-six senators voted against and defeated the amendment — but 31 senators voted for it. And one of those 31 votes was from Montana's Democratic Sen. Mike Mansfield, the majority leader, who praised Symington and said, perhaps significantly:

"He has raised an issue which is just now in its infancy, but which in time I am confident will grow to enormous proportions. It is time, in my judgment, that we take a long, hard look at our intelligence community, its function and objectives."

Nedzi thinks so, too. In his preparatory work, he and his subcommittee aides have already been looking through the CIA, the Defense Depart-

ment and the State Department, and also "eight hours of continuous discussions" at the national security agency.

Still to come are the FBI, the Atomic Energy Commission and, finally, the intelligence agencies of the armed services that reportedly spend the lion's share of the intelligence budget.

"I haven't come to any conclusion... Yet on the whole question of how far one should go in making public activities of this kind," Nedzi says. "What I think I'd like to do is get people from the agencies to present unclassified versions of their positions and provide a forum for critics and students of the problems."

An opponent of the war in Vietnam, Nedzi thinks his appointment in July as chairman of the intelligence subcommittee by Rep. F. Edward Hebert of Louisiana, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, may have "tempered the strong passions" some frustrated house members have about intelligence procedures.

Still, more than a dozen bills have been introduced in Congress this year aimed at making intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA, accountable to Congress. That is a rate slightly higher than average since 1949; in the two decades since then, almost 200 such bills have been introduced — and none has passed.

Whatever review power Congress has over intelligence matters resides in four congressional subcommittees.

On the House side, one is Nedzi's subcommittee, created in July. The other is the intelligence operations subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee. Its members are an official secret, but there is good reason to believe they are the ranking three Democrats and two Republicans on the full committee's defense subcommittee. George Mahons of Texas.

On the Senate side there are also two subcommittees. One is the central intelligence subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee which includes Stennis, Symington, Democrat Henry M. Jackson of Washington and Republicans Peter H. Dominick of Colorado and Barry Goldwater of Arizona. This subcommittee reviews CIA programs, but not financing.

The other is the intelligence operations subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee. Its members are Chairman Allen J. Ellender of Louisiana, Stennis, Democrat John L. McClellan of Arkansas and Republicans Milton R. Young of North Dakota and Mrs. Margaret Chase Smith of Maine.

It seems worth noting that Symington is a part of these elite groups and yet is a leading protester against the setup they represent.

One reason may be Ellender's explanation on Nov. 23 about the way five senators (from the Appropriations Committee) decide what funds the intelligence agencies need.

"This method of appropriating funds for these intelligence activities has been in effect for at least 20 years that I know of..." He said. "We five who sit on this committee hear the testimony of those applying for funds. The funds are justified to us."

"We ask many questions. None of this information is in writing, nor is it recorded, but it is simply given to us, and we weigh it and then recommend appropriations as is seen fitting... I would hesitate to suggest that more senators and more members of the House be involved in this sensitive work."

At another point, Symington and his supporters referred to newspaper disclosures two years ago that the CIA was financing much of the war in Laos.

STATINTL

SHAWNEE, OKLA.

NEWS-STAR

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M - 11,674

S - 11,770

The Pursuit Of Peace

Summitry is in its heyday. Mr. Nixon has trips planned to many places other than Peking, to talk with leaders of other nations. The Russians are traveling all over the globe making agreements. Leaders of every European nation except Spain, Portugal and Greece are constantly on the move between capitals. World government may someday be run, like America's nuclear retaliation system, in a fleet of ever-airborne planes.

In the pursuit of peace all this happens. But there is war in Vietnam, in Laos, in Cambodia, in Pakistan, in Ireland, possibly any day in the Middle East. In South-east Asia American troops are being withdrawn, but U.S. bombing goes on mightily, interminably, and, as publication of three different sets and versions of the Pentagon Papers last month reminds Americans, no one is really sure how the United States ever got into this diabolical holocaust, according to D. J. R. Bruckner of the Los Angeles Times.

There is no certainty the United States will not get into another, either. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is publishing its hearings into presidential warmaking powers now; it will probably report out a bill before the end of the year to limit those powers; the chance of Senate passage of that bill next year is good. Whether the House—its normal condition is confusion, laziness and panic in the face of presidential threats—will act on it, or pass it, is another matter.

As a cautionary measure, the bill is not so bad. But it is not good, either. Its early sponsors, to win conservative support, accepted a provision supplied by Sen. John Stennis (D-Miss.), chairman on the Armed Service Committee, to authorize the President to make a first strike "to forestall the direct and imminent threat" of an attack on the United States. Should something like that be written into law? Adolf Hitler claimed that Germany was threatened by attacks from Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Otherwise, the bill would require Congress to act within 30 days if a President were to continue any hostilities he committed American armed forces to. Whether that is of any value when the bill would, for the first time in American history, authorize a President to start a war, is highly questionable. Somebody started the war in Vietnam without any such authority.

As Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) wrote in a letter to the Washington Post last summer, "The truth is, out of 160 occasions when the President has committed U.S. forces to military operations abroad, only five have been declared wars. Over half of these (other) 155 actions were begun without any prior approval from Congress and almost 70 took place outside the western hemisphere."

Legislation is only words so long as Congress is systematically ignorant of the foreign and military operations of the United States. Take the war in Laos, where the CIA used intelligence funds to support an army of 36,000 men. Neither Congress nor the people know how big the U.S. intelligence budget is, or whether it is used to make war.

In the Senate, five men are authorized to know. On Nov. 23, Sen. Allen Ellender (D-La.), chairman of the appropriations committee, said in a floor debate that he is one of the five. He claimed the United States needs the secrecy which the Senate has provided to keep itself ignorant of what is going on. Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) asked him whether he knew, at the time he approved CIA appropriations, that the CIA was funding the war in Laos. Ellender's reply says everything about Congressional control over warmaking:

"... Mr. President," he said, "I wish to say that I do not know. I never asked, to begin with, whether or not there were any funds to carry on the war in this sum the CIA asked for. It never dawned on me to ask about it. I did see it publicized in the newspapers some time ago."

Such is the way Congress keeps an eye on the executive branch which, in the words of GOP Senate leader Hugh Scott, "maintains as much secrecy as possible to the point of suffocation and isolation," which only a few months ago refused to allow its chief foreign policy planner Henry Kissinger to testify, refused to detail military aid plans for the next five years, and has now reorganized the intelligence apparatus in such a way that Kissinger, protected by claims of executive privilege, can throw a shroud of secrecy over the whole works.

Congress can pass its bill to limit warmaking powers; it can cut the defense budget with a crude meat-axe (the only weapon it knows how to use); it can send investigating committees abroad to publicize the government's waste, corruption, deceit and atrocities; it can horrify sane men everywhere by revealing the extent of the business community's greed-governed complicity in America's secret war machine and the evil pervasion of military surveillance over the civilian population—and the President will still be free to go to war when he decides to and then to justify his action in any words he chooses to use. A President is subject to the judgment of all those leaders he meets at the summits more than he is to the judgment of the Congress or the people.

If it will make Congress feel better to have a restraining law on the books, such as it is, the bill may as well be passed. But, if Congress is to regain its constitutional role in the government of the United States, including its authority to declare war, it will have to reorganize itself, restructure its committees, improve its staff, and outlaw executive privilege.

To be blunt about it, Congress is systematically stupid. Its very operational structure prevents it from adequately understanding the defense budget or foreign policy, or from devising alternatives to executive initiatives in these areas. Congress is said to be in a battle now with the White House over warmaking powers. Well, there is a lot of political wrangling going on. But there is no real battle. Congress is not yet equipped to do battle. That is why, ultimately, the White House is so well equipped to do battle wherever and whenever it pleases.

7 DEC 1971

**U.S., Allies Recruit
Thai Irregulars**

Saigon, Dec. 6 (Special) -- The allies are secretly training Thai irregulars in South Vietnam to operate helicopter gunships against the Communists in Laos, reliable sources said tonight.

They said that the Thais had been recruited by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and that the U.S. would provide helicopters for their missions.

—Joseph Fried

STATINTL

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Waste and duplicity in intelligence gathering?

Former CIA 'spy' comes in from the cold—into hot water

By Joanne Leedom

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Boston

In the basement of his home in Oakton, Va., with dogs and children running havoc around him, Victor Marchetti wrote a spy novel last year. Today Mr. Marchetti and his new book "The Rope Dancer" are stirring up havoc of another kind just a few miles from his home, at Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) headquarters where Mr. Marchetti was an official just two years ago.

Today Mr. Marchetti is the spy "who came in from the cold—into hot water," to quote one of his friends. Now an outspoken critic of the agency, Mr. Marchetti has been traveling around the country promoting his exposé of the spy's world and crusading for reform in the CIA.

Mr. Marchetti left the CIA after a 14-year career in protest over what he asserts is its waste and duplicity in intelligence gathering, its increasing involvement with the military, its amorality, and what he says now is its subtle shifts to "domestic spying."

Reform, he says, in the entire intelligence network should be three-pronged: (1) reorganizing responsibilities, (2) reducing size ordered by President Nixon. Placing CIA director Richard Helms as overall coordinator of national intelligence recently was in part aimed at eliminating the waste in the nation's \$6 billion/200,000-man intelligence operation which spans a dozen governments and funding, and (3) exposing the intelligence community to more public control and scrutiny.

Silence maintained

The CIA, in its turn, has remained customarily silent to the public attack. However, one former top CIA official, who asked to remain anonymous, agreed with some of Mr. Marchetti's points but disputed his main arguments.

Since Mr. Marchetti began speaking out several months ago, a major restructuring in the intelligence community has been ordered by the President. It was also aimed at tailoring intelligence output more closely to White House needs.

This reform and Mr. Marchetti's own criticism come at a time when Congress, too, is demanding more knowledge and control over the intelligence networks. For the first time Congress has ordered public hearings on the CIA next year, and Mr. Marchetti plans to testify.

Military influence

In Boston Mr. Marchetti explained his own "defection": "My discontent with the

agency was hard for me to identify at first. I began first to criticize the waste. This is ridiculous, I thought. We could be doing the job for \$2 billion less.

"The second thing that was most annoying to me was the military influence. This is very pervasive. When the Secretary of Defense controls 85 percent of the assets, he [the CIA director] doesn't have the muscle to make changes. The military influence in many ways is the greatest single factor of waste. They want to know more and more and are responsible for collection overkill."

To these two criticisms, the former CIA official who worked close to the director and who responded for The Christian Science Monitor, partly agreed. "There is unfortunately an awful lot of duplication," he said, but added, "What is needed is tighter control over the military [not the CIA]. It's not a question of the CIA duplicating the military, but of the military duplicating what the CIA does. The President's reorganization is a strong move in the right direction."

Another one of Mr. Marchetti's complaints is that the traditional intelligence work of gathering and assessing information has been "contaminated" with paramilitary activity.

A prime example is Laos where the CIA recruited and armed thousands of natives, says Mr. Marchetti, who worked in the CIA as an intelligence analyst, as special assistant to the chief of plans, programs, and budgets, to the executive director, and finally as executive assistant to the agency's deputy director.

"[At the time] perhaps a handful of key congressmen and senators might have known about this activity in Laos. The public knew nothing," he declared.

According to the former CIA administrator, however, paramilitary activity is shifting out of the CIA now and into the Army. "But in any case," he said, "the CIA doesn't decide on this activity; they are directed by the President and the National Security Council." If there is to be reform in the use of the CIA, he argues, it must come from the President's direction.

While Mr. Marchetti is highly critical of the CIA's paramilitary and clandestine interventions in other countries, he insists that the real threat of the CIA today is that it may "unleash" itself on this country.

Concern noticed

"In recent years as domestic unrest increased, I've noticed the CIA is concerned about the FBI's apparent inability to handle subversion in this country. I think there's an effort to convince the nation that the CIA should get into domestic intelligence."

"Ridiculous," snapped the former CIA administrator, and left this charge at that.

To reform the intelligence network, Mr. Marchetti says there should be a reorganization to limit the Defense Department to the routine intelligence needs of various departments—Army, Navy, etc.

"Then I'd put the National Security Agency under the control of the President and Congress," elaborated Mr. Marchetti. "Congress has very little knowledge about what goes on. The Pentagon papers and the way the Supreme Court acted strips away the shield intelligence has always had. We need to let a little sunshine in; that's the best safeguard."

Laos example cited

The former administrator insists, however, that there are already adequate controls through special congressional committees which control appropriations and military affairs. "If you had the whole Congress and Senate debating these issues in executive session, you might as well do away with it [secret intelligence operations]. Inevitably there would be leaks."

"Of course there would be leaks," admitted Mr. Marchetti. "What I'm really saying is that in the final analysis if we made the President walk through it [his decision to use covert forces in foreign countries], the President would see it's all not worth it. Then if we deny ourselves these alternatives we'd have to act in a diplomatic fashion."

STATINTL

DANBURY, CONN.

NEWS-TIMES

DEC 3 1971

E - 29,870

A blank check with no maximum limit

Even in these days of \$230 billion federal budgets and \$27 billion federal deficits, \$579 million is a lot of money.

It represents about \$11,000 for every man, woman and child in Danbury.

One would expect that when Congress votes an appropriation of \$579 million, it would know what the money is going for.

But in the case of the current Defense Department budget, it does not.

That \$579 million fund is the last item on the table of aircraft procurement requested by the Pentagon for fiscal 1972 and is identified merely as "classified projects."

Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri, the only senator who is a member of both the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee, suspects this is one of the hidden items to cover intelligence funding, for the CIA and for other intelligence operations.

But the Pentagon won't admit it is, nor will it say it isn't.

Senator Symington, a former Air Force secretary, has been on the Armed Services Committee for the past 20 years ranking immediately behind the chairman in seniority. Not once has he or the full committee, let alone the entire Senate, been informed what hidden funds are included in the defense budget for intelligence operations. During this period, U.S. intelligence operatives have been credited with or blamed for U.S. involvement in affairs of foreign countries, including the secret war in Laos.

Senator Symington last week tried to put a limit on the blank check Congress provides for intelligence operations. He offered an amendment to the defense appropriations bill to put a \$4 billion lid on the blank check.

He didn't ask that the budget provide a breakdown of the \$4 billion, nor that secret material be revealed to the Senate. He just wanted intelligence funding limited to intelligence, so we don't get into another situation where U.S. personnel are organizing and running a war on foreign soil, and an airline to go with it, without Congress or the American taxpayers knowing about it.

Unfortunately, only 30 other senators joined Senator Symington in voting for the amendment, so the intelligence operatives not only continue to have a blank check but one without limit as far as Congress is concerned.

The usual Pentagon supporters in the Senate won this round. But the questions Senator Symington and others raised about U.S. military and intelligence officials involving this country in distant wars cannot be hidden away like the \$579 million appropriation.

Sooner or later, the administration, the Pentagon, the CIA and others involved will have to face up to these questions. As far as taxpayers are concerned, the sooner the better.

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30 months of Nixon slaughter bared by DRV

In 30 months of power, with his "Vietnamization of the war" aimed at implementing the "Nixon doctrine" in this part of the world, President Nixon not only obstinately continued and prolonged the war of aggression in South Vietnam, but also embarked on new military adventures... against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, overtly extended the U.S. war of aggression into Cambodia and Laos, whose undertakings were accompanied by innumerable crimes against the peoples of the three Indochinese countries, and seriously jeopardized peace in Southeast Asia.

I. In carrying out "Vietnamization," the Nixon administration prolongs the U.S. war of aggression with countless concomitant fresh crimes against the South Vietnamese people.

1) The Saigon army feverishly beefed up and an important contingent of U.S. troops maintained in South Vietnam.

Under the U.S. plan, the Saigon junta feverishly drafted troops from 15-year-old adolescents to fifty-year-olds to raise the strength of their army from half a million to a million-odd men. Besides, it reorganized the police into an armed force with 20 men per village, 300 per district, 3,000 per province, and tens of thousands at the central echelon to lay an iron grip upon the population and repress them. Over a million people, mostly aged, women and children were forced into "civil defense" units.

With a great sense of urgency, the U.S. equipped the Saigon army with all types of weapons and war means. Since the beginning of the "Vietnamization" program alone, it has supplied 649,000 M.16 rifles, 20,000 machine-guns, 34,000 grenade-throwers, 870 guns, 10,000 81mm mortars, 210 M41 tanks, 1,000 armored vehicles, 44,000 military lorries and 40,000 transceivers. . . .

As regards the Saigon air force, the U.S. provided it with some 850 planes of various types and has intended to bring this figure to 1,200 by 1972. To the Saigon navy, the U.S. turned over an estimated 1000 ships and craft of different kinds. The annual credit allocated by the Nixon administration to the Saigon junta for general expenses was brought to 2 billion dollars.

Up to June 30, 1971, the Nixon administration still kept in South Vietnam about 240,000 U.S. troops, not including nearly 20,000 men in the 7th Fleet and coast-guard units and 32,000 others in the USAF stationed at American airbases in Thailand. . . .

2) Relentless furtherance of "pacification" work — backbone of the Nixon administration's "Vietnamization" — along with intensified bombardments and sweeps against civilians.

The U.S. government has just announced an additional \$1 billion and entrusted the U.S. Defense Department and

the CIA with the direct conduct of a new "pacification" effort called "rural defense and local development" program, beginning May 1, 1971. According to an assigned quota, within a year, the Saigon agents have to liquidate 14,000 patriots and force four million more people into the "civil defense" organization.

Following were the principal measures taken to implement the Nixon administration's "pacification" program:

In 30 months under Nixon, the U.S. used in South Vietnam an amount of explosive equal to the total of U.S. bombs expended in both 4 years' World War II and two years' Korean War (Bomb tonnage used in the Europe and Pacific theatres: 2,632,244 tons; that used in Korea: 635,000 tons).

Under Johnson, the yearly average of U.S. bombs used in both South and North Vietnam ran to 800,000 tons. Under Nixon, the quantity of bombs dropped on South Vietnam alone yearly average 1,377,000 tons. According to the U.S. Defense Department's data from the beginning of 1969 to August 1970, the U.S. rained 2,131,334 tons of bombs and fired 2,292,125 tons of shells in the Indochina theatre, mostly in South Vietnam.

The French newspaper Le Monde on July 29, 1970 stated: In 1970, on an average, the U.S. discharged on the Indochina theatre a quantity of explosive equivalent to 11 20-kiloton A-bombs, the sort released by the U.S. on Hiroshima in 1945.

The U.S. command in Saigon unilaterally delineated "free fire zones," making of entire large populated areas its targets. . . . B-52 strategic bombers, in particular, redoubled their carpet-bombings without distinction of targets. In March 1969, right after taking office, U.S. Defense Secretary M. Laird decided to ask for an additional credit of 52 million dollars in 1969-70 to increase B-52 activities from 1,000 to 1,800 missions a month. . . .

Over 2,500 artillery pieces of all calibers. . . positioned everywhere on the mainland and based on warships. . . . Everyday, tens of thousands of shells of different calibers were pumped into villages and hamlets. Quang Tri alone, in a single day, received over 20,000 shells. . . .

Sweeps against civilians, villages and hamlets

In the period under review (January, 1969-June, 1971) U.S.-Saigon and satellite troops mounted over 50,000 mopping-up operations of battalion size upwards throughout South Vietnam, blotted out more than one-fourth of the total of hamlets in the South, and perpetrated hundreds of new Son My-type massacres, many of which had been disclosed by GI's themselves.

. . . In the two provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien, out of 870 hamlets, nearly 500 were levelled. . . .

In Quang Da province, till late 1970, out of 441 hamlets, 100 were flattened. Go Noi area, composed of 6 villages with 40,000 inhabitants, was razed to the ground. The surroundings of Da Nang, 25 miles long by 10-15 miles wide.

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KISSINGER'S APPARAT

by John P. Leacacos

A top Washington's complex foreign affairs bureaucracy sits the National Security Council, a 24-year-old body given new status in 1969, when President Nixon moved to make it a kind of command and control center for his foreign policy. The new Nixon NSC system, run from the White House by Henry A. Kissinger, has now existed for nearly three years, producing 138 numbered study memoranda, reaching 127 formal decisions, and employing a permanent staff of about 120 personnel (more than double the pre-Nixon figure). Though the substance of its operations are necessarily secret, interviews with officials permit tentative evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the Kissinger NSC. There is broad agreement on the following seven points:

—The NSC has served President Nixon more or less as he desired, that is, in the ordered style of formal answers to detailed questionnaires. The volume of this paperwork has at times been staggering, but it has sharpened focus on the search for policy choices.

—The answers and alternatives for action, "coming up through the NSC" have produced few panaceas, but have contributed greater coherence of outlook in foreign affairs management. NSC recommendations are more pragmatic than academic, reflecting Kissinger's view: "We don't make foreign policy by logical syllogism."

—Explicit insistence on the "limited" nature of U.S. power and the need for greater restraint and cautious deliberation about its exercise have been reinforced at the highest level by Nixon's habit of withdrawing to make final decisions in solitude and of frequently deciding on no-action rather than accepting advice to initiate new action.

—By being close to the President and keeping his fingers on all aspects of the NSC process personally, Kissinger without question is the prime mover in the NSC system. The question arises whether the NSC would function as effectively without Kissinger, and whether it can bequeath a heritage of accomplishment to be absorbed by the permanent machinery of government.

—Secretary of State William P. Rogers

operates within the NSC system and also utilizes it as a forum to establish whatever policy position is preferred by his State Department; but he side-steps the NSC on occasion to carry his demurrer, dissent or alternate position to the President privately.

—Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird is less personally involved in the NSC process, having apparent indifference to what he believes is unnecessary NSC paperwork, which he leaves to his deputy, David Packard. Laird's main day-to-day operational preoccupation is with the exit of U.S. forces from Vietnam. His International Security Affairs Bureau in the Pentagon performs poorly by Washington bureaucratic standards.

—The influence on foreign policy of the military, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are usually represented in the NSC process, is at the lowest point in several years. This has been attributed to the anticlimactic winding-down atmosphere of the Vietnam war, and to the fact that the Chiefs' once die-hard views and abstract argumentation on strategic nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union have been successfully emulsified into the Nixon-Kissinger basic principles for SALT negotiations with Russia. Kissinger has commented: "In my experience with the military, they are more likely to accept decisions they do not like than any other group."

From time to time, gears have clashed within the system. The State Department has complained bitterly of the "Procrustean bed" fashioned by the Kissinger staff. Meeting excessive White House demands, bureaucrats allege, robs State and Defense of manpower hours needed for day-to-day operations. After his first year, Kissinger conceded: "Making foreign policy is easy; what is difficult is its coordination and implementation."

White House NSC staffers, on the other hand, exuberant at their top-dog status, express a degree of condescension for the work of the traditional departments. In 1969 Kissinger staffers rated State-chaired studies and recommendations only "50 to 70 percent acceptable" and based on mediocre reporting which failed to sift wheat from chaff in the political cables constantly arriving from 117 U.S. embassies overseas. The Kissinger staff say that they have to hammer out the real choices on the hard issues, since a cynical and sometimes bored bureaucracy offers up too many "straw options." State's planners, for their part, criticize the NSC staff for overdoing

Thailand coup strengthens U.S. hand

By Richard E. Ward

Despite appearances, the recent bloodless coup in Thailand will mean more bloodshed in Indochina—if the U.S. has its way. With the most reactionary elements of Thailand now in complete power, Washington hopes that it will have a firm rear base for continuing its military effort in Indochina.

It looked like a typical military coup—internal rivalry among Thailand's pro-American leaders—when Prime Minister and Field Marshall Thanon Kittikachorn announced on Nov. 17 the abolition of parliament and the constitution which had been in effect for less than three years.

In trying to justify the coup, Thanon claimed that Thailand was confronted by a number of threats and internal confusion—parliamentary opposition to the budget, pressures from within the government for exploring possible relations with China and growing "lawlessness," an apparent reference to revolutionary activity led by the Patriotic Front of Thailand.

But "his language was vague," observed Iver Peterson in the Nov. 20 N.Y. Times, referring to Thanon's remarks made the day before to the press. No wonder. For Thanon made no reference to problems in U.S.-Thai relations or the U.S. crisis in Indochina in which Thailand is also deeply implicated. These elements are at the heart of the matter, a complex story whose full details are not yet available.

Pro-U.S. elements strengthened

Although some of these details are lacking—just as similar data was unavailable before publication of the Pentagon papers—there is sufficient evidence to conclude Washington was involved and supported the coup which placed the most fascist, pro-U.S. elements at the head of the government in Bangkok.

These circles, primarily corrupt military chieftains, are those who have proven their faithfulness to the Thai alliance with Washington, one that places U.S. strategic and economic interests first, regardless of Thai national interests.

The long-standing U.S. strategic design in Thailand is use of the country as a base for aggression against the peoples of Indochina and also a forward projection of U.S. power near China. As is well known, most of the bombing raids over Indochina have originated from U.S. bases in Thailand and these bases now have increased importance as U.S. air power becomes the chief means of attempting to prolong the war in Indochina. Also, under the "Nixon doctrine" of using Asians to fight Asians, Thailand has become a major source of troops for assisting the pro-U.S. elements in Laos.

Washington clearly regarded it especially important to secure its position in Thailand in the face of a growing Thai revolutionary movement and opposition to the pro-U.S. posture of the government within Thai ruling circles. The latter took the form of parliamentary opposition to emphasis on military spending and some timid steps toward gaining a more independent role for Thailand outside of the U.S. orbit. In particular, Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman had been increasingly outspoken in favor of the Thai people's movement.

Thanat, who had enjoyed a long tenure in office, was one of the chief Thai leaders eliminated from power in the coup.

Thus, the conclusion is inescapable that Washington, first of all, wanted to preserve its Thai bastion for maintaining U.S. military intervention in Indochina and, looking toward the day when this may become untenable, the U.S. is trying to insure it will be able to draw a new line at the Thai border to hold back the revolutionary tide in Southeast Asia.

Thailand definitively entered the U.S. orbit following the victory of the Chinese revolution in 1949, when the U.S. began acting more energetically against indigenous revolutionary movements under the pretense of meeting a threat from China. Marshall Pipul Songgram, who served as the Japanese puppet leader during World War II and resumed control with U.S. backing in a postwar coup, signed military and economic agreements with the U.S. in 1950 and 1951, formalizing Thai dependence on Washington.

During the 1950s, U.S. military and economic aid, supervised by American "advisors," was directed toward developing a large Thai army capable of repressing popular opposition movements. Initially, Thai revolutionary and democratic elements attempted to work legally, but they were outlawed in 1952. After futile efforts to continue quasi-legal activity, which was met by armed repression, revolutionary elements in 1965 formed the Patriotic Front of Thailand to lead a political and military struggle for national liberation.

Thailand today has armed forces of 100,000, paramilitary police forces of 80,000 and other, counter-revolution elements, including a village defense corps of local militia. Admitted U.S. assistance to Thailand is more than \$140 million in the current fiscal year, with the preponderate amount financing military and repressive activities. It is no coincidence that the "strong man," behind Thanon Kittikachorn, according to the American press, is Praphas Charusathien, commander-in-chief of the army and interior minister in the former government, the two key positions for directing the military and police repression.

Parliament seen as threat

Gen. Praphas in September issued a blunt warning that there might be no future elections after a pro-government candidate of the United Thai People's party came in a dismal third in a parliamentary by-election. The UTPP held only a minority in parliament, despite efforts to carefully control elections. The parliamentary opposition, while relatively timid, was a thorn in the government's side; members of parliament wanted more economic plums for their constituencies, a threat to rising military budgets.

The short-lived parliamentary experiment coincided with a developing economic crisis. Thailand, or rather a very narrow ruling circle, reaped considerable profits from the Thai alliance with the U.S. To support the air war in Indochina, the U.S. had constructed a network of air bases in Thailand costing more than \$500 million. At the peak of U.S. fighting in Indochina in 1968-69, some 30,000 members of the U.S. armed forces were permanently stationed in Thailand (about 35,000 remain

What the Pentagon Censored

Publication of the Pentagon Papers by several prominent daily newspapers last June confirmed the general suspicion that the Government's security classification system serves as much to protect political leaders from embarrassing public scrutiny as to preserve genuine military secrets.

Now the publication of the Pentagon's own censored version of the Pentagon Papers demonstrates that the system is not only abusive of the democratic process but self-deluding as well.

The Pentagon rushed into print with its "sanitized" version of the Papers when it became known that Beacon Press was about to publish the original, classified version of the papers—as made available by Senator Mike Gravel, Alaska Democrat.

The Pentagon's motives were unclear, but the effect was to reveal what it considers to be the most sensitive portions of the original document, a development of interest not only to the American public but also to any potentially hostile foreign power.

Much of what the Pentagon censored had already appeared in *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, the *Chicago Sun-Times*, and other newspapers. The rest of what was deleted was immediately apparent to those reporters who possessed the original papers and should now be evident to any foreign intelligence service which takes the time to put the Pentagon version and the Beacon Press version side by side.

An analysis of what the Pentagon deleted shows that the Government is still anxious to conceal the role of the United States in several crucial aspects of the Vietnam involvement: how the first U.S. combat troops were sent to Vietnam, how plans were drawn up to use nuclear weapons against China, how the secret war in Laos has been waged, how the CIA conducted exten-

sive covert operations in North Vietnam, and how U.S. officials plotted the overthrow of South Vietnam President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963.

Other deletions were more predictable, largely the record of diplomatic dealings with the Soviet Union, the Western European powers, and several "Third World" countries.

The most inexplicable deletions deal with the Diem coup. The Pentagon censors obviously failed to get the word from their Commander-in-Chief, President Nixon, who admitted openly at a White House press conference September 16 that "the way we got into Vietnam was through overthrowing Diem and the complicity in the murder of Diem."

Yet the Pentagon censors snipped out page after page of narrative detailing the intimate involvement of U.S. Embassy officials in the sordid maneuvering that led to Diem's fall. A possible explanation, in current political terms, is that the deletions contain several citations of U.S. hostility toward General Duong Van (Big) Minh. Minh sought briefly this year to mount a campaign against President Nguyen Van Thieu but backed out, charging that Thieu had rigged the elections with tacit U.S. approval.

The deletions covering the dispatch of the first combat troops to Vietnam in 1965 amount to more than six pages. Apparently they were made to obscure indications that the troops were conceived from the beginning as the vanguard of a major offensive buildup, not the small, defensive, and support force they were depicted as being at the time. In the original version, the Pentagon historians concluded that the evidence pointed "in support of the phased build-up proposition."

The deletions about nuclear weapons include a devastatingly matter-of-fact comment by Secretary of State Dean Rusk in 1964 that nuclear weapons would be used if Communist China entered the Vietnam war.

"If escalation brought about major Chinese attack," Rusk is paraphrased by the Pentagon Papers historian as declaring, "it would involve use of nuclear arms. Many free world leaders would oppose this. Chiang Kai-shek had told him [Rusk] fervently he did, and so did U Thant. Many Asians seemed to see an element of racial discrimination in use of nuclear weapons; something we would do to Asians but not to Westerners. . . . One must use the force one had; if Chinese used masses of humanity, we would use superior firepower."

On the eve of President Nixon's trip to Peking the Pentagon censors obviously thought it best to leave such blatant "Yellow Perilism" on the cutting room floor. But unless China's security officials are as obtuse as ours, it is likely that Rusk's remarks are already part of their briefing book for the Presidential visit to Peking.

(THOMAS ROSS and
MORTON KONDRACKÉ

(Mr. Ross and Mr. Kondracke are Washington correspondents for the Chicago Sun-Times.)

STATINTL

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N. Viet Aircraft Harass U.S. Jets Over Laos

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE—North Vietnamese Mig-17 fighter bombers have been playing a month-long game of cat and mouse with U.S. fighter bombers over northern and central Laotian provinces to harass and provoke American aircraft, highly reliable American sources here say.

The Russian-built Mig-17s, described as obsolete and no match for U.S. planes, have been penetrating Laotian airspace continuously, sometimes twice daily, in the past month, flying in westward arcs into northern Laos from Hanoi and Vinh, 160 miles to the south, then streaking back to the opposite airfield from departure.

No shooting incidents have been reported.

Reportedly flying at a low altitude to avoid radar tracking, the North Vietnamese warplanes have penetrated as far westward as Moung Soui, 110 miles north of here, to guard the northwest approaches to the Plain of Jars where Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese gunners have recently begun mounting pressure on pro-government forces.

North Vietnamese planes have made similar runs at infrequent intervals in the past but never, reportedly, for such a lengthy period.

Presence of the enemy aircraft over Laos "on a number of occasions in recent days" is confirmed by U.S. embassy spokesmen in Vientiane.

The last public announcement of North Vietnamese jets over Laos came three weeks ago from Gen. Thongpanh Knoksy, Lao military spokesman, when he reported Migs over Xieng Khoang Province about 40 miles east of Moung Soui on the eastern side of the Plain of Jars.

U.S. and Laotian aircraft flying in Laos have been warned of such penetration at least once daily since the announcement.

Pointing out that information upon which to base alerts, and the alerts themselves, originate with U.S. Air Force radar and radio surveillance, sources say, "Either someone is lying about alerts for a reason, or information just is not being circulated in the mission here."

The sources say that repeated attempts by U.S. jets to trap the Migs over northern Laos may account for the long delay in public announcement by the U.S. mission. The sources say that despite repeated attempts at interception, however, no contact has been made.

Enemy penetration alerts in Laos originate from an Air Force C-130 Hercules, code-named "Cricket," that is constantly flying over northern Laos (another is in southern Laos, the sources say) and monitoring radio traffic.

"Cricket" is the command center for air operations over Laos and monitors North Vietnamese as well as other frequencies, issuing a general warning to U.S. aircraft in the area when penetration is suspected or known.

"Cricket can hear them call out their course as they lift off Hanoi or Vinh," American sources say.

Upon receipt of an alert all civilian aircraft and non-fighter government planes immediately vacate, the sources say, flying elsewhere as low and as fast as possible while U.S. "fast mover," as jets are known by the military, move into the penetrated area to intercept.

U.S. pilots also warn enemy aircraft in Laotian air-

space are creating a morale problem among U.S. civilian pilots flying for Air America and Continental Air Service, and for Laotian forces in northern Laos, reliable sources say.

Pilots say there is mounting speculation that one of the Migs may eventually attack an unarmed and lumbering cargo plane or one of the many civil helicopters plying Laotian skies.

Sources also say that failure to announce alerts leaves the public unaware of the hazards under which civil planes fly in Laos.

A reliable source in Laos reports that a helicopter was shot down recently by a Mig in southern Laos west of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, a report mission spokesmen here say they cannot substantiate nor deny.

Army commanders in the Plain of Jars area of northern Laos are reported to have expressed some concern over the possibility of air attack on their positions, particularly the six fire support bases on and about the plain.

Recent visitors to the firebases and bases north of the plain note there would be little protection from air attack.

Aviation sources do say, however, that flying under these circumstances is about as safe as is possible considering that it is a war zone.

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The CIA Show

Heads of the world's secret services are advised to tune in to Granada's *World In Action* tonight if they want to see Who's Who in the Central Intelligence Agency. Of a group of about eight who will be shown, only one—Richard Helms, the CIA's director—is publicly known.

The programme deals with the role of the CIA in Laos and Stephen Clarke, the co-producer, wanted a picture of the man who directs their operations there. This is not easy, as Clarke and his team found out when they unsuccessfully tried to film him in Laos. On one occasion their camera was smashed when a CIA helicopter flew straight at them.

Eventually Clarke turned to a CIA "defector" whom he had met in Washington and who happily obliged with a picture of the top brass round a dinner table.

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
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Letter From Paris

Web Grows in French Drug Tangle

By MARGOT LYON

PARIS — "It's like a Shakespeare play," said a leading Frenchman this week. "It's an infernal cauldron where ambitions, grudges, big money and blackmail are all simmering — an explosive mixture that will probably spare nobody when it boils over, as it must."

He was talking of the latest revelations in the scandal that links French counter-espionage services with the \$12 million sale of heroin in the United States.

The story began last April when French agriculturist and one-time spy Roger Delouette was arrested in New Jersey as he went to claim a Volkswagen minibus in which 96 pounds of heroin were hidden. He told American authorities that the man behind the smuggling attempt was a Colonel Fournier — later said to be Paul Ferrer — a high-ranking officer of the Service de Documentation Extérieure et Contre-Espionage or SDECE, roughly the French equivalent of the CIA.

Action Urged

New Jersey attorney Herbert Stern has been demanding that Fournier-Ferrer come and defend himself against the charges, but since last April nothing has moved, except for a visit to Paris from Mr. Stern himself earlier this month, when he saw the director of the cabinet of the Interior Minister, Raymond Marcellin, in the presence of U.S. Ambassador Watson and other officials. The ambassador seemingly tried to smooth the rough edges of a somewhat stormy meeting, but as one of the participants said later, "Dr. Watson did not manage to soothe Sherlock Holmes."

Last February Minister Marcellin signed a cooperation pact on dope-hunting with Attorney General John Mitch-

ell and it looks as if Washington does not wish to sacrifice the restored cooperation between the two for the skin of a crook. But Attorney Stern is seen to be in a hurry to build his own political career, and is impatient with the slow and exceedingly formalistic style of French justice.

In turn the French criticize him for keeping their official from contact with Delouette. Mr. Stern says that Delouette's lawyer will only allow him to meet with them after Delouette himself has been granted immunity — a long long way from French traditions of judicial procedure.

With little understanding of each other's methods, legally what is going on is a dialogue of the deaf.

BUT THE FRENCH public sat up and paid attention last weekend when Colonel Roger Barberot, a gaullist former ambassador, a well known businessman, and very probably an ex-spy himself, revealed in a radio interview that the entire affair had probably less to do with international drug traffic than with East-West spying.

Before De Gaulle returned to power, he said, the French intelligence service had virtually become a subsidiary of the CIA. But after 1958 De Gaulle restored its independence. Later in his term of office he oriented it toward counter-espionage against the United States.

Two years ago when President Pompidou took over, he ordered the service changed back to its former task of spying on Communist activities. By that time it contained so many anti-American agents that according to Colonel Barberot, when new broom Alexandre de Marenches began his clean-up, he found he had to fire all the top brass.

Since then SDECE (pronounced Zdek) agents have used their inside knowledge to settle scores with new-

comers, old-timers and any other faction they disliked. The former head of the Research Service of the Zdek, said Barberot, was himself fired on suspicion of working closely with Communist agents.

EARLY THIS WEEK the man in question, a Colonel Beaumont alias Bertrand, while admitting the whole service was infested with factional rivalries, sued Barberot for one million francs for slander. Said Barberot: "I didn't make my statement lightly." However, both colonels take the line that no serious link exists between the Zdek and drugs, but that rivals clumsily placed the heroin in the minibus knowing that Delouette would implicate anybody to get himself off the hook.

However, the staunchest defenders of France have been pushing the line that a link indeed exists between spying and drugs—only it concerns the CIA and not French intelligence.

Everybody knows, say these hard-liners, that the CIA manipulates the selling of Laotian opium because it is more than a source of profit, it is a tactical necessity. So the CIA has used the existing networks to wipe out political adversaries — which in that part of the world were French, France having retained a good deal of her influence since Laos and the rest formed part of the French Empire.

A Hidden War

Since General de Gaulle's anti-American speech at Phnom Penh in 1966, a hidden but merciless war has gone on — and the Delouette case is only one aspect of a French-American settlement. Nobody would know who emerged the winner, say the gaullists, if President Nixon had not recently demanded a reorganization of the CIA for misleading him — especially on Laotian and Cambodian affairs.

L'AFFAIRE FOURNIER

Ceux qui sortent de l'ombre

(En couverture cette semaine)

STATINTL

Paris, mardi, 12 h 45. Vêtu d'un pardessus gris anthracite, une écharpe autour du cou, un homme d'une cinquantaine d'années, d'une bonne corpulence, sort du cabinet du juge d'instruction Roussel, au Palais de Justice. Il a un mouvement de recul en apercevant un photographe de L'Express, Philippe Morel, posté là avec un reporter d'Europe 1, Pierre Douglas. Les deux journalistes le suivent jusqu'à la grille du Palais et l'abordent dès qu'il franchit l'enceinte. L'homme lève un sourcil broussailleux et dit d'une voix grave, très posée : « Je ne suis pas celui que vous croyez. » Le photographe a braqué son appareil et prend des clichés. « Vous n'avez pas le droit... Donnez-moi votre pellicule. » L'homme hèle l'agent en faction, qui appelle un « panier à salade » et conduit le trio au vieux commissariat des Halles.

« Comprenez-moi, dit l'homme, je fais de l'information, moi aussi, comme vous. Mais mes fonctions, comme ma personnalité, sont couvertes par le secret de Défense nationale. Si j'avais l'autorisation de paraître et de parler, c'est avec plaisir que je le ferais, puisque je suis mis en cause par des déclarations aberrantes. Mais je ne m'appartiens pas. »

Sur une copie. La pellicule est saisie par le commissaire, à la demande de la Cour de sûreté de l'Etat. Elle a impressionné le visage d'un homme tenu à l'anonymat, mais dont le pseudonyme et la profession défraient la chronique mondiale depuis l'avant-veille : le « colonel Paul Fournier »,

adjoint à la direction du Service de documentation extérieure et de contre-espionnage (Sdece, prononcez Zdek).

Escamoté du commissariat par une mystérieuse ambulance immatriculée 1296 LV 75, il vient de déposer, près de cinq heures durant, devant le juge d'instruction Roussel, dans une affaire de trafic de drogue dont la justice américaine l'accuse d'être l'organisateur.

Au même moment, un de ses « honorables correspondants », M. Roger Delouette, comparaît devant le tribunal fédéral de Newark (New Jersey). Grand, élancé, cheveux noirs bien ramenés sur la nuque, ne paraissant pas ses 48 ans, il a, en plus jeune, un faux air de Ray Milland dans « Love Story ». Il suit, sur une copie, la lecture de l'acte d'accusation faite par le juge Frederick Lacey : « Vous avez plaidé coupable d'avoir conspiré avec le colonel Fournier en vue de l'acheminement d'héroïne de France vers les Etats-Unis. Connaissez-vous Paul Fournier, des services de contre-espionnage français, Sdece ? »

— Oui.
— Etiez-vous un agent du Sdece ?
— Oui.
— Depuis quand ?
— J'ai été recruté en 1968. J'ai commencé à opérer en 1969.
— Avec qui deviez-vous vous mettre en rapport aux Etats-Unis ?
— Je devais avoir un contact au consulat de France à New York. » (Ce contact serait M. Harold Mac Nab, chef du poste « Sdece ».)

Le juge donne alors lecture des

déclarations faites par l'accusé depuis son arrestation, le 5 avril, par le service des douanes du New Jersey. Ce jour-là, une jeune inspectrice, miss Lynn Pelletier, 22 ans, avait eu bien du flair en procédant à la fouille d'un minicar Volkswagen, débarqué sur un quai de Port Elizabeth du cargo « Atlantic Cognac », en provenance du Havre, et dont le propriétaire, M. Delouette, était arrivé la veille à New York par le vol 803 de la T.w.a. Sous le plancher. « Un petit quelque chose m'a mis la puce à l'oreille », dira plus tard la jeune femme. En démontant le réservoir d'eau en plastique sous le lavabo de la caravane, elle a trouvé quinze sacs remplis de poudre blanche, quatre-vingt-six autres sous le plancher : au total, 43 kg 778 d'héroïne pure, estimée à 2,750 millions au prix coûtant et en valant 66 à la revente clandestine au détail.

Le Français est aussitôt appréhendé sur le quai du port et interrogé par les enquêteurs des douanes. « Je n'y comprends rien. Je ne sais pas ce que c'est que ça. » L'interrogatoire va durer trente heures. Commencé à la douane de Port Elizabeth, il va se poursuivre à l'hôtel Sheraton de New York, où une souricière est tendue dans la chambre que M. Delouette a réservée. Jaloux de leurs prérogatives, les douaniers se contentent de prévenir le Narcotic Bureau de leur exploit. Les policiers alertent à leur tour l'antenne de l'Office français des stupéfiants, tenue par le commissaire Daniel Hartwig et par l'officier de police Claude Chaminadas. Le protocole de coopération franco-américain ne s'étend pas, en effet, aux douanes. M. Chaminadas est, cependant, autorisé à assister à un bout d'interrogatoire. Sans intérêt.

Le lendemain matin, 6 avril, le téléphone sonne dans la chambre où M. Delouette a passé la nuit avec un douanier. La communication, qui est enregistrée, vient de Paris. Au bout du fil, une voix de femme.

« Il est arrivé un pépin à la voiture », dit M. Delouette, qui raccroche en soupirant. Le commissaire Hartwig est invité à entendre l'enregistrement, puis la suite de l'interrogatoire, qui prend alors un ton nouveau. Après le coup de téléphone, M. Delouette commence à se confesser : « Je suis du Sdece et j'ai agi sur ordre de mon supérieur. » M. Hartwig assiste au début de la confession, qui ne donnera lieu à aucun procès-verbal, car l'enquête est terminée. Les témoignages oraux aux Etats-Unis. Bientôt, le commissaire

Un « incorruptible »

M. Herbert J. Stern, l'accusateur de M. Paul Fournier, est un jeune procureur de 35 ans qui s'est fait une réputation d'« incorruptible ». Il a passé la plus grande partie de sa vie dans le New Jersey et à New York. Après des études à l'Ecole de droit de l'université de Chicago, grâce à une bourse de la Fondation Ford, il est nommé en 1961 assistant du procureur du comté de New York. En 1964 et en 1965, toujours dans ce même comté, il est affecté au bureau des homicides, où il a été chargé de l'instruction sur l'assassinat du leader noir Malcolm X. Il obtient l'arrestation des trois coupables.

A la fin de 1965, il est nommé au ministère de la Justice à la tête de la section que les Américains appellent « le crime organisé et le racket ». Sa réputation est déjà suffisamment établie pour qu'en 1966 on lui confie le

de diriger un « grand jury » afin d'enquêter sur la corruption qui règne dans la ville de Newark (New Jersey). Auprès du procureur fédéral de cet Etat, M. Frederick B. Lacey, qui est aujourd'hui devenu juge, il entreprend, en septembre 1969, une enquête retentissante sur les activités de la Mafia à Newark. Il parvient à établir que l'organisation secrète a à son service le maire de Newark, trois des neuf conseillers municipaux, quatre anciens conseillers municipaux, et d'innombrables policiers. Dans cette ville, proche de New York, qui est en majorité noire, la Mafia contrôle tout. M. Stern parvient à y faire condamner les coupables, y compris le maire, M. Hugh Addonizio. Aux élections suivantes, un Noir est élu maire.

Au début de l'année 1971, M. Stern est nommé procureur fédéral pour le New

Thai Guerrillas Grow More Troublesome

By Peter A. Jay

Washington Post Foreign Service

BANGKOK, Nov. 25—Thailand's Communist insurgents, one American official here likes to say, are like mice "operating between the hooves of the government elephant."

It's not a bad simile. The Thai government is very concerned about the mice, who began to appear nearly seven years ago and have become increasingly troublesome, and it is squashing them as fast as it can. But they show no signs of going away.

By the standards of Vietnam, the guerrilla threat to Thailand is minimal. According to the government's best estimates, there are only about 5,000 armed insurgents in the country—though for each man with a rifle there may be as many as 10 unarmed but active supporters of the movement.

This number has not grown appreciably since the clandestine Communist Party of Thailand decided in 1964 to switch from simple political activity to armed struggle—but the guerrillas are now much better armed, trained and organized.

According to the official Thai reports, the combined number of terrorist incidents and assassinations has risen steadily from 300 in 1966 to 1,100 last year. In the first seven months of 1971 there were 900 such incidents.

Village-level organization by the guerrillas continues, despite new government programs to stop it. In one area of northeast Thailand alone, an estimated 200 villages are estimated to be effectively under Communist control.

When there is violence—ambushes, assassination of government officials, attacks on isolated police outposts—it is often carried out with speed and precision.

"That was a real pro job," an American counterinsurgency specialist said not long ago of an ambush in northeast Thailand that cost the lives of several government soldiers.

Generally speaking, Thailand has not one but several different insurgencies. Those of most concern to the government are in the north and northeast.

The northeast is a dry, flat, poor area, dotted here and there with the large American-built air bases, from which bombing missions throughout Southeast Asia are flown, and it is here that Communist political organization has been most successful.

The insurgent Thai People's Liberation Armed Forces that operate in this area and base in the Phu Phan, mountain area near the Nakorn Phanom airbase have begun to establish a true village infrastructure, government sources say. The guerrillas have an estimated armed strength of 1,500.

In far north, the mountainous jungled arm of Thailand that reaches toward China between Laos and Burma, the situation is different.

About 2,000 Meo tribesmen—ethnically the same as the tough CIA-trained guerrillas used in Laos to fight the Communist Pathet Lao—led by Thai cadre have staked out highland "liberated areas" in the north where the government seldom seeks to go.

These units launch hit-and-run raids on lowland settlements around Chiang Mai, and then fade back into the hills where the royal Thai army follows only at its own risk. If pressed too hard, they can slip across the borders into Laos or Burma.

"What have you achieved when you have chased 40 Meo from one ridge line to another?" asked one official in Bangkok. "Nothing and it takes a hell of a lot of effort."

In addition to the northern and northeastern insurgencies, Thailand has little

pockets of trouble in back country areas of the south and west.

Also, in the far south, about 800 Chinese and Malay guerrillas are known to base along the border with Malaysia—but they are said to be members of the Malaysian Communist Party and more concerned with probing across the border to the south than with Thailand.

Thai sources in the five-year-old Communist Suppression Operations Command, a combined police-civil-military organization headed by the respected Gen. Siyud Kerdphol, believed that the various insurgencies are directed from Peking—not from Hanoi.

The Americans, who have a special counterinsurgency section manned jointly by representatives of the embassy, CIA and the military, tend to agree.

"It's part of a long-term plan aimed at the ultimate control of Thai society," one source said. "It's not a spin-off from the Vietnam war."

Captured Communist cadre told Thai officials of training in China. More recently, there have been reports of Meo and Thai guerrillas being trained by Chinese instructors along the road the Chinese have been building, for the last several years, down through Laos toward Thailand.

The road, which has now reached to within 30 miles of the Thai border, has had Bangkok officials worried for some time and has tended to dampen enthusiasm for diplomatic overtures toward Peking.

Indeed, last week's "coup against parliament," in which the military leadership of the country disbanded the National Assembly, abrogated the constitution and imposed martial law, was said to be directed in part at checking public sentiment in favor of a rapprochement with China.

American officials here are sensitive to the insurgency, and tend to be annoyed by the not uncommon suggestion that the Bangkok government overstates the nature of the emergency to squeeze more military aid out of Washington.

They note that U.S. military aid to Thailand has been decreasing annually from a high of \$58.3 million in 1966 to about half that in 1970.

They also say that Thais have responded well to the threat of the insurgents. "Both the insurgency and the government's performance are on rising curves," one source said, "and the government's keeping up."

Whether it can gain on the insurgency, however, is another question. It starts with certain basic disadvantages.

Thailand is a country only slightly smaller than France, with a hard-to-administer, largely rural population of about 35 million and thousands of miles of border.

Of the four countries with which it shares borders; two (Laos and Cambodia) are at war with Communist forces and the other two (Malaysia and Burma) have low-level guerrilla problems of their own.

On the other hand, it is the only country in Southeast Asia without a history of colonial rule.

At the moment, the guerrillas are still more of an annoyance than a real threat. But there is no doubt that over the long run the Thais are worried.

Foe Opens Laos Offensive With Win

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE—Pathet Lao North Vietnamese forces in Laos have begun their annual dry season offensive, informed U.S. sources report, and have launched it from a position of greater strength than in any past year.

Mounting military action in both southern and northern Laos, including the season's first significant exchange of territory around the southern panhandle town of Moung Phalane, leads sources here to agree on this assessment.

An early start to the annual push, along with the Communists' apparent strength in materiel and indications of ill preparedness by government and pro-government forces to meet the offensive are proving worrisome in both Laotian and American government circles.

"This could well be the season when the Reds establish once and for all their total dominance of Laos' mountains," a knowledgeable American source said. "It looks like a hell of a dry season shaping up."


The failure of government forces to roll back Communist advances of last year in southern Laos have given the enemy a decided advantage, sources say. The Communist gains were made in the wake of South Vietnam's operation Lam Son 719, and carved a buffer zone from royalist territory that could be used as alternate routes for the Ho Chi Minh Trail to the east if further incursions occurred.

Operation Lam Son, sources say, failed to seriously slow the movement of men and materiel down the trail.

Communist strength in southern Laos, the sources say, remains at a high level of effectiveness.

The enemy is now capable of fully consolidating its holdings, retaking the slight losses to the Royal Lao Army during the wet season just passed and acquire additional territory in the south.

Government forces claim significant losses of



Communist forces opened the current dry season offensive in southern Laos by taking the area around Moung Phalane, on the Bolevens Plateau. Royalist forces retreated 20 miles in the significant battle.

last year and mounting pressure in northern Laos, which drains off combat personnel has left government forces in a precarious position and most observers are pessimistic. Few sources believe Communist moves westward will penetrate to the Mekong River, but the Moung Phalane retreats seem to indicate that royalist troops in the south are not in a mood for battle.

Increased Pressure

In the Plain of Jars area, 100 miles north of Vientiane, northern Laos is coming under increasing pressure from enemy guns located in the mountains on the eastern rim. Their dry season pounding of Gen. Vang Pao's Meo army firebases on the plain has begun, though informed U.S. sources say aiming is still wide of its targets.

Vang Pao, who all sources say has established six fire support bases on knolls

gunners and gain the same advantage the enemy now holds in firing downward, has turned many qualified observers into pessimists over Vang Pao's ability to hold the plain.

If he loses it early in the current Communist offensive, sources warn, he is in grave danger of losing his headquarters at Long Cheng and virtually the entire mountain area of northern Laos now held by Meo. The psychological blow to Vang Pao's Meo army resulting from Long Cheng's fall, sources say, would irreparably scatter his command.

However, few observers believe that if the plain were captured by the Communists early in the dry season, and if they captured the CIA base at Long Cheng, that it would mean enemy entry onto the Mekong plain around Vientiane. That, most sources concede, could easily be done but most believe North Vietnamese strategic aims lie with Pathet Lao controlling the mountain areas for the present as a buffer and as a bargaining point in future settlement talks in Laos.

Scattering the Meo army is a prime objective in north Laos, sources believe. Capturing Long Cheng would greatly enhance the Communists' bargaining position in Laos, which is already quite strong, diplomatic sources say.

The rising crescendo of artillery and rocket fire from enemy gunners on the higher ground to the east is an indication that the Communists have "a lot of ammunition to expend," sources say.

The Communist hold on the higher ground is seen as worrisome by qualified sources, who note it gives the enemy a decided advantage in firing into Vang Pao's firebases and into his infantry operating on the open plain outside the firebases.

Failure of the Meo to capture the northeast corner of the Plain of Jars this year, then failure to take the high ground held by enemy

Spies get together

There is one secret that the intelligence fraternity in Washington has not been able to keep under cover: its own lines of communication have become badly scrambled. In an attempt to get rid of the worst discrepancies and overlaps President Nixon has announced a reorganisation of the multiple branches of the secret service under the direction of Mr Richard Helms, the present and very able head of the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr Helms will now head the new United States Intelligence Board and will co-ordinate the activities and the budgets of the various intelligence networks—the first time that anyone has had power to do this. The board will be directly responsible to the National Security Council. At the same time two new panels will be set up within the NSC. One, under the direction of Mr Henry Kissinger, the chief of the council, will analyse all the intelligence reports. (In the rush to collect raw facts their interpretation has often been neglected.) The other will compare the strength of the Soviet forces as a whole with those of the United States.

The tangles within the intelligence world go back beyond the crisis over missiles in Cuba. On numerous occasions the many military spies—the three services have their own intelligence networks and then the Department of Defence has still another—have come up with assessments that differ from those of the civilian agencies such as the CIA and the intelligence division of the State Department. Although the CIA has a hawkish image in foreign eyes, it is generally the military men who have over-estimated the resources available to the other side, partly in an effort to boost support in Congress for their own defence budget. Furthermore, relations have been strained recently between the CIA, which gathers information from abroad, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which manages surveillance at home.

This year the confusion has been more noticeable than most. The abortive commando raid a year ago to free prisoners of war from the deserted camp at Son Tay in North Vietnam caused acute embarrassment. Then the Pentagon papers revealed that there had earlier been some serious discrepancies between military and civilian



Richard Helms: master-spy

information on the war in Vietnam. And now there is a struggle brewing over the extent of the reported build-up of missiles by the Soviet Union at a time when the negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms are reaching a crucial stage.

Congress, which has always been suspicious of the secrecy surrounding the intelligence world, has also been prodding the President. The conservatives in the Senate, led, rather surprisingly, by Senator Ellender, who used to be the spies' best friend, want to cut the money that goes on military intelligence; in the age of expensive satellite spies about \$5 billion a year is spent on this out of an annual intelligence budget of around \$6 billion. The liberals, on the other hand, claim that Congress has too little control over the intelligence networks; in particular they feel that the CIA has too great an influence on foreign policy. What, they

ask, is the CIA doing in Laos? It will be no consolation to these critics that Mr Kissinger will now have greater authority over spying. As a presidential aide he is not responsible to Congress.

STATINTL

A Novel of 'Cowboy Diplomacy' in the Congo in the '60s

Reviewed by
Bruce Oudes

Books

STATINTL

The reviewer has written extensively on African affairs and was a member of the American mission to the Congo (Kinshasa) in 1964-65.

In this process of adding up our flesh and blood as well as psychological losses from our recent adventures abroad, there should be a line for the foreign service, especially the junior ranks. Talented potential candidates have shunned government service, and a number of those on the inside have resigned outright. An entire foreign service generation has been depleted by this self-purge.

Some signed petitions and demonstrated before they quit; others made a splash of resignation as a question of principle. Malcolm McConnell did neither.

He quietly went to a Greek Island and wrote in eloquent fury a taut first novel about how a young American diplomat and ex-Freedom Rider, Steve Sherman, and his sexually athletic wife spent the last week of 1963 in the Congo during a *matata*, the Swahili equivalent of brouhaha.

And what, pray tell, does this now ancient Congolese history have to do with, say, the U.S. "people-to-people" campaign in Indochina? As Sherman, the disenchanted FSO, put it to a CIA man on New Year's eve in Albertville, "All you people going around the world writing surrender passes and bombing the hell out of people and stuff like that. It's O.K. as long as you say they're Communists . . . Why the hell do we always have to decide who gets bombed and who gets the milk powder?"

Sherman is disgusted not

MATATA. By Malcolm McConnell.

(Viking, 300 pp., \$6.95)

only with the superficiality of the U.S. contact with the Congolese, but with the vapid, play-every-night life he and Lisa are leading within the American community—a phenomenon known as embassy incest.

One of the paranoia-inducing truths of embassy life abroad is that in posts without an FBI agent, it is the CIA section that keeps tabs on the private lives of all Americans. McConnell demonstrates just what a clout for conformity this lever can deliver. The spook tells Sherman, "You won't get a security clearance for a pay toilet in Red Square when I'm through with you."

"Matata" is the first novel to give a slice of what life was really like for Americans in the Congo in those slapdash days, and McConnell's effort is a vivid, chilling success. The Congo, now the Republic of Zaire, was the kind of place where one set of American officials used every possible pressure to keep private Americans from joining the South African-Rhodesian dominated mercenary commandos, while others saw to the "meres" combat needs including jeeps—with AID friendship decals—to chase Simba rebels. It wouldn't do for Americans to actually kill Africans, not even errant ones.

McConnell, fortunately, does not limit his perspective to a one-way view of the Congo's tragedies, but he tells at sympathetic counterpoint the only slightly incredible story of the quintessential Congolese, Pierre-Marie Tshimpama, a victim of independence.

One is almost relieved to see Tshimpama's youthful respect and admiration for whites evolve to adult hatred. Anything less would have meant McConnell pulled punches. A CIA B-26 I saw parked on the apron at Kamina in 1964 carried an unforgettable reminder. On the nose of that plane: "our" anti-Castro Cubans were flying on behalf of the Congo's national air force was the World War II-style hand-painted name: "Boogie's Bogey."

The difficulty of drawing a fair conclusion about what the U.S. did in the Congo is that, according to the usual yardsticks of international success, our cowboy diplomacy worked. The Congo is still whole, the U.S. role and expenditure there is down considerably, American influence remains high, and the government is relatively stable. Joseph Mobutu is just as much a fat-cat general and expert at one-man elections as Nguyen Van Thieu, but he and his country have receded in the American mind back to the travel pages.

Nevertheless, the American diplomatic brigade that helped put out the fire is to a substantial degree still intact. When things got slow in the Congo, the State Department transferred McConnell's boss, Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley, back to Indochina. The gregarious Godley took to Laos a choice selection of aides including his CIA station chief and his present chief deputy where, to this day, the "Congo mafia" is still doing business.

However, the protagonist man, had no difficulty

reaching a conclusion about the quality of American diplomacy he saw. He told the CIA man all about it: "You're all just robots. You don't have any human feeling left . . . They're just spics or niggers or slopes to you. They're something to f--- around with, something to laugh at and plan air strikes against and make up lies about in your horseshit reports. It doesn't matter where they send you. It'll always be the same, doesn't matter if it's Cuba, or Laos or the Congo. You just follow orders."

The civil rights collegians of the early '60s didn't integrate easily into the foreign service. They weren't as indifferent and calculating as the traditional mold would have preferred, but the Steve Shermans were intensely aware of what Washington is now rediscovering: the human consequences of foreign policy.

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Spy Budget Secrecy May End

By TAYLOR PENSONEAU

A Staff Correspondent of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, Nov. 26.

THE BELEAGUERED CONGRESSIONAL minority that has fought to pry loose the Government's secret figures on intelligence expenditures mounted a challenge this week, that though unsuccessful, may make the objective more attainable.

Although an attempt by Senator Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, to limit intelligence outlays was rebuffed by the Senate as expected, an increasing number of members—including some of Symington's opponents—predicted that the day would come when Congress was no longer in the dark on the country's undercover activities.

Possibly most significant, the debate on Symington's proposal brought out that the seemingly broad war being organized and financed in Laos by the Central Intelligence Agency may finally persuade some previously hesitant members of Congress to assert themselves more in this ticklish field.

THE MOST SUCCINCT appraisal of Symington's effort came from one of the opponents, Senator Charles Mathias Jr. (Rep.), Maryland, who remarked moments before the vote that the Missourian had focused "our attention on water that is not only muddy, but actually murky."

"Many members may be reluctant to stir this water for fear of what they may find," Mathias said. "I think we cannot delay much longer in turning our attention in this direction for fear that what is there may evade our examination and our concern."

This feeling may be realized sooner than expected because a number of Senators, in the wake of the Symington matter, said they would push for an executive session by the Senate to consider the intelligence question. It could mean a major breakthrough for those of Symington's persuasion—especially if a censored transcript was made public later.

SYMINGTON sought to amend the Department of Defense appropriations bill for fiscal 1972 to place a 4-billion-dollar ceiling on intelligence outlays. Most estimates put this yearly expenditure currently at more than 5 billion dollars.

The proposed limit, which the Senate rejected Tuesday 56 to 31, would have applied to the CIA, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency

and undercover endeavors by the armed forces.

Many observers regard Symington's move as the most determined attempt yet to force Congress to account at least somewhat for the activities of these agencies.

Although waste and duplication in many of the intelligence operations were given as the most obvious reasons for the amendment, the greater intent was to provide Congress, and the American public, with more insight into both the domestic and foreign activities of these agencies.

USING HIMSELF as an example, Symington contended that he had been unable to determine the appropriations this year for intelligence, even though he is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee as well as an ex-officio member of the Appropriations Committee.

Senator J. William Fulbright (Dem.), Arkansas, asserted in the debate Tuesday that the Missourian should not feel insulted because nobody had discovered where the intelligence funds were in the defense appropriations measure.

"When they read a line item and find that there is so much for aircraft, or for a carrier, those may or may not be the real amounts," Fulbright said.

REPLYING Senator Allen J. Ellender (Dem.), Louisiana, chairman of the Appropriations Committee and a main opponent of Symington's amendment said that there was no specific appropriations for intelligence activities. "They are funded from many different appropriations included in the bill," he said.

Much of the argument this week centered on the CIA, which came under congressional scrutiny earlier this year for clandestine role in the activities of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. In his support, Ellender was particularly critical of the CIA.

"One of the things that worries me most of all is that I do not see any reason why we should pass appropriations for the CIA to organize an army, pay the troops and conduct a full-scale war in Laos," Fulbright said.

"Yet people of this country think we have a democracy in which a war, if one is to be fought, has to be declared by Congress. Yet Congress did not know about the war in Laos until it was well under way."

When prodded by fellow Senators, Ellender conceded that he did not know in advance about CIA financing of any army in Laos. He said further that he had "never asked, to begin with, whether or not there were any funds to carry on the war in this sum the CIA has asked for."

"It never dawned on me to ask about it," Ellender said. "I did see it publicized in the newspapers some time ago."

Fulbright and his allies pointed to Ellender's statement as a prime example of the necessity for greater congressional awareness of undercover activities.

Ellender became a prime target of the Symington side, because of an occurrence last week that the Missourian related to the Senate Tuesday. Symington, when asking staff members of the Appropriations Committee about intelligence figures, was told that they could discuss the matter only with Ellender and four other senior members of the panel.

"THIS MEANS that these billions of dollars of the taxpayers' money are being authorized and appropriated by the Senate with the knowledge and approval of just five of its members," Symington contended. The other four are Senators John L. McClelland (Dem.), Arkansas; John C. Stennis (Dem.), Mississippi; Milton R. Young (Rep.), North Dakota, and Margaret Chase Smith (Rep.), Maine.

Symington's mention of this matter constituted an attack on the system and, therefore, possibly his shrewdest jab of the day. As the argument ensued, one of the few oases near Symington was Ellender's remark, "If I'm not trusted, I'll quit."

"You're to be trusted," Sym-

ington answered, "but why aren't the rest of us to be trusted, too?"

Ellender was not hushed in his rebuttal as he told the Senate that "this method of appropriating funds for these intelligence activities has been in

effect for at least 20 years that I know of, since I have been on the committee."

Only a few persons consider these funding requests because of the sensitivity of the subject, Ellender said. In addition, he expressed an opinion of many of Symington's opponents in saying that the intelligence field was too much of a hot potato to "discuss in the open."

THIS APPROACH was adopted by Young also, who asserted that proper defense of the CIA in the debate would require documentation of activities that could not be done.

"Spying is a dirty business, but it is a business every nation in the world engages in," Young said. "Russia does a bigger job of it than we do. You can not disclose secret information."

In an action earlier this year against the use of intelligence funds, the Senate passed a bill that would provide \$35,000,000 in fiscal 1972 for financing the operations of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty through the Secretary of State.

The measure, sponsored by Senator Clifford P. Case (Rep.),

New Jersey, is intended to divorce the CIA from the funding of the stations. Radio Free Europe, beamed to eastern Europe, and Radio Liberty, beamed to the Soviet Union, operate in West Germany, ostensibly on private contributions.

However, Case said in January that funds had been expended from secret CIA budgets to pay almost totally for the costs of the stations.

The House has approved a bill providing for a commission to conduct a two-year study of the stations. Continued funding of them would be channeled through the commission. A compromise between the two bills will have to be worked out in day. As the argument ensued, one of the few oases near Symington was Ellender's remark, "If I'm not trusted, I'll quit."

"You're to be trusted," Sym-

SPECIAL REPORT

The \$149 Billion Question--Was It Worth It?

BY ROBERT C. TOTH
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON--A nation has "no permanent friends or permanent enemies," a British statesman once remarked, "only permanent interests."

When the Senate two weeks ago killed temporarily a foreign aid bill, it was basically demanding a similarly hard-nosed attitude by the Nixon Administration toward a very costly program which has been "a basic instrument of U.S. foreign policy" for a generation.

What permanent interest of the United States has been served by spreading \$149 billion worth of guns and economic help around the world over 25 years?

Why should the United States keep it up, either at the present requested rate--\$5.1 billion a year in the formal aid "package" (including \$3.5 billion in the bill killed by the Senate) but more like \$9.5 billion all told when every spigot is counted--or at any other level?

Criticized as 'Handout'

Implacable foes of the program say "none". Conservatives like Rep. H.R. Gross (R-Iowa) call it the "foreign handout program." In Congress almost since aid began, Gross recently challenged anyone to prove he even once voted for "this giveaway." All justifications are, to him, one big "snow job."

Even liberals like Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) and economist-author-diplomat John Kenneth Galbraith, however, now blast foreign aid as dollar-diplomacy, a grab bag, a tool of the cold war and a form of imperialism. The aid program, said Galbraith, is "the disaster area" of American foreign policy.

Aid is certainly a grab bag. It is guns and money, and money to use

Times staff writers who contributed to this report were David F. Belnap, Buenos Aires; Donald Brenner, Hong Kong; Don Cook, Paris; William J. Coughlin, Beirut; William J. Drummond, New Delhi; Jack Foisie, Bangkok; Sam Jameson, Tokyo; Francis B. Kent, Mexico City; Tom Lambert, Jerusalem; Stanley Meister, Nairobi, and Harry Trimborn, Moscow.

the guns as well as money to improve the economies of poorer nations. It also includes humanitarian aid to refugees and the like.

Give away it is not, at least not exactly. Two-thirds of the \$149 billion was given away as "grants," but the rest was lent. About \$21 billion has been repaid on the principal or as interest on the loans.

Even the grants were not simply dollar handouts. Most were spent in the United States. The taxpayer footed the bill, but the money employed Americans. Examples:

--Arms, worth \$41.7 billion. All were U.S. made. Whatever the morality of being the world's leading "merchant of death," the 10% of the total that was sold (on easy credit) did help the U.S. balance of payments and did partially subsidize the domestic arms makers.

--Food for Peace, worth \$19.7 billion. All was grown here and most was surplus which, if sold cheaply abroad, would have created chaos on world markets.

--Economic aid (excluding food, but including funds that support military efforts, as in Vietnam), worth \$88 billion. It was very largely spent in the United States for goods and services. This year the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) spent \$1.66 billion, over 90% at home. American business gets almost a \$1 billion a year; American labor gets jobs from the program.

Reasons for spending it in the first place are as numerous as the many parts of the program. But several grand rationales have been offered in the past:--peace and stability in the world, and a better life for poor people in that world.

These generalizations are somewhat better focused now. Earlier

this year President Nixon said his foreign aid bill had three aims:

"To strengthen the defense capabilities and economics of our friends and allies . . . ; to assist the lower income countries in their efforts to achieve economic and social development . . . ; and to provide humanitarian assistance to countries struck by natural disasters and political upheaval."

But conservatives who had voted primarily for arms aid, and liberals who had preferred economic aid, combined in October to vote against all of it. The old reasons, despite the new cosmetics, have lost much of their force over the years.

Communism is seen as a less contagious disease than when aid began. Forward military bases are less valuable in a world of nuclear-tipped intercontinental missiles. Military pacts with small countries seem more trouble than they are worth. Hunger and discontent at home cries for priority over hunger and distress abroad.

Goals are Contradictory

Furthermore, contradictions are recognized in the goals of foreign aid. Military assistance tends to perpetuate the status quo, economic aid to change it. Arms to Greece kept out communism but facilitated the military coup against a democratic government. Economic assistance raises living standards but also stimulates the appetite for more, and faster, which is destabilizing.

Industrializing a poor country does create a greater market for U.S. goods. It also creates greater competition against U.S. goods, both in world and in American markets.

South Korea, which a U.S. senator in the early 1960s wrote off as "a hopeless, bottomless pit for aid," received \$5 billion before graduating last year out of the program. It exported virtually nothing to the United States in 1963; now it sends \$473 million a year, including textiles that apparently threaten U.S. jobs.

Western Europe was rebuilt with U.S. aid with similar results. But there, U.S. private money took up after government aid stopped. Now, over \$20 billion is invested by Americans in Europe, earning over \$2 billion annually. More than half the profits are brought back.

Europeans Criticize It

Europeans do not like it. Some now see Marshall plan aid as malignant, rather than pure altruism by

continued

Laos patriots: U.S. escalates war

The U.S. is continuing to intensify its war of aggression in Laos through the use of American air power to support puppet Lao troops and Thai forces being utilized under the "Nixon doctrine," the Central Committee of the Lao Patriotic Front (Pathet Lao) said in an Oct. 19 statement denouncing these U.S. actions.

"For nearly 20 years now," said the Pathet Lao, "the U.S. imperialists have carried out and daily intensified their intervention and aggression in Laos. When Nixon took office, the Johnson administration had suffered repeated and heavy defeats in its

war of aggression against Indochina... That is why Nixon... is forced to work out a new global strategy called the 'Nixon doctrine'—an extremely reactionary doctrine."

The statement points out that the "Nixon doctrine" of using Asians to fight Asians, with U.S. logistical and air support, has involved an unprecedented increase in aid for the Vientiane puppet administration and the dispatch of large numbers of U.S. "advisors" to Laos.

"At present," the statement continues, "in spite of their very heavy defeats, the U.S. imperialists remain stubborn. They continue to introduce ad-

ditional Thai regulars into Laos to coordinate with the Lao 'special forces' and rightist troops....

"The U.S. imperialists have paid particular attention to building and consolidating their [Lao] 'special forces'... to make them the core for carrying out the 'Nixon doctrine' in this country... to serve the U.S. 'special war' and its sabotage activities along the Laos-Vietnam and Laos-China border areas. These 'special forces' have been built, equipped, trained, directed and commanded by the CIA."

The Pathet Lao statement also denounces U.S. "pacification" efforts, the use of Laos by the U.S. to

attack the liberation movements in other countries of Indochina, the use of the U.S. Agency for International Development as a cover for aggressive activities and the U.S. rejection of Pathet Lao peace proposals while Washington hypocritically claims it respects Lao neutrality.

The statement concludes with a vow to continue the struggle against the U.S. and their puppets. "The Lao people, shoulder to shoulder with the brother Vietnamese and Khmer peoples, are determined to fulfill their noble task, and turn the Indochinese peninsula into a really independent and peaceful region."

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How Much For What?

'Spy' Spending Keeps Senators In The Dark

McClatchy Newspapers Service

WASHINGTON — The full extent of congressional ignorance about US intelligence operations, including covert military action in Laos, was spotlighted on the Senate floor last night in an exchange between Sen. Alan Cranston, D-Calif., and appropriations committee chairman Allen Ellender, D-La.

Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., had offered an amendment to the Pentagon budget bill to limit outlays for intelligence activities to \$4 billion.

The bill has no separate item for this purpose and the actual amount is unknown to all but Ellender and four other members of a special intelligence subcommittee.

Ellender reported his committee slashed \$390 million from administration requests for intelligence operations. But the Senate could not determine the original figure or the reduced figure.

Addressing Ellender, Cranston declared:

"The chairman stated that he never would have thought of even asking about CIA funds being used to conduct the war in Laos. I am sure I never would have thought to ask such a question. But it appeared in the press that perhaps that was happening. I would like to ask the senator if, since then, he has inquired and now knows whether that is being done?"

"I have not inquired," Ellender replied.

"You do not know, in fact?" Cranston asked.

"No," said Ellender.

"As you are one of the five men privy to this information, in fact you are the No. 1 man of the five men who would know, then who would know what happened to this money?"

Cranston continued. "The fact is, not even the five men, and you are the chief one of the five men, know the facts in the situation."

"Probably not," said Ellender.

Cranston noted that the \$70 billion defense appropriations measure specifies

outlays for pay and allowances, clothing, travel, retirement pay, health care, welfare and recreation, medals and awards, emblems and insignia, milk purchases, acquisition of weapons systems — but not a word about funding for the CIA and other intelligence groups.

"Is the way these items are handled inflated, or bloated, in fact, some of them, at least — that will cover up what is in this bill for intelligence?" he asked.

"Yes, the senator is correct — some of it," Ellender replied.

Cranston and Sen. John V. Tunney, D-Calif., voted for the Symington amendment, which was rejected, 56-31.

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SYMINGTON'S SHOT IN THE DARK

Spy spending still top secret

(UPI)—The Senate refused yesterday to limit U.S. intelligence agencies spending after a rare open discussion on how Congress supervises the secret spy network.

The proposed \$4 million ceiling, an amendment by Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., to a defense money bill, was rejected 56 to 31.

Sen. Symington, a former secretary of the Air Force, said that tho he served on the armed services and foreign relations committees he had no idea how much is spent on intelligence gathering. He said the \$4 billion limit was just a shot in the dark.

LESS SCRUTINY

"The point," he told senators during the dinner-hour debate, "is that we do not have the facts required to allocate the resources of the country."

"There is no federal agency of our government whose activities receive less scrutiny and control than the CIA," Sen. Symington said, and the same is true of other intelligence agencies of the government."

As a case in point, Sen. Symington cited the central intelligence subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee headed by Sen. John Stennis.

He is one of five senators entrusted with the details of the intelligence budget, it came out during the debate.

Another of the five, Sen. Allen Ellender, D-La., chairman of the appropriations commit-

tee, acknowledged that intelligence outlays were hidden by padding out line item appropriations in various bills.

He said he could not reveal how much is spent on intelligence because "that's a top secret."

Sen. Ellender conceded he did not know in advance about the CIA's financing of any army in Laos.

Sen. J. William Fulbright, chairman of the foreign relations committee, argued that such lack of congressional knowledge demonstrated the need for more accountability.

"One of the things that worries me most of all is the CIA going off and conducting a war of its own," Sen. Fulbright said. He disputed Stennis' contention that revealing the total budgets of intelligence agencies would disclose any military secrets.

"I don't believe it is tragic" for the Senate to demand the information thru such a device as the Symington amendment, Sen. Fulbright said. "The Senate is due an explanation."

Sen. Symington at one point shouted "I can be trusted" in expressing his frustration over being kept in the dark.

Sen. Stennis argued that Congress itself had set up the agencies.

He told senators: "You're just going to have to make up your mind that you can't have an accounting — shut your eyes and take what comes."

STATINTL

24 NOV 1971

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Intelligence Outlay Ceiling Is Rejected by Senate, 56-31

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

After a sharp debate punctuated by such shouts as "The Senate is due an explanation" and "I can be trusted," the Senate last night voted 56 to 31 against an amendment to put a ceiling on spending by government intelligence agencies.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), in offering the amendment to the defense money bill, said his purpose was to let Congress in on what American intelligence operatives are already doing and plan to do in this country and abroad. "The point," he told the senators during the dinner-hour debate, "is to state that we do not have the facts required to allocate the resources of the country."

Symington and his allies thus made the stiffest challenge yet to the way Congress tries to keep track of the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency and the separate intelligence arms of the Army, Navy and Air Force, operations which altogether reportedly cost some \$6 billion a year.

"There is no federal agency of our government whose activities receive less scrutiny and control than the CIA," Symington said, "and the same is true of other intelligence agencies of the government."

As a case in point, Symington cited the Central Intelligence subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee which is chaired by Sen. John Stennis (D-Miss.).

When Stennis during the debate said "it is so tragic" to try to limit intelligence operations through hasty action on the Senate floor, Symington shouted in reply: "I wish his interest

was such he had just one meeting, just one meeting."

The Missourian said he did not know how much the various intelligence agencies of the government spent in any one year, adding that he understood published estimates of \$6 billion were too high. But his amendment, in an attempt to force an accounting, would have limited total spending by all the various agencies to \$4 billion in the fiscal year starting next July 1.

Chairman Allen J. Ellender (D-La.) of the Senate Appropriations Committee and its Intelligence Operations subcommittee said during the debate he could not tell fellow senators how much is spent on intelligence because "that's a top secret."

Ellender conceded under questioning by fellow senators that he did not know, in advance about the CIA's financing of any army in Laos. Symington's allies, especially Chairman J. W. Fulbright of the Foreign Relations Committee, argued that such lack of congressional knowledge about worldwide activities demonstrated the need for more accountability.

"One of the things that worries me most of all is the CIA going off and conducting a war of its own," Fulbright said. He disputed Stennis' contention that revealing the total budgets of intelligence agencies would disclose any military secrets.

"I don't believe it is tragic" for the Senate to demand the information through such a device as the Symington amendment, Fulbright said. "The Senate is due an explanation."

Symington at one point shouted "I can be trusted" in expressing his frustration in being kept in the dark about

covert intelligence operations. He said such lack of information undercut his effort to vote sensibly on the allocation of the nation's resources.

Several senators expressed uneasiness over the White House's recently announced reorganization of intelligence functions. "No doubt about it," Symington said of the reorganization, "we're putting intelligence in the hands of the military."

Stennis, in declaring that Congress in its own laws creating the agencies stressed the need for secrecy on intelligence operations, said to his fellow senators: "You're just going to have to make up your mind that you can't have an accounting—shut your eyes and take what comes."

He promised that the Senate Armed Services Committee would conduct an in-depth analysis of the nation's intelligence activities, including the restructuring recently ordered by the White House.

In the meantime, Stennis said, "The only thing to do is vote this amendment down" and work for reforms in a more orderly fashion.

Myriaden von Daten

200.000 Menschen arbeiten in den Geheim- und Spionagediensten der USA, aber sie arbeiten oft nicht zur Zufriedenheit des Präsidenten. Deshalb wurden die Dienste jetzt Nixons Chefberater Kissinger unterstellt.

Jeden Morgen, kurz nach Anbruch der Dämmerung, bringt eine schwarze Limousine brennende Fracht ins Weiße Haus. Es ist eine Mappe mit den geheimsten Geheimberichten der letzten 24 Stunden. Titel: „The President's Daily Brief“ — Tägliche Kompendium für den Präsidenten.

Zunächst studiert Nixons außen- und sicherheitspolitischer Chefberater Henry Kissinger das Papier. Von ihm läßt sich der amerikanische Präsident dann die Top-Nachrichten referieren. Er selbst liest das von der Zentralen Geheimdienstbehörde (CIA) zubereitete Dokument allenfalls abends — und eher lustlos.

Denn Polit-Routinier Nixon, so erkannte „Newsweek“, „ist an Geheimnissen um ihrer selbst willen nicht interessiert“. Er wünscht weniger Daten, dafür aber gründliche Analysen, die ihm als Grundlage für politische Entscheidungen dienen können.

Bisher lieferten die Geheimdienste — neben der CIA vor allem die „Intelligence“-Stäbe bei Heer, Marine, Luftwaffe — zu wenige Analysen nach Nixons Geschmack. Die Folge: Unzufriedenheit im Weißen Haus.

Falsche Informationen durch Amerikas Militärspäher und die kletternden Kosten des aufgeblähten Spionage-Apparates verstärken den Unmut der Regierung noch, von der harschen Kritik liberaler Volksvertreter an den Geheimnissen zu schweigen.

Law-and-Order-Präsident Nixon reorganisierte daher jetzt die Nachrichtendienste. Zwar bleiben alle bestehenden, weitverzweigten Behörden am Leben. Doch praktisch sollen nunmehr alle Geheimdienstfäden bei zwei Männern zusammenlaufen:

▷ CIA-Direktor Richard Helms überwacht und koordiniert sämtliche Programme. Obendrein leitet er einen neugeschaffenen Spar-Ausschuß, der die Budgets trimmen soll.

▷ Präsidentenberater Henry Kissinger dirigiert das neue „Intelligence Committee“ im Rahmen des Nationalen Sicherheitsrates. Dieses Komitee erteilt Spionage-Aufträge und schiebt die Resultate für Richard Nixons Gebrauch.

Sogar dem CIA-Chef Helms soll der Harvard-Professor Kissinger auf allerhöchsten Wunsch künftig „Führung



Geheimdienst-Chef Helms
Interview mit Hitler

und Richtung“ geben. Washingtoner Beamte werten die neue Informations-Schleuse unter Führung Kissingers als wichtiges „Bindeglied zwischen Produzenten und Konsumenten“.

Kissingers Machtzuwachs hat im Kongreß sogleich Widerspruch hervorgerufen. Senator William Fulbright sieht die erweiterten Befugnisse als neuen Beweis dafür, daß die Regierung dem Kongreß die Kontrolle über die Nachrichtendienste entziehen wolle.

Daß bei den Geheimdiensten gespart werden soll, ist freilich auch den Parlamentariern nur recht. Insgesamt verschlingen die Nachrichten- und Spionagebehörden mit ihren 200.000 Beschäftigten etwa sechs Milliarden Dollar pro Jahr. Allein fünf Milliarden gehen auf

das Konto der drei militärischen Geheimdienste, wobei der größte Anteil auf die Luftwaffe entfällt: Ihr gehören jene teuren Flugzeuge und Satelliten wie der zehn Tonnen schwere „Big Bird“, die militärische Anlagen in China oder der Sowjet-Union ausspionieren.

Profi Helms, 58, dürfte darum wohl vor allem versuchen, bei den militärischen Geheimdiensten Kosten zu kappen. Er gilt als tüchtiger Verwalter, als ein Bürokrat von kühler Kompetenz.

Der CIA-Boß (Hobby: Umweltschutz) ist ein Nachfahre deutscher US-Einwanderer. Er verbrachte einige Schuljahre in Freiburg sowie in der Schweiz — seit damals spricht er Französisch und Deutsch.

Jagd auf Nachrichten machte der spätere „Intelligence“-Fachmann erstmals als UP-Korrespondent — 1937 interviewte er Hitler. Bei Kriegsende arbeitete Helms in der US-Abwehr. Und seit 1947, dem Gründungsjahr der CIA, diente er sich im Geheimdienst hoch.

Berühmt, aber mehr noch berüchtigt wurde die CIA durch Beteiligung an Polit-Gräueln und Coups in vielen Ländern der Dritten Welt. CIA-Agenten leiteten die Mörder Che Guevaras an; CIA-Männer trugen 1970 zum Sturz des kambodscha-Premiers Sihanouk bei. Falsche CIA-Informationen führten 1961 zum Fiasko der Invasion in der kubanischen Schweinebucht. Und die CIA ist es, die in Laos eine 30.000 Mann starke Armee von Stammeskriegern unterhält — zum Kampf gegen die Kommunisten. Insider des Geheimdienstes betonen freilich, die CIA ziehe sich aus dem Coup-Geschäft zurück.

So viel ist richtig: Die CIA hat sich von einem kleinen Trupp patriotischer



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Newsweek

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Ein Eingeweihter über die CIA

Von paramilitärischen Geheimaktionen bis zur Anzettelung von Kriegen

Viktor Marchetti, ein ehemaliger Mitarbeiter der Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), sprach gegenüber einem UPI-Mitarbeiter als Eingeweihter über einige Praktiken des amerikanischen Geheimdienstes, dessen Leitung er lange Jahre angehörte. Obwohl er sich über die Verschwendung entrüstet, die dieses Instrument der USA-Regierung betreibt — er schlägt u. a. nicht realisierbare Kontrollmaßnahmen vor —, bejaht er im Prinzip diese Institution. Im folgenden Auszug aus dem amerikanischen Magazin dürften besonders die Äußerungen Marchettis — in einer ihm gemäßen Sprache — über die Rolle amerikanischer Geheimdienste bei der Anzettelung von Kriegen in Gebieten, in denen die USA nicht genehme Entwicklungen im Gange sind, interessant sein. Ein Grund für sein Ausscheiden aus der CIA liegt in der — sicher durch die Kenntnis von Geheimdokumenten beeinflussten — Einsicht, daß die blutige USA-Aggression gegen Indochina dem amerikanischen Ansehen in der Welt schade. Das amerikanische Magazin zitiert aus dem Gespräch u. a.:

So verwendet zum Beispiel die Nationale Sicherheitsbehörde (National Security Agency) — zu deren Aufgabengebiet es auch gehört, aufgefangene Botschaften ausländischer Regierungen zu dechiffrieren — etwa die Hälfte ihres Jahresbudgets von einer Milliarde Dollar. — Sie haben in Fort Meade (Maryland) ganze Waggonen voll von Tonbändern von mitgeschnittenen sowjetischen (Rundfunk-) Mitteilungen, die zehn Jahre alt sind — Güterwagen voll. Weil die Sowjets in Codesystemen ebenso erfinderisch sind wie wir. Es ist technisch fast eine Unmöglichkeit, eine verschlüsselte, chiffrierte Botschaft zu dechiffrieren. So beschränken sie sich darauf, ständig das Material weiter zu sammeln und es in Waggonen zu

lagern. Sie horchen weiter in der ganzen Welt. Sie geben weiter ein Vermögen aus in dem Versuch, die sowjetischen (Chiffrier- und Dechiffrier-)Computer nachzubauen", führte er aus...

Was Marchetti am meisten an der CIA beunruhigt, ist ihre Neigung zu den dunklen Künsten paramilitärischer Geheimaktionen — ein Gebiet, das für die Agentur doppelte Anziehungskraft besitzt, weil das Militär auf diesem Terrain kaum operieren kann.

„Eins von den Dingen, die die Geheimdienstleute der CIA tun können, ist Kriege anzuzetteln", sagte er. „Sie können auf geheimen Wegen in einem Lande einen inoffiziellen Krieg auslösen und dafür sorgen, daß es so aussieht, als ob es sich nur um etwas handelt, was die lokalen Bauern tölpel selbst beschlossen haben und in eigener Regie durchführen wollen."

Auf diese Weise haben — Marchetti zufolge — die Vereinigten Staaten zuerst begonnen, aktiv in Vietnam zu kämpfen. Das ist die Art von Aktivität, die jetzt in Kambodscha und Laos vor sich geht, wo die CIA, wie kürzlich Zeugenaussagen vor dem Kongreß enthüllt haben, eine Operation durchführen, die 450 Millionen Dollar jährlich verschlingt, sagte er.

Marchetti erklärte, er sei davon überzeugt, daß die CIA auch für den Staatsstreich verantwortlich sei, durch den Prinz Norodom Sihanouk (von Kambodscha) Anfang 1970 vertrieben wurde und der die amerikanisch-südvietnamesische Razzia nach kommunistischen Zufluchtsorten in jenem Lande einige Wochen später ermöglichte.

Die Geheimoperationen in Südostasien waren vor Jahren der Anlaß, daß die CIA zur Tarnung dort eine Luftfahrtgesellschaft, die AIR America, gründete, die heute ebenso viele Menschen, nämlich 18 000, beschäftigt, wie der Arbeitsstab der CIA zählt, führte er aus.

„Nun, die CIA hat nicht nur in Vietnam und Laos ihre Hände im Spiel", sagte Marchetti, „sie hält Ausschau nach weiteren Gebieten, in denen sich vielleicht auch günstige Gelegenheiten dieser Art ergeben könnten. Wenn sie beginnt, private Luftfahrtgesellschaften und alles andere zu errichten, was mit der Unterstützung für eine Regierung oder eine gegen die Regierung gerichtete Bewegung verbunden ist, so ist dies sehr, sehr gefährlich, weil die CIA dies auf geheimen Wegen tun kann und es somit für das Publikum schwierig wird, zu erkennen, was vorgeht."

Marchetti zufolge gehören Südamerika, Indien, Afrika und die Philippinen zu den Gebieten, wo die CIA möglicherweise eine künftige paramilitärische Aktivität entwickeln könnten — alles Länder, in denen soziale Umwälzungen gären. Ein Umsturz sei das, was den CIA-Direktor veranlasse, mit der Planung für eine mögliche Geheimdienstaktivität in einem Lande zu beginnen, sagte Marchetti...

Außer der Fluggesellschaft AIR America habe die CIA die Southern Air Transport in Miami und die Rocky Mountain Air in Phoenix zum möglichen Einsatz für paramilitärische Operationen in Südamerika gegründet, sagte er. Ähnliche getarnte Fluglinien seien in der ganzen Welt aufgekauft und verkauft worden, u. a. eine in Nepal und eine in Ostafrika. Ferner teilte Marchetti mit, die CIA habe ein großes Depot im amerikanischen Mittelwesten, wo sie militärische Ausrüstungen aller Art und unmarkierte Waffen aller Art hat.

„Im Laufe der Jahre hat sie alles in der ganzen Welt gekauft, was sie an Unentdeckbarem bekommen konnte — um sich auf den Eventualfall vorzubereiten, daß sie vielleicht den Wunsch haben könnte, einer Gruppe in, sagen wir einmal, Guatemala Waffen zu liefern..."

STATINTL

DETROIT, MICH.

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Rousing Success in Indochina

TO THE people of Thailand, the abrupt end of a brief flirtation with democracy will make little personal difference. The parliament was so limited and so inexperienced in the ways of parliamentary government that it will hardly be missed.

But the record should show that it has died. A military clique headed by Premier Thanom Kittikachorn has abolished the constitution; dissolved parliament, disbanded the cabinet and established martial law. King Bhumibol and Queen Sirikit, who have no powers, were not disturbed.

What caused the coup is something of a mystery, but some clues are available. The Nixon Doctrine of self-sufficiency has shaken the faith of a government supported largely by American involvement. Heavy American military spending has upset the economy, not helped by the Senate's killing of the foreign aid bill.

Thus one more fragile Asian structure has collapsed in our misguided quest to keep the dominos from falling. They have not fallen to communism. Nations do not

fall like dominos to communism unless they are as narrowly based as dominos.

These have fallen to war and to the overwhelming power of the United States.

Now the record is complete—every nation we worried about and whose importance we cited in defense of our Vietnam intervention has fallen to repression.

In Vietnam, our elected puppet sits in the Presidential Palace, secure so long as we keep him secure. In Laos, no coalition government runs the country, as envisioned by the 1962 Geneva Agreements. It is run by the CIA on one side and the Pathet Lao on the other, with help from Thai-based U.S. bombers for the CIA-led troops, help for the Pathet Lao from Hanoi.

In Cambodia, Prince Norodom Sihanouk has been deposed, his place taken by Premier Lon Nol, who has also dissolved parliament and created a dictatorship. And the United States, having invaded Cambodia and made it a battleground of war, has now cut off military aid to Cambodia.

Otherwise, U.S. foreign policy is a glorious success in Southeast Asia.

SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.
 EXAMINER
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John Roche

Liberals Demolish Their Own Image

IF RICHARD NIXON were truly the Machiavellian he is cracked up to be, he would be busy buying TV time for most of his potential Democratic opponents. Like a band of medieval penitents, the professed and unprofessed aspirants for the Democratic presidential nomination are wandering around the country confessing their sins, beating their backs, and generally informing a somewhat bemused populace that liberalism has been a failure.

When you start exploring the reasons why liberalism has allegedly been such a flop, the answers are a bit confusing. First of all, of course, that sinister Lyndon Johnson duped everybody into his war — and kept them duped, presumably, for four years.

The more you think about that one, the more you wonder how these characters ever got elected to the city council — it is an open confession of political incompetence! Maybe they are that incompetent, but must they advertise their impotence so widely? It is embarrassing to serious citizens, and to the League of Women Voters.

★ ★ ★

TO FOLLOW THIS UP, let us examine the recent demise of the AID (Agency for International Development) appropriation. In the view of a number of liberal Democratic senators, AID had become a monstrosity, a "money tree," a boondoggle, a prop for dictatorship, etc. "It should have been reformed long ago" runs the chorus.

Fair enough, but precisely what body is charged with reforming AID, what body should have reformed it long ago? Answer: The Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The vote against the AID bill was in point of fact a vote of no confidence in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a chastisement which (if the critics of the bill were correct) that committee richly deserved.

Now the Foreign Relations Committee's disdain for serious work is well known: It would much rather spend a week trying to track a CIA man into Laos than get into the messy bureaucratic detail of reforming foreign aid. But if it refuses to do the job? It can hardly accuse the administration of dereliction of duty. Particularly since Senator Fulbright and his friends have been announcing from every platform in the country that the time has come for Congress to take a strong hand in the formulation of foreign policy.

★ ★ ★

A WHILE AGO Senator Edmund Muskie took the lead in the mea culpa stakes by telling a Liberal Party banquet in New York that liberals had not accomplished anything in 20 years. (There was some irony in this situation: The House was packed with Liberal Party spoilsmen on Mayor Lindsay's payroll — liberalism had done something for them!)

Actually much that Muskie said made sense except that it seemed as though once every five paragraphs there was a brief interlude of flagellation, and the press, naturally enough, featured these exercises with the knout.

The idea behind this may be that "young idealists" will respond to pleas for absolution. If so, let me break the news: "Young idealists" respond with contempt to such requests. They prefer a hard-line opponent to a mushy ally.

★ ★ ★

WHICH BRINGS US to a refreshing note. On Nov. 5, in Chattanooga, Tenn., Senator Henry M. Jackson declined to enter the public confessional. Without for a minute denying the scope of the problems we face, or endorsing the banalities of "the politics of hope," Scoop Jackson pointed out that under liberal leadership the United States had come a long way. "Much, much more remains to be done (he said) but I fail to see how denying what we have done will help us do more. I fail to see how poor-mouthing our achievements helps us solve our problems."

And then the real clincher, a question addressed to all the flagellant friars in the Senate and elsewhere: "Are we seriously to go to the American people in November, 1972, and say: 'We have failed, we have not accomplished anything . . . vote for us!'" A good question . . . anybody want to answer it?

sacrifice, God can turn the midnight hour into a bright and shining morning. We will never return to anything better until we have a revival in this nation.

There are some encouraging signs among our youth and among other elements which I never expected to see. These are good signs, but we need not wait. Where we live is here. What we do will be here. The hour is at hand when we must act. Do we feel the responsibility enough to be willing to say, "God here am I, send me; work through me. Make me be an instrument to Thy glory."

MILITARY COUP IN THAILAND

Mr. MOSS, Mr. President, once again we learn of a military takeover in Southeast Asia that serves as another grim reminder of the failure of the Nixon doctrine to support freedom and democracy in that part of the world. Thailand's loss of parliamentary government and blatant assertion of military rule can only reinforce Senate opposition to continuing involvement in Southeast Asia.

Three times in recent weeks the Nixon doctrine of using U.S. military and economic aid to assist Asian countries in maintaining democratic rule has suffered severe setbacks. On October 3, democracy was suspended in South Vietnam by the uncontested reelection of President Thieu. Cambodia's national assembly was suspended on October 20. And now we witness a return to absolute rule in Thailand. And yet in all three countries, the United States has been the major military and economic supplier.

The Senate has taken a firm stand in the revised foreign aid bill against continued U.S. support of Thai mercenaries fighting in Laos. Estimates are that some \$200 million was spent in such assistance last year alone. Justification for Thai support has frequently been founded on arguments that Thailand serves as the model in Southeast Asia for the Nixon doctrine. The House is now provided with evidence as to the soundness of the Senate stand.

I recommend to Senators three timely articles dealing with the military coup in Thailand and ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Nov. 18, 1971]

COUP IN THAILAND

Thailand's reversion to absolute rule under its long-time Premier, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, reflects the mounting pressure of changing American policies on one of this country's closest allies in Asia.

Because Marshal Thanom and his associates have cast their lot heavily with the United States since they first came to power in a military coup d'état in 1957, turning their backs on an ancient Siamese tradition of neutrality, it is most unlikely that the new Government will cut ties with Washington. But the abrupt dismissal of a Parliament that never posed any serious threat to the ruling elite suggests that Bangkok has been severely shaken by the evolving Nixon Doctrine of self-sufficiency for Asian allies, gradual withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam and United States overtures to Peking.

In addition, the reduction of American personnel and military spending in the area and a threatened Congressional cutback in aid, coupled with a weakening in the mar-

kets for Thailand's principal exports of tin, rubber and rice have generated mounting economic problems for the regime. Economic stringencies have fed social unrest, especially in the cities where the impact of heavy American spending, and heavy-spending American troops, has upset traditional Thai values, including a tradition of acquiescence to authority.

This abrupt upheaval in Bangkok should give the Administration second thoughts about Thailand as a model for the Nixon Doctrine and a stable base for what is looking more and more like a policy of victory through air power in neighboring Indochina.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 18, 1971]

FRAGILE DEMOCRACIES

(By Murray Marder)

Thailand's loss of parliamentary government yesterday was the third setback in just over six weeks to the hazardous life-span of democratic rule in Southeast Asia.

For the Nixon administration, caught in an unprecedentedly intense struggle with Congress over foreign aid, the retrogression could not come at a more inopportune time.

Each setback has supplied new ammunition to the administration's adversaries on Capitol Hill to challenge the effectiveness of the Nixon Doctrine in supporting freedom and democracy: South Vietnam's uncontested reelection of President Nguyen Van Thieu on Oct. 3, the suspension of Cambodia's national assembly on Oct. 20, and now the military takeover in Thailand.

In each case, there has been embarrassment for the United States, which is the major military and economic supporter of all three nations. But in the case of Thailand yesterday, as in the previous instances, American officials indicated that no variation in U.S. policy is expected or likely.

Present U.S. strategy in the Indochina war, these sources point out, virtually locks in American policy to support the existing, pro-American, military power structures in all three countries while American troop withdrawals from South Vietnam continue.

President Nixon, in effect, pronounced the grin-and-bear-it attitude of his administration over the disappointments for democracy in Southeast Asia when he commented defensively about the South Vietnamese election outcome.

"We would have preferred . . . a contested election somewhat along the lines that would meet our standard," the President said on Oct. 12. However, he added, if the United States refused to send representatives to the inaugurations of winners of uncontested elections around the world, "we would have only one-third as many delegations to send . . ."

American officials, trying to put the best face on their latest disappointments in Thailand, noted yesterday that the main power figures they have been doing business with over the years are generally still the men in control in Bangkok. At the same time, this also illustrates the shallowness of the roots of democracy in Thailand—which the United States prided itself on nurturing with every possible form of military and economic aid.

Now ousted from office, with all civilian officials, is one who holds a service record as foreign minister (since 1959). Western-trained Thanat Khoman, whose education includes attendance at Harvard University's graduate schools, Thanat provided his own epitaph yesterday for the Western concept of democracy in Thailand: "Somehow or other we have not mastered the political forms of Europe and America."

However, although Westernized democracy has a highly hazardous and erratic short history in Thailand, that nation, more than any other in the region, has been a centerpiece of U.S. policy.

Thailand, an original member of the U.S.-built Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, has provided the United States with major air bases for support of anti-Communist warfare throughout Indochina. It has also supplied 11,000 troops to fight in South Vietnam.

The Thai troops were supplied at considerable U.S. cost, estimated by a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee last year as adding up to more than \$200 million. Thailand also has supplied, clandestinely and later, semi-openly as "volunteers," thousands of its troops for service in Laos.

These Thai forces have been the principal target of recurring "anti-mercenary" legislation initiated in the Senate.

Sens. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.), J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) and other critics have repeatedly charged that the Nixon administration "circumvented" attempts to shut off U.S. payments to these Thai "mercenaries."

Current attempts to close this outlet have been accompanied by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's protest that: "with continuing reports about U.S. financing of Thais and Cambodian mercenaries in Laos and even Thai mercenaries in Cambodia, it is virtually impossible for the Congress to judge the accuracy of these reports or know how much of the taxpayers' money is being used to support these activities . . ."

The administration is counting on greater sympathy for its strategy among members of the House in Senate-House conference to blunt, if not to remove, Senate limitations on these Thai forces.

[From the Evening Star, Nov. 17, 1971]

THAI TAKEOVER IS BLOW TO ADMINISTRATION FIGHT FOR AID TO ASIA

(By George Sherman)

The military takeover in Thailand today is seen here as another blow to the Nixon administration in its battle with the Senate over American aid to Southeast Asia.

U.S. officials were taken by surprise. They maintained that the decision of Premier Thanom Kittikachorn and his generals to remove the "inefficient" Parliament came from domestic factors—not Thai foreign policy.

But they said they feared repercussions in the U.S. Congress, where the foreign aid program already is under attack.

Both U.S. officials and congressional sources said they saw this latest move against democracy as reinforcing Senate opposition to continuing U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia.

At stake is the Nixon doctrine of using military and economic aid to help Asian countries defend themselves. Regarding Thailand the immediate issue is U.S. financing of Thai irregulars fighting in neighboring Laos.

The Senate has passed an amendment by Sen. Clifford Case, R-N.J., to the revised foreign aid bill forbidding all U.S. funds for such operations.

Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., who has access to classified material, already has informed the Senate that 12,000 Thai forces are being groomed to operate in Laos during the coming dry season.

No exact figures are available on the cost of these operations. Symington said in October that the U.S. budget for these mercenaries—under a Thai general—is 25 percent higher than the whole military aid budget for the Royal Laotian army. That figure was set at \$80 million for this fiscal year.

That would put the figure set aside by Washington for the Thais in Laos at about \$100 million. The funds are included in budget for the CIA and Defense Department. But the Case amendment would prohibit spending these funds.

The administration says it is not prepared to accept the prohibition. It is resting its

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Symington's Fears on Cambodia and Laos

The United States is gradually getting out of Vietnam, even though it appears we will have a residual force there for some time.

But the fears voiced by United States Senator Stuart Symington in an interview here Saturday are matters that should be of concern to all Americans.

We are winding down the war in Vietnam. But what about Cambodia and Laos?

The Pentagon says it cannot—or perhaps will not—is more correct—supply the Senate Foreign Relations committee with information about the number of American personnel, air strikes, or casualties in Laos.

We admittedly are fighting an air war in that part of Southeast Asia. Is there a CIA-directed ground war also?

What about Cambodia, where our defense expenditures have jumped from nothing to nearly a quarter of a billion dollars within three years?

Are we going to get out of Vietnam, or are we going to get completely out of Southeast Asia?

An American death in Laos and Cambodia is just as tragic and meaningless as an American death in Vietnam.

The American direction should be for withdrawal from Southeast Asia—not just for withdrawal from South Vietnam.

U.S. INTELLIGENCE: CONSPIRACIES, SUBVERSION, ESPIONAGE

PART II

To be sure, the CIA concentrates first and foremost on actions against the countries of the socialist community and the progressive regimes in young national states. Another major target of its subversive activity is the Communist and Left organizations in the capitalist countries, which the monopolies and hence intelligence regard as a force potentially dangerous to the very existence of imperialism and its mainstay the United States. Furthermore, it is a task of the CIA to counteract the national liberation movement in the colonial countries, where the United States still hopes to step into the shoes of the outgoing old colonial powers, to retain these countries within the capitalist system. Finally, much attention is paid to the states of Latin America. Regarding this continent as its strategic rear, the United States employs the combined forces of diplomacy, intelligence, the police apparatus and the Pentagon to stabilize the reactionary regimes there and thereby to preserve the domination of its monopolies.

Suffice it to enumerate some of the aggressive foreign policy actions of the United States in the past two decades to see that the CIA is working precisely in this direction: the intrigues of U.S. intelligence in Iran; the military putsch in Guatemala; the deposition of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma of Laos in 1958, the armed intervention against people's Cuba; the coup d'état in the Dominican Republic; the anti-government conspiracy in Iraq; the military coup in Brazil; the preparation of armed intervention against Vietnam; the coup in Cambodia and this is a far from complete list.

PENTAGON INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Pursuing their aggressive ends, the U.S. ruling circles are seeking as much information as possible about the socialist countries and above all the Soviet Union. The intelligence services of the Western powers are sparing no effort to obtain information about the military-economic potential of the USSR and its Armed Forces, about the internal situation in the Soviet Union and the

latest achievements of Soviet science and technology.

Speaking of the position of military intelligence, i.e. of the Pentagon's organ, in the intricate system of U.S. intelligence services, it should be noted that immediately after the end of World War II, referring to the experience accumulated, it started laying claims to the leading role among all the intelligence organizations of the country. Inasmuch as after the establishment of the CIA, Allen Dulles strove to "politicize" the entire strategic intelligence and turn the CIA into an organ not merely co-ordinating intelligence activities but making "big policy", the Pentagon openly voiced its resentment of this line. For some time the struggle among the different intelligence organs was waged "in camera", within the bounds of the Intelligence Community, but before long it emerged to the surface. The military had the upper hand: in August 1961 the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) was

States was accompanied by the expansion and consolidation of military intelligence.

THE "BRAIN TRUST"

The DIA is the supreme organ, the "brain trust" of U.S. military intelligence. Just as the intelligence organs of the three armed services, the DIA sees its principal task in obtaining information about the military-economic potential and armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty states. According to the DIA statute endorsed by the Secretary of Defense, the chief of the DIA is subordinated only to him personally and to the Intelligence Board. It is to supply intelligence information to military institutions (through the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and to the Secretary of Defense (through the latter's secretariat).

Although the DIA is vested with certain rights in regard to the military intelligence services, the latter have retained independence in the fields of direct interest to them (except through the system of military attachés, which in 1965 passed to the jurisdiction of the DIA

Evidently this is in large measure due to the increased role of the American military, naval and air attachés and military missions, who together with their official personnel make up the basis of the modern legal foreign apparatus of U.S. military intelligence. This function of military attachés has been particularly widely developed in the practice of the U.S. diplomatic service.

The department directing the work of military attachés forms a part of the DIA apparatus. It works out its instructions and gives assistance to the attaché system in close contact with State Department offices. At present attachés of the Defence Department are

accredited to 92 countries, with larger states having attachés of all three armed services. For instance, air attachés are to be found in 67 countries, and in 24 of them they are senior attachés. The question of which attaché is to be senior is decided by the secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force, depending on which armed service in a given country is of greater interest to the United States. As General MacCloskey writes, since Russia's air power is of the greatest interest to the United States, the U.S. air attaché holds seniority there.

The DIA widely applies data processing techniques. At the beginning of 1963 a special centre for the automatic processing of intelligence data was set up. Attached to the DIA is the military intelligence school es-

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Final curtain

Is the long, costly and deadly war in Vietnam finally fading out of existence, at least so far as American combat involvement is concerned? This seems to be the case, though the exact timing remains uncertain. There have been numerous indications, backed up by the optimistic assessments of Defense Secretary Melvin Laird and others, that the stage is being set for the final curtain.

More will be known when President Nixon makes his anticipated address on the situation. There have been reports that Mr. Nixon will announce the end of the official U.S. combat role, and increased troop withdrawals that would leave us with only a small residual force in Vietnam sometime next year.

Meanwhile, we must depend on other indicators. One of the best measures of the intensity of the war has been the death count of American soldiers. This has recently declined to levels last seen in 1964 and earlier. In one recent week only two American deaths from hostile action were reported. Though newsmen learned that others had died during that week, their names having been withheld

pending notification of their families, the official figure nevertheless reflected a sharply declining U.S. involvement.

Skeptics and pessimists remain unconvinced. They note, for instance, that a large contingent of American "advisers" remains in Thailand. It is pointed out also that air raids from Thailand and elsewhere against trails in Cambodia and Laos are continuing at a high rate. Finally, there is the continuance of the CIA's clandestine activity in Laos. These operations have attracted little attention because of their low profile, but they are nevertheless significant evidence that the war may not be winding down as much as one would like to think.

On balance, considerable optimism as to our chances of being out of Vietnam in the relatively near future seems warranted. Unless a drastic crisis should occur between now and the next year's election, President Nixon appears likely to be able to campaign on having ended the war. What happens in Vietnam after this is, of course, anybody's guess.

that while attending school they should spend their time behind the books rather than behind the throttle. To send these pilots to school costs a considerable sum of money and they should devote their full time and attention to that schooling.

Mr. TALCOTT. I commend the chairman and the ranking member and the full committee for trying to save some money. I think that we can save considerable amounts of money which are used in developing flying schools and in creating flying facilities and in the maintenance of aircraft and facilities if they are not necessary to maintaining flying proficiency.

I simply wanted to be assured that rated personnel who become students would be permitted, like other personnel, to fly, to keep up their proficiency, if they desired.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. YATES).

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, I am concerned with the provisions of section 713 (c) which appear on page 34 of the bill. When the House reads the bill for amendment I shall offer an amendment to change the section by limiting the power it gives to the President to 60 days at the end of which time he would be required to come to the Congress to obtain its approval for the additional troops that he has called up. The reason for my amendment is that this section gives the President a blank check. To give him the right to call to active duty as many troops as he thinks necessary even though that number exceeds the mandatory troop levels that have been established by the military committees of the House and the Senate and by the funding of the Committees on Appropriations of the House and the Senate. What awesome power to give to the Chief Executive and without check.

Some years ago when President Truman seized the steel companies, the Supreme Court decided that he had exceeded his powers as Chief Executive having acted without congressional authority. In his decision Justice Jackson said:

We may say that power to legislate for emergency belongs in the hands of Congress but only Congress can prevent its power from slipping through its fingers.

In section 713(c) of this bill, it is proposed that Congress should relinquish its power, should let it slip through its fingers by giving complete authority to the President to call up as many men into the Armed Forces as he thinks necessary. Even the gravest emergency should not provide the Chief Executive with such power without congressional approval. The Constitution gives the Congress the responsibility and the authority to raise armies and to provide the funds to pay for them. It is a joint responsibility. Congress must be consulted.

Even the best of Presidents should not have such power, for all Presidents are mortal with human failings. If he is a good President, he will not want such power. If he is a bad President, he certainly ought not to have it.

If there is any lesson to be learned from

Vietnam it is that the Executive should not be permitted to act without congressional supervision.

Unfortunately, too often the Congress has deferred in its judgment to that of the executive branch. Unfortunately, too, these days the executive branch has come to assume that in matters of foreign policy—especially foreign policy which may lead to wars the Congress is under the duty to accept the judgment of the executive branch.

Too frequently the executive branch has failed to follow the sage advice of the late Senator Vandenberg that the Congress should be informed and consulted before the takeoff and not merely at the end of the crash landing of an ill-fated venture.

And, that is the purpose of my amendment: To bring the Congress into the picture before we are so overcommitted by the President that it almost impossible to extricate ourselves. In this day and age when wars can break out anywhere on the face of the globe when it may be decided that American Armed Forces should be dispatched to an area of conflict in order to influence the decision, the Congress must be consulted. In a time when wars need not be declared—indeed today that formality is rarely observed, in a time when wars can be undertaken solely by Presidential decision, it is of critical importance that there be congressional review and that such review occur within a reasonable period.

In the absence of a declaration of war, the only oversight Congress has of a Presidential action initiating American armed intervention is through its power over the pursestrings. Section 713(c) proposes to waive that power and to give the President the absolute right for the duration of a fiscal year at least to do as he wishes with our Armed Forces expanded to any size he sees is necessary without having to come back to Congress for funds to assist such action.

I believe the authority requested is excessive, arbitrary and unreasonable.

I shall offer my amendment at the appropriate time.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. BADILLO).

(Mr. BADILLO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Chairman, from all appearances, President Nixon has convinced most Americans that he is ending our involvement in Vietnam and he is now mesmerizing them with the illusion of action to end our economic chaos. The defense appropriations bill before us today offers a prime opportunity to set the record straight on both counts.

First of all, the President is not getting us out of Vietnam. It is apparent that he has every intention of maintaining a permanent military presence in Southeast Asia and of merely substituting increased air warfare for the decline in ground combat. It is also apparent that the withdrawal of our uniformed combat forces is being more than matched by the escalation of covert activities, particularly in Laos and Cam-

bodia, under the aegis of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Actually, Mr. Nixon no longer has to rely on a massive U.S. military force in Vietnam. He obviously feels the American people will tolerate any level of air combat, regardless of how much of Indo-China is laid waste in the process. And with the failure of Congress to effectively prevent the President from conducting a secret war through the CIA and through paid mercenaries, his freedom to continue our tragic involvement in Southeast Asia remains unchecked.

The fraud of his Vietnam policy is more than matched, however, by the fraud of his economic policy, as evidenced by the bill before us now. The economic dislocations under which so many millions of Americans are suffering are the direct result of our involvement in Southeast Asia and the continued dominance of defense spending is our first national priority. The defense appropriations bill on which we will soon vote perpetuates a distortion which not only has been a prime cause of inflation, but which also has seriously retarded our ability to meet urgent domestic problems.

More than a billion and a half dollars of this \$71 billion bill is earmarked for one item—procurement of ammunition for all Army weapons except missiles. The committee would have us spend half a billion dollars more on this item than spent last year and this increase represents fully a third of the total increase in the bill over last year's defense money bill. If the war in Vietnam is ending and our troops are coming home, why are we spending so much more on ammunition for the Army?

Let me read you the paragraph from page 84 of the committee report. It says as follows:

This appropriation finances the procurement of ammunition for all Army weapons except missiles. It also provides industrial facilities needed for production of ammunition and items and components, the modernization of Army ammunition plants, and the layaway of Government-owned plants and equipment at the time ammunition production is completed and where it has been established that the facilities will be required in the event of mobilization.

Now, Mr. Chairman, let us analyze that paragraph to see why we need another one-half billion dollars more for ammunition for the Army. What happened to the wage-price freeze? Why does it cost that much more money to manufacture these items? Do we need it for the industrial production—for the production of ammunition? Do we mean that after all these years we no longer have industrial facilities with which to produce this ammunition? Do we need it for the modernization of Army ammunition plants? What is meant by this?

They say that "We want it for the layaway of Government-owned plants and equipment at the time ammunition production is completed, and where it has been established that the facilities will be required in the event of mobilization."

Are we preparing to mobilize for some unknown war, and that is why we have to spend half a billion dollars more this year than last year?

NASHVILLE, TENN.

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Is Pentagon Arrogant Or Simply Inefficient?

MANY BELIEVE the most shocking aspect of the Pentagon Papers disclosures was the evidence that the Johnson administration kept information from the Congress, as well as the public. Congressional leaders professed concern that the executive had not told the entire story of the involvement in Indochina, or why actions were taken or even why money was appropriated. The papers themselves, of course, were denied to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee prior to their unauthorized release to newspapers.

* * *

Congress has declaration of war authority and is responsible under the U.S. Constitution for providing war funds. The indication then that congressmen were denied facts about events leading up to and expanding the war was rightly considered an undercutting of the legislative branch by the executive.

It was expected that the Nixon administration would learn something from the Pentagon Paper experience and share information and authority with the Congress to a greater extent. Sadly, this has not been the case as clearly demonstrated by the refusal by the Pentagon of a Senate request for information on the U.S. military role in Laos.

After 9½ months of correspondence, the Pentagon has advised Sen. J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, that his panel cannot be supplied information about the number of personnel, air strikes and casualties in Laos.

The exchange began in January when Sen. Fulbright asked for a

Defense report on Laos and Cambodia similar to one then being received on Vietnam. He was informed in April that such material could not be supplied because it would include "highly sensitive information on military combat operations."

The senator then requested any information outside the "highly sensitive" category. Incredibly the Pentagon replied that this too was impossible and that the Defense Department was in no position to make "reliable" reports anyway because of a congressional ban on military advisers in the two countries.

Two committee aides then went to Laos, gathered much of the information the panel wanted and published it in a report that was declassified by the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon.

Believing that he had shown that requested information was available, Sen. Fulbright then asked that the Pentagon supply monthly reports such as the ones his aides had compiled. The Pentagon general council, J. Fred Buzhart, wrote that the Pentagon could not comply and he had forwarded the request to the State Department.

* * *

Sen. Fulbright believes that the Pentagon has demonstrated one of two things: It is too inefficient to keep up with military developments, or it is too arrogant to share information with Congress. The senator summed up his frustration with the Pentagon with an awesome warning:

"If it does not consider itself accountable to the Congress which provides its funds, it is, in a real and disturbing sense, uncontrollable..."

15 Nov 1971

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When Imperialism Masks Itself As Altruism

In a sarcastic reference to Senator Fulbright and defeat of the foreign aid bill, Deputy Defense Secretary Packard at a press conference Nov. 4 said "I hope we don't go back to a Fortress Arkansas posture." If the Pentagon wants to see a real Fortress Arkansas, it should read the speech delivered by the other Senator from Arkansas, McClellan, the day foreign aid was defeated. Sen. McClellan said the bill contained only one item deserving of support—the \$250 million it would have authorized for East Pakistani refugees. The chauvinism and isolationism to which Nixon and Rogers covertly pandered after the UN vote on China found uninhibited expression in the McClellan speech. He called the vote "this insult to America's good will and unparalleled beneficence." He inserted a table in the Congressional Record showing that the U.S. had given \$43 billion in aid since World War II to the nations which voted against the U.S. on China. "When they so viciously bite the very hand which has sustained them," McClellan said, "it is time to stop giving them our taxpayers' money." This is the kind of talk which goes down far better in rural and small town Arkansas than Fulbright's idealism. Those attacking Fulbright on foreign aid would do well to consider how differently the U.S. would look to the rest of the world if the other Senator from Arkansas were chairman of Senate Foreign Relations.

"Foreign Aid" A Misnomer

Both Senators from Arkansas voted no when the foreign aid bill was finally rejected. But on the way to that final ballot, they voted quite differently. To look at their contrasting positions on the various amendments offered is to begin to see the multiplicity of issues involved. Lumping them all together in a so-called "foreign aid" bill gives an erroneous impression of what the fight was all about. Nor can the various votes on various issues simply be classified as "internationalist" or "isolationist." Let us begin with the issue of Greece, which ranked high on the Pentagon's concerns. The Nixon Administration programmed \$90 million in military aid to the Greek dictatorship this fiscal year and \$118 million next fiscal year. The foreign aid bill, as reported out of committee by Fulbright, called in effect for a ban on all military aid to Greece until free institutions have been restored. This is in accord with the 46 to 8 vote by which the NATO Assembly as recently as Sept. 27, called on all the NATO powers to press for the restoration of democracy in Greece. Secretary Rogers, in his Oct. 30 statement on the defeat of the foreign aid bill, said we "cannot retreat from the realities of our interdependence with the rest of mankind." Which represents such a retreat? The Nixon insistence on aid to the Greek dictatorship, despite the views of our NATO allies, or the Fulbright call for an arms embargo? Packard said we might have to withdraw our 6th fleet from the Mediterranean without Greek and Turkish bases. Is that internationalism or imperialism? When the Administration pressed successfully for restoration of Greek military aid, McClellan voted for it and Fulbright voted no.

Or let us take the vote on the Buckley amendment, where Fulbright was allied with the Administration. New York's rightist Senator would have cut the \$139 million recommended for a group of UN organizations to \$37.5 million. This would have been seen as a major blow to the UN's operations in Taiwan. It would have had a crippling effect on the UN De-

velopment program, its Children's fund, the FAO world food program, the World Health Organization and the miserable pittance UNRWA provides for Palestinian Arab refugees. Fulbright spoke strongly against the cut, as did Javits, and it was defeated 55 to 28. McClellan voted with Goldwater, Dole, Eastland and most of the Southern Democrats for the Buckley amendment. But the battle lines shifted, and the Administration was dependent on these same right-wing votes when it came to the heart of the struggle, which was not over disbursements but over the war-making authority.

The foreign aid bill, as it came from the Fulbright committee was an anti-war and an anti-imperialist measure. The foreign aid program over the years has provided the first stealthy steps toward military commitment in Indochina. Programs first sold as foreign aid were later cited as authority for armed intervention. It was therefore natural that the foreign aid bill should become the vehicle to reverse the process. The Administration then made it clear that it preferred to veto the bill and drop foreign aid altogether rather than accept amendments which would force it to wind up the war in Indochina. Its first target was the Cooper-Church amendment which would have prohibited the use of funds for U.S. forces in Indochina for any purpose other than withdrawal. Its second was the Symington-Case amendment to put a ceiling on involvement in Cambodia, which threatens to become a second Vietnam. When the Administration succeeded in knocking out the first and weakening the second, many supporters of foreign aid like Fulbright, Nelson, Tunney and Hatfield among others voted against the bill.

Cambodia--A New Vietnam?

The final vote reflected the anxieties triggered by the revelation in the *New York Times* Oct. 13 that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were planning the expansion of the Cambodian armed forces to more than 500,000 men by 1977. This would mean putting nearly half the adult male population under arms. It would also boost aid for Cambodia to half a billion dollars a year by 1977. Fulbright said that the Administration's actions, in planning to transfer the war from Vietnam to Cambodia and Laos, "strike me as being quite inconsistent" with the supposed purpose of Nixon's trip to Peking. "I think the longer we prolong the war, and certainly we do so by expanding it in Cambodia," he told the Senate, "the more difficult it will become for the President to achieve any significant agreement with the Chinese." The Nixon Doctrine of (in Dulles's phrase) "letting Asians fight Asians" to contain China for us is either obsolete or the new gestures toward

continued

HIDING BILLIONS FROM CONGRESS

LOUIS FISHER

Mr. Fisher is the author of *President and Congress: Power and Policy*, to be published by the Free Press in January.

According to the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950, it is the policy of Congress that the accounting of the government provide "full disclosure of the results of financial operations, adequate financial information needed in the management of operations and the formulation and execution of the Budget, and effective control over income, expenditures, funds, property, and other assets." Despite that general policy, it has been estimated that, in a budget for fiscal 1972 of \$229.2 billion, secret funds may amount to \$15 billion to \$20 billion.

The financing of the war in Vietnam illustrates how billions can be spent for programs known to relatively few Congressmen. In September 1966, President Johnson expressed his "deep admiration as well as that of the American people for the action recently taken by the Philippines to send a civic action group of 2,000 men to assist the Vietnamese in resisting aggression and rebuilding their country." Other announcements from the White House created the impression that not only the Philippines but Thailand, South Korea, and other members of the "Free World Forces" had volunteered troops.

However, hearings held by the Symington subcommittee in 1969 and 1970 revealed that the United States had offered sizable subsidies to countries that involved themselves in Vietnam. It was learned that the Philippines had received river patrol craft, engineering equipment, a special overseas allowance for its soldiers sent to Vietnam, and additional equipment to strengthen Filipino forces at home. It cost the United States \$38.8 million to send one Filipino construction battalion to Vietnam. Senator Fulbright said that as he saw it, "all we did was go over and hire their soldiers in order to support our then administration's view that so many people were in sympathy with our war in Vietnam."

The Philippine Government denied that U.S. contributions represented a subsidy or a fee in return for the sending of the construction battalion, but an investigation

Mr. Fisher's article is the second of three which *The Nation* is running this fall on the elusive ways whereby accounts are kept, and expenses budgeted, by the federal government. "Military Budget: Double-Talk Bookkeeping" by Richard F. Kaufman appeared in the issue of November 1; an article by Sen. Frank Church on the executive's power to impound funds authorized by the Congress will be published soon.

Philippines in exchange for its commitment of a battalion to Vietnam.

The Symington subcommittee also uncovered an agreement that the Johnson administration had made with the Royal Thai Government, back in 1967, to cover any additional costs connected with the sending of Thai soldiers to Vietnam. The State Department estimated that U.S. support to Thai forces—including payment of overseas allowances—came to approximately \$200 million. A number of other expenses were also involved, such as modernization of Thai forces and the development of an anti-aircraft Hawk battery in Thailand. The Foreign Ministry of Thailand denied that the United States had offered payments to induce Thailand to send armed forces to Vietnam, but GAO investigators revealed that U.S. funds had been used for such purposes as the training of Thai troops, payment of overseas allowances, and payment of separation bonuses to Thai soldiers who had served in Vietnam. An interim GAO report estimated that the U.S. Government had invested "probably more than \$260 million in equipment, allowances, subsistence, construction, military sales concessions, and other support to the Thais for their contribution under the Free World Military Assistance program to Vietnam."

U.S. subsidies were used once again to facilitate the sending of South Korean forces to Vietnam. Assistance included equipment to modernize Korean forces at home, equipment and all additional costs to cover the deployment of Korean troops in Vietnam, additional loans from the Agency for International Development, and increased ammunition and communications facilities in Korea. To assure that the dispatch of men to Vietnam would not weaken the defensive capabilities of the Republic of Korea, the Johnson administration agreed to finance the training of forces to replace those deployed in Vietnam and to improve South Korea's anti-infiltration capability. From fiscal 1965 to fiscal 1970, Korea's military presence in Vietnam was estimated to have cost the United States \$927.5 million.

The legal basis for this assistance to free world forces in Vietnam derives from authorization and appropriation statutes of 1966. Funds were made available to support Vietnamese "and other free world forces in Vietnam, and related costs . . . on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine." In 1967 assistance was broadened to include local forces in Laos and Thailand. Reports on such expenditures were submitted only to the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of each house. One would not know from the general language of the statutes what type of financial arrangement the Administration might enter into, or with what country. Even staff people who had access to the reports said that they did not know the nature and dimension of financing the free world forces until hearings were held by the Symington subcommittee.

Legislation in 1969 and 1970 tightened up the language of the statutes somewhat by placing a ceiling on the funds that could be given to the free world forces. Funds were also established for payments of overseas allowances. The

by the General Accounting Office confirmed that "quid pro quo" assistance had indeed been given. Moreover, there was evidence that the Johnson administration had increased other forms of military and economic aid to the

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Taiwan's Many Little Secret 'Wars'

By Charles F. Ransom

Of The Register's Editorial Page Staff

THE NIXON Administration was offended by the cheering in the United Nations General Assembly at the assembly vote which led to the ousting of Taiwan (the Nationalist "Republic of China").

But for much of the world, Taiwan does not have the "good guy" image it has had in the United States, but is regarded as a usurper to the name of "China" and a troublemaker in east Asia. Taiwan announced regularly its intent to "liberate" the mainland by force, and used what force it could muster.

Besides this open goal, it took part in a series of secret wars, mostly with the help of the United States, some at its instigation.

The world laughed in 1953, when the neophyte Republican Administration in Washington "unleashed Chiang Kai-shek" — that is, stopped preventing him from carrying on hostilities against the Chinese mainland. The U.S. restrained him during the Korean War; one Asian war at a time was more than enough.

Taiwan-Based CIA Airline

But it wasn't funny. Chiang was serious. The pin-prick raids from the offshore islands to the mainland; the heavy concentration of troops and guns on Quemoy, five miles from the mainland; the overflights of mainland China with Taiwan-operated U-2 spy planes furnished by the United States became public at the time or a bit later. But

they were not all the "unleashed" Chiang did.

Allen Whiting, one of America's outstanding China-watchers, pieced together the story for the New York Review of Books. Whiting watched China from the U.S. consulate general in Hong Kong 1966-68 and is now a political scientist at the University of Michigan's Center for Chinese Studies. He found evidence of Taiwan's secret wars in the Pentagon Papers, in new studies of China-India relations, in the memoirs of George Patterson, a British missionary-journalist and elsewhere.

It was an airline based on Taiwan, financed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, which provided transport for U.S.-trained sabotage and guerrilla teams sent into North Vietnam in 1954, when Vietnam was legally at peace.

The same airline provided the transport for the CIA effort to overthrow the Indonesian government in 1958.

Warplanes and transports from Taiwan airdropped arms and supplies to Tibetan rebels in the period from 1951 through 1962, though the major fighting was quickly suppressed in 1951 and 1959. They used refueling bases in Thailand and flew over India and Burma without permission. India and China each thought the planes belonged to the other and complained. The Burmese shot one down, it landed in Thailand and was identified as a Chinese Nationalist bomber from Taiwan.

Taiwan had a secret part in the wars in Laos and South Vietnam, too. Still another CIA-financed airline was formed in 1960, and a third later in the 1960s, and carried on legal commercial passenger and freight business in Laos and Vietnam, and also clandestine military

operations. One job was ferrying guerrilla paratroops trained by the United States in Taiwan. North Vietnam caught some of them in 1963 and sentenced them, but the effort continued. Later Taiwan more or less openly sent several dozen psychological warfare men to South Vietnam.

Equipment Handouts

The United States paid for a lot of this clandestine activity, and also made it possible for Taiwan to maintain large and modern armed forces for a country of only 14 million people. With considerable pride, Taiwan stopped taking open U.S. "military aid" some years ago, but it has continued to get handouts in the form of "excess equipment" — including planes, tanks, missiles and destroyers of not quite the latest model.

Whiting does not say so, but Taiwan enlarged its airport runways to take America's biggest planes, in the hope of replacing Okinawa as base for American strategic bombers and nuclear weapons.

There are only about 8,000 American servicemen on Taiwan now and routine U.S. naval patrols of the Taiwan Strait have stopped, and still more recently U.S. overflights of China have stopped. But the U.S.-Taiwan military alliance continues.

In words this alliance is defensive. But Taiwan's record must look pretty aggressive to mainland China, Burma, India, and other countries which learned about it long before it became public knowledge in the United States.

HOUSTON, TEXAS

POST

NOV 14 1977

M - 294,677

S - 329,710

An intelligent move

The Nixon administration's plan to consolidate the activities of U.S. intelligence agencies operating abroad is a step toward further efficiency and economy in this vital and expensive bulwark of our national security.

Under the administration plan, Central Intelligence Agency director Richard Helms will supervise all U.S. foreign intelligence gathering operations. The revamping holds the promise of reducing conflicting and overlapping efforts by a plethora of U.S. intelligence organizations.

Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield and Republican Sen. George D. Aiken, both members of a special Senate review panel for CIA activities, have endorsed the reorganization plan. Speaking of the need for centralized administration of our intelligence work, Sen. Aiken said:

"We've had too many intelligence agencies. Every agency of government seems to have one — the Defense Department, the Navy, the Army, and God knows how many others. If you have more than two agencies of government working on the same thing they always try to undercut each other."

The public gets only sketchy indications of the huge sums spent by government agencies on intelligence gathering precisely because most such activities are classified. One indication appeared a few months ago in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report that the CIA spent well over \$100 million last year to halt North Vietnamese advances in Laos.

It remains to be seen what economics can be effected in intelligence agency budgets but it is reasonable to assume that some money can be saved through reduced duplication of effort and coordinated planning. The main goal, however, is improved efficiency. This country's economic troubles dictate that we get more mileage from our intelligence-gathering dollars as from other forms of government spending.

No next assignment for the spy

BY POLK LAFFOON

Once during the conversation his hands seemed to shake. He was lighting his second or third cigarette, rather a lot for the short time he had been talking. The nervous edge was peculiar — it didn't jibe with the kind of image Victor Marchetti had painted of himself.

A real-life spy who came in from the cold, Marchetti is a 14-year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency who has just authored a book called "The Rope Dancer." The novel purports to show espionage work for what it really is, as Marchetti experienced it. What he described, while dressing last Tuesday morning, is hardly nerve-fraying.

"Not all spies are dashing, handsome, debonair," he said with anti-James Bond certainty. "The average spy is married and lives in the suburbs, belongs to the PTA, or is a scoutmaster." Marchetti was all of those things, and he indicated that his job was equally unextraordinary.

"I WORKED OUT of Washington, was permanently assigned to headquarters, and occasionally went on overseas assignments. For example, years ago we were interested in Soviet military aid, so I might go to Indonesia for as long as ten weeks, to try to get a better handle on what the Soviets were up to."

But most of the time, the ex-agent stressed, he was engaged in collating and interpreting vast supplies of information coming in from sources all over the globe. It was painstaking, arduous work, bureaucratic tedium that differed from corporate tedium only in that it dealt with national security instead of marketing strategy.

"The bulk of the information acquired today is through satellites, overhead sensors, and electronic sensors," Marchetti said, again subverting the martini-mistress mystique that permeates espionage literature. He added that much additional information comes through diplomatic and official channels, with newspapers and magazines providing most of the remainder."

FIDGETING RESTLESSLY, the aspiring writer smiled, and partially amended his de-romanticized "heresy."

"Maybe 10 per cent of all the people engaged in espionage work are back alley spies. But of these, 19 out of 20 are faking it under the cover of diplomacy. They try to acquire local agents in the country where they're working."

To the disillusionment of spy-novel aficionados everywhere, however, Marchetti emphasized that there are very, very few agents living overseas without cover, and that their contribution is of marginal value. "It's kind of like fishing — you throw them out and sooner or later you get a strike."

No clue to the speaker's own unease emerged as he discussed his idea for the book. "I was just sitting around talking with another agent. We were saying that things in the agency were so screwed up that it wouldn't be surprising to find that a Russian was running it. We meant it as a joke, of course, but that's where the book began."

WITH THE PUBLICATION of "The Rope Dancer," Marchetti terminated a long, distinguished career with the CIA. He was assistant to the director of the entire agency when he resigned, and prospects for the future were good. So why did he quit?

"I'd lost a great deal of faith in the agency and its policies. If I couldn't believe in it, I couldn't serve it," he said sounding more like a campus politician than a hardbitten "spy." In truth, Marchetti left for a variety of reasons, some of them intriguing for the insights they lend to the arcane workings of the CIA.

While hard to see, the government is spending far in excess of what it should for defense. He labels the \$50 billion poured into defense each year, and the \$30 billion more for Vietnam as

absurd with the problems at home. "It's ridiculous overkill. We're like two guys standing across the street from each other with triggers on mortars, cannons, and rockets. We don't need it," he said, looping his tie.

IN HIS VIEW, the same kind of thinking that led to the arms buildup is reflected in the structure of the modern CIA. "It's too big, too costly, with too much military influence." Marchetti says the quality of the agency's product — good data — has been diluted accordingly. "We need more control from within the organization, and more directly from the outside."

Separately, Marchetti condemns the "cold war mentality" that colors much of the CIA's thinking, and translates to poor estimates of the international situation. "Cuba is the perfect example," he said eagerly, recounting the misguided thinking that led the U.S. to back Batista against Castro under the mistaken assumption that most Cubans also were anti-Castro.

Then, he says, when Castro won after all, the U.S. labeled him a Marxist and forced him into Russia's embrace. "That's what's wrong with Vietnam and Laos today," Marchetti continues, "we're trying to support governments not representative of the people."

ALMOST TO THE end of his reasons for resigning from the CIA, the cheerful novelist finished dressing, and readied himself to face anew the rigorous publicity tour. And still he eluded any indication of why he seemed slightly edgy.

"I disliked the clandestine atmosphere one finds in an organization like the CIA," he said, finalizing the list. "What bothers me most is when some guys got restless in the CIA and military intelligence a few years ago. With groups like the SDS, the Black Panthers, and with civil unrest in general, people in the CIA began to wonder what they should do about it."

Drawing on yet another cigarette, Marchetti explained that such internal disorders are properly the concern of the FBI or the army, not the CIA. Nevertheless, a vociferous minority of the agents — the "spooks" — calls them — began to say, "We're the ones who should do the work."

THIS RATIONALE could lead to trouble at home as it already has in numerous small countries pockmarked by CIA interference. Marchetti disliked the trendline, and resigned.

Gathering papers together to go meet his pulchritudinous local representative, he mentioned that he was that he no longer is associated with an outfit instrumental in the conduct of the Vietnam war. He feels free as he talks with his 17-year-old son, almost of fight the war, and a hearty disbeliever in it.

His clean conscience has been tempered by budgetary regrets, however. "I had to tell my son he wanted to go on to college, he'd have to manage the way I did, by working his way through." Marchetti regrets that he has to be careful in acquiescing wife's requests for new living room furniture.

The problem is that in leaving the CIA, and a high within it, Marchetti was exercising an uncommon id — at least uncommon in 41-year-olds with a wife and three children. He left a \$23,000-a-year job, with promise of substantially more soon, for the vagaries of a writer's life.

Marchetti is morally at peace with himself. What precisely the key to his restlessness. He has a second thought. He is a spy without his next assignment.

Incomplete as received.

3
DAYTON, OHIO
NEWS

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NOV 10 1973
E - 161,249
S - 215,360

CIA Gadfly Welcomes Move To Streamline Spy Action

Victor Marchetti was in Dayton today feeling a little better about the future of the Central Intelligence Agency than he has in the past few months.

Marchetti, 41, worked for the agency 14 years. He left it two years ago and wrote a spy novel, "The Rope Dancers," which, he says, looks at the intelligence business realistically.

He also has been criticizing the agency, charging that it is too big, too wasteful, is dominated by the military and

lacks adequate congressional controls.

WHAT MADE Marchetti at least somewhat satisfied, if not happy with the agency, was the announcement from the White House last week that the agency's director, Richard Helms, has been given increased authority to coordinate and streamline the complicated U.S. intelligence community. Some cuts will be made in intelligence spending.

Marchetti does not exactly take credit for the action, but he said it vindicates the posi-

tion he has been taking in interviews and radio and television appearances.

Marchetti estimates that the U.S. intelligence community involves expenditures of about \$6 billion yearly and the efforts of 75,000 to 200,000 persons, depending upon the definition.

HE SAID he feels that \$1 billion to \$2 billion could be cut from the spending. Much of his criticism is leveled against the so-called action elements which involve paramilitary, psychological warfare, and political action as

opposed to the classical intelligence function of gathering and analyzing information.

He said the agency started its own "private war" in Laos, beginning in 1962, with U.S. spending running \$500 million yearly.

"The same kind of thing happened in Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and Cuba," he said.

STATINTL

GREENSBORO, N.C.

NEWS

NOV 8 1971

M - 83,477

S - 101,081

Rabid reflections

Joseph Alsop's rabid and insulting reflections on the motives of senators who voted against the foreign aid bill a week ago Friday make very little sense. Provisions for the military security of South Vietnam are largely contained in the defense budget, not the foreign aid budget, and moreover the hotly-disputed items have to do with aid to Cambodia and Laos.

If "undeclared" is the word for the war in Vietnam, "secret" is the word for the war in Laos and Cambodia. Millions of American dollars continue to be spent, with little congressional oversight, for massive bombing, for secret CIA activities (including the operation of an airline and the hiring of mercenaries).

It is worth recalling, since it throws some little light on the foreign aid vote, that when President Nixon in May, 1970, thrust American forces into Cambodia he did not bother to consult or inform the Senate beforehand. Even when the Senate passed resolutions intended to restrain executive warmaking, the spirit and letter of those resolutions was defied in an invasion of Laos — this time by South Vietnamese soldiers riding in American helicopters.

There are 100 U. S. senators, a large majority of whom now believe for better or worse that this uncontrolled activity in Indochina must be brought to an end —

quickly. They have sought to get the message across repeatedly, by every means short of denying appropriations. Their impatience is symptomatic of a Senate mood that neither Mr. Nixon nor Mr. Alsop seems to understand — a mood that can hardly be explained by the mere influence of two senators.

As has been said before, a whole mixture of factors explains the defeat of the foreign aid bill. In retrospect, however, the essential one is the Senate's weariness with the President's determination to keep as much American force and money in Indochina as long as possible. That collision of judgments, which is largely to be explained by differences between the constituency and constitutional responsibilities of the President and the Senate, does not lend itself to such simple-minded explanations as Mr. Alsop's — that Senators Fulbright and Mansfield want to "lose" the war. Nonsense. By standards announced from time to time by Mr. Alsop, the war is already "lost," or should be. Yet withdrawal and Vietnamization, which he so much feared at the beginning, has apparently brought the war — in his view at least — to the verge of a successful conclusion. By that logic, completing the job of disengagement would perfect the good result. That is just what Senators Mansfield and Fulbright seem to have in mind.

BOSTON, MASS.
GLOBE

M - 237,967
S - 566,377

NOV 6 1971

Common sense in foreign aid

The final shape of foreign aid will be decided within the next few days on the floors of both Houses of Congress, and any prognosis of what it will be must necessarily await the possibility of somersaults under White House pressure.

As the bill left the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, however, it was two bills, and the Administration was clearly the loser in its running battle with the Senate's Fulbright school. "We" are not satisfied, the President's press secretary, Ronald F. Ziegler, told newsmen. "We" do not believe it is enough to meet the President's policy. Mr. Ziegler's pronouncement well may have assured passage of the bill or bills in substantially the present form, for it is precisely on the matter of presidential policy, rather than the sums to be authorized, that the Senate majority now has the bit in its teeth and is reluctant to let go.

The current bills authorize expenditures of \$2.3 billion, roughly \$1.2 billion less than the President wanted and \$700 million less than was in the bill the Senate defeated a week ago Friday, 41 to 27. But it is not in the amounts alone that the bills come down hard on the side of the Senate in its latest rowdydow with the White House.

The bills would separate economic and military assistance, as should have been done long ago, thus as-

sureing that a recipient nation's need for butter will not be measured by its eagerness for guns — and its willingness to use them at the whim either of an authoritarian regime or at the urging of the US State Department, the CIA or the Pentagon.

The military aid bill, indeed, specifically wipes out the CIA program for financing "volunteers" in Laos, as well as other outside mercenaries elsewhere. It also imposes a spending limit of \$341 million for military activities in Cambodia. This is all the Administration had asked, but the ceiling was imposed, almost pointedly, as an expression of the Committee's determination to prevent a later transfer of funds for what the Administration might regard as an emergency.

About half of the proposed authorizations, \$1.1 billion, is for economic and humanitarian aid, including \$250 million for Pakistan refugees and \$139 million for the United Nations. There may be some increase in these funds, for they are inadequate. But the in-fighting will be on the military bill, especially since it incorporates the Mansfield amendment setting a six-month deadline for total US withdrawal from Indochina.

The chips are down now, with the Senate, as its critics right along have been demanding, asserting its right to be heard, not told, by the White House. The next few days should be interesting ones.

U.S. Aid Revived As 2 Bills

Senate Panel Cuts Amount By \$1.2 Billion

By Spencer Rich
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted unanimously yesterday to revive foreign aid, but only after splitting it into two separate economic and military assistance bills and slashing more than \$1.2 billion from President Nixon's \$3.6 billion request for this year.

The two bills, totalling \$2.329 billion in authorizations, are intended as an "interim" substitute for the \$2.9 billion measure rejected by the Senate Friday by a 41 to 27 vote.

White House Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler told reporters immediately after the committee action, "We are not satisfied with that level. It is not sufficient to meet the essential elements of the President's policy." He added, "You may quote the President" that the \$2.329 billion figure "is insufficient."

Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R-Pa.) told reporters that he believed the committee had reported out the best bills it could, given the deep disagreements within it over the aid program.

But he said he would offer floor amendments to raise the total, although not all the way to \$2.9 billion again, because that would simply risk another rejection of the program by the Senate. He said he believed he could count on enough vote switches to pass

the two measures if their total added up to somewhere between \$2.329 billion and \$2.9 billion.

The two bills reported out yesterday:

- A \$1.144 billion economic and humanitarian aid authorization. This includes \$250 million for development loans, \$175 million for technical assistance, \$225 million for the Alliance for Progress, \$250 million for Pakistan refugee relief and \$139 million for the United Nations.

- A \$1.185 billion military aid authorization, which includes \$350 million for military aid grants, \$135 million for war-related economic supporting assistance (of which \$85 million is earmarked for Israel) and \$400 million for foreign military credit sales (with \$300 million in arms credit authority earmarked for Israel). The biggest cuts were in this area.

An unusual feature of committee voting was the use by Scott of a proxy from Karl E. Mundt (R-S.D.), who has been absent from the Senate for two years because of illness and has never appeared on the floor during that period. Mundt's proxy was decisive in an 8-to-7 committee vote to package humanitarian and economic aid together, instead of leaving them separate and having a total of three bills.

The military bill contains a \$341 million ceiling on aid to Cambodia, which the administration has now said it will accept, after threatening a veto of the earlier aid measure over an identical provision. Although it is only seeking \$341 million in funds for Cambodia aid, it had opposed a ceiling in case it wanted to switch more for emergency reasons.

State Department spokesman Charles Bray said yesterday, in the first such assurance yet given by the administration, that Cambodia aid programs "have come close to their peak and will be declining." The \$341 million ceiling was designed to head off a suspected increase.

Other important provisions approved by the committee yesterday would limit CIA operations in Cambodia; require annual authorization for

basic State Department expenses; bar use of U.S. funds for outside mercenaries to fight in North Vietnam, Thailand or Laos (thus wiping out a CIA program of financing Thai "volunteers" in Northern Laos). Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield's end-the-war-in-six-months amendment also is in the bill.

Despite committee approval, the aid program still faces serious obstacles. Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) and some other former aid supporters who voted against the bill on the floor last Friday still have serious reservations about the use of military assistance as a tool to "bribe" potential allies and still fear that aid to Cambodia may lead to deeper U.S. involvement and a long-term financial drain.

Traditional foes of high foreign spending may not be fully assuaged by the committee's big slashes.

In the House, which has already passed a \$3.4 billion authorization bill, the whole issue will have to come to the floor again. Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Thomas E. Morgan (D-Pa.) said yesterday it will be hard to get both bills through the House separately, since economic aid has always piggybacked to passage on the shoulders of military aid.

Even if the authorizations pass both chambers the program could face new cuts in the appropriations committees. Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman Allan J. Ellender (D-La.) said yesterday he couldn't envision his committee voting out more than \$2 billion to \$2.2 billion in actual appropriations.

Before taking final action yesterday, the committee defeated, 10 to 6, a proposal by Sens. Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.), Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) and John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) to approve a flat \$2.4 billion in a single bill, and include language barring any funds in the bill from being used for Cambodia and Laos except for the purpose of assisting in withdrawal of U.S. forces from Indochina.

Javits told reporters before the meeting that he would

seek a \$2.9 billion authorization, but Case said the three shaved the figure to \$2.4 billion when it became clear that the higher figure had no chance.

Fulbright and the bulk of Committee Democrats opposed the Javits-Case-Cooper proposal because they favored a three-bill approach -- seeking to have each of the separate portions of the program fly on its own -- and a lower total figure, \$2.655 billion.

The committee first voted 9 to 7 for a three-bill system, then voted 8 to 7 to join economic and humanitarian aid. It went down each separate item in the two final bills, and Republicans won enough increases to push the final two-bill total to \$2.329 billion. Scott said he favored a single package for fear military or economic aid portions might be defeated if sent to the floor alone, in a three-bill system.

Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, in a statement yesterday, blasted defeat of the earlier bill, saying (in a reference to Fulbright) that he hoped it didn't indicate a desire to return to "Fortress Arkansas."

He declined to link the bill's defeat to any possible slowdown of U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, but in emphasizing the need for military aid to U.S. allies, said the U.S. Navy would have to pull out of the Mediterranean without the support of Greece and Turkey.

continued

Australia Is Said to Plan to Aid In Training Cambodian Troops

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 2—Australia has agreed to provide instructors and facilities in South Vietnam for the training of several battalions of Cambodian troops, informed sources said today.

William McMahon, the Australian Prime Minister, who is visiting Washington, was reported to have discussed the arrangement today with President Nixon. The two leaders met for nearly two hours at the White House.

About 125 Australian instructors will reportedly train the Cambodian troops at Muidat, a jungle warfare training center near Saigon, as part of an allied effort to enlarge and equip the Cambodian Army.

The Australian instructors will remain behind after the departure of the 8,000 Australian troops currently serving in South Vietnam. Mr. McMahon announced in August that all Australian combat units would be home by Christmas.

The Cambodian armed forces now number approximately 180,000, according to American sources, compared with the 38,-

000-man force that was in existence in March, 1970, at the time of the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk as Chief of State. The goal for 1972 is 220,000 men.

A total of 60 battalions of Cambodians have been trained so far by the South Vietnamese in South Vietnam and have been equipped by the United States. Five other battalions have undergone training in Thailand and three others were given instruction by Central Intelligence Agency units in southern Laos last spring.

Charles W. Bray 3d, the State Department spokesman, confirmed today that the United States was discussing the possibility of assistance for the Cambodians, including the training of Cambodian troops. He said that no final decisions had been reached.

Mr. Bray said the discussions had preceded and were in no way related to the rejection of the foreign aid authorization bill by the Senate last week. Australia is expected to cover the expenses of the training program herself.

INDIEN/PAKISTAN

Explosive Lage

Die bewaffneten Zwischenfälle an der indisch-pakistanischen Grenze häufen sich. Die pakistanische Armee hat in Ostbengalen Streitkräfte von 80 000 Mann an der Grenze zu Indien zusammengezogen. Indien berief 600 000 Reservisten ein und traf andere Maßnahmen zur Verteidigung. Premierminister Indira Gandhi erklärte, ihr Land unternehme „alles Erdenkliche, um einen bewaffneten Konflikt zu vermeiden“.

Die Kriegsgefahr auf dem Subkontinent, wo etwa ein Fünftel der Menschheit lebt, ist eine Folge der blutigen Ereignisse in Ostpakistan. Als dieser Landesteil, der fast 2000 Kilometer durch indisches Territorium von den westlichen Provinzen getrennt ist, seine Autonomie durchsetzen wollte, entsandte die Zentralregierung in Westpakistan im März 1971 Truppen. Sie erstickten mit Waffengewalt den Widerstand in der östlichen Region, die von der Bourgeoisie Westpakistans als innere Kolonie betrachtet und ausgebeutet wird (siehe auch „Die aktuelle NBI-Karte - Zum Konflikt in Pakistan“, Heft 22/71).

Um den Verfolgungen und Repressalien der Armee zu entgehen, ergoß sich ein Strom ostpakistanischer Flüchtlinge über die Grenze nach Indien - vor allem in den Unionsstaat Westbengalen. Noch immer flüchten täglich etwa 30 000 Menschen. Inzwischen wuchs ihre Zahl auf insgesamt fast zehn Millionen Menschen an, die meist in primitiven Lagern kampieren. Ihre Versorgung

bürdet der Wirtschaft Indiens zusätzliche unerträgliche Lasten auf, welche die Verwirklichung der sozialökonomischen Programme der Regierung Indira Gandhis spürbar verlangsamt haben.

Es gilt bereits als offenes Geheimnis, daß sich die amerikanische Geheimdienstzentrale CIA verstärkt in Pakistan engagiert hat. Die US-Gesellschaft „World Airways“, die ebenso wie die „Air America“ und „Continental Air Service“ in Laos eine verkappte CIA-Firma ist, befördert Truppen von West- nach Ostpakistan. Bereits in diesem Sommer trafen amerikanische Militärberater ein, die wie in Laos der US-Botschaft zugeordnet sind und einen diplomatischen Status haben. Wie kürzlich Senator Edward Kennedy erklärte, liefern die USA - trotz gegenteiliger Versicherungen - Waffen und Munition nach Pakistan und heizen damit die Spannung in diesem Gebiet weiter an.

Auf der UNO-Vollversammlung hat Außenminister Gromyko die Haltung der Sowjetunion, deren Friedensverhandlungen schon 1965 den pakistanisch-indischen Krieg beenden, dargelegt: „Wir sind davon überzeugt, daß nur auf dem Wege einer politischen Regelung der in Ostpakistan entstandenen Fragen auch eine Entspannung in diesem Gebiet erreicht werden kann... Die Flüchtlinge müssen nach Ostpakistan zurückgebracht werden; aber das wird nur dann möglich sein, wenn dort ihre Sicherheit gewährleistet ist.“ Andrej Gromyko gab der Hoffnung Ausdruck, daß „Selbstbeherrschung und Vernunft die Oberhand behalten werden“.

Jen Wilten

1 NOV 1971

STATINTL

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EDITORIALS

Remember Cambodia?

Unless you are an assiduous Nixon-watcher, you probably don't. Nor do many Americans remember the promises of early victory that President Nixon made at the time of his "incursion" a year and a half ago. But there are those who do remember—in particular, Sen. Mike Mansfield. Supplying a preamble of his own, he inserted in the *Congressional Record* (October 13, pp. S16251-16256) a series of three articles on Cambodia, written by T. D. Allman for the *Manchester Guardian*, which show up Mr. Nixon as a peerless master of bamboozlement, and a majority of the American people as political dupes. Not that they are incapable of understanding but that they are so wrapped up in their personal concerns that it is easy to victimize them.

In his introduction, Mansfield points out that, before the invasion and the overthrow of Sihanouk, not one cent of American aid was going to Cambodia. Now we are well started on our first billion of military and economic support, without the slightest indication of when we shall be able to get the Lon Nol regime off our backs. Without our support, that so-called government would fall apart within a few weeks.

While Sihanouk was clinging to power, his country was at peace. It was a peace as precarious as Sihanouk's tenure, but the people lived without fear of looting, rape, destruction of their homes and sudden death. Small areas on the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border were controlled by the North Vietnamese or Vietcong, who by all the available evidence behaved in a civilized manner. Now the Cambodians are at the mercy of the South Vietnamese who, supported by American artillery and air power, renew their forays, and are feared and hated by the Cambodians, whom they regard as hereditary enemies and legitimate victims. And, to cap the irony, enemy "sanctuaries" now comprise the greater part of Cambodia.

Allman shows that this ruinous reversal was engineered by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, which continues to make the Cambodian people its pawns in the unrelenting quest for victory in Indochina. In 1963 the CIA was supporting anti-Sihanouk insurgents and Sihanouk sent the whole American mission packing, thus depriving the CIA of its cover. In 1969 diplomatic relations were resumed, with the understanding that the CIA would not return. But, although the State Department tried to adhere to this agreement, the CIA transmitted promises of support to the anti-Sihanouk elements and, when hostilities broke out, sent teams of Laotian mercenaries into Cambodia, along with Cambodians trained in South Vietnam. Together, these supplemented the open American invasion, which lasted one month, and in which 350 Americans died and hundreds of others were wounded.

All of this was done to save Cambodia for the "Free World," Sihanouk having made it clear that he would not stooge for Washington's definition of that term. Now Lon Nol has declared that he will no longer "play the game of democracy and freedom," since that interferes with winning the war we are paying him to fight. The idiocy of our Asian policy is again graphically displayed.

American aid to the Lon Nol faction in Cambodia is largely clandestine. Visible expenditures, such as the U.S. appropriation of \$235 million in fiscal 1971 and the \$310 million requested by the Administration for 1972, are estimated by Allman to amount to less than half the total. The cost of U.S. bombing in Cambodia and of U.S. tactical support, the cost of training thousands of Cambodian troops abroad, are not included. Allman estimates that, while the United States is ostensibly withdrawing from the region, the cost to the American taxpayer alone will amount during the next eleven months to about \$1 billion—and with no end in sight.

The Cambodianization of the war is a fraud. Without active American military support, the Lon Nol and Thieu military effort would collapse. Within the past few weeks American TV has carried pictures of American 8-inch cannon firing at Communist positions, and American patrols going into action to protect Cambodian (or South Vietnamese) positions along the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border. Every week, thousands of tons of explosives are dropped on suspected enemy centers. On October 18, U.S. Air Force jets, flying in support of South Vietnamese troops near the Cambodian border, killed eighteen ARVN soldiers and wounded others. This was a mishap, but when the USAF is more successful, the media tell tall stories of scores of Communist dead, while the South Vietnamese suffer only light casualties.

There is also a well-founded suspicion that American advisers are working with the Cambodian forces, and that their role will increase. *Newsweek* (October 18) quotes an American diplomat in Phnom Penh: "The pressure to increase the military presence here is very strong. There are simply too many officers losing their jobs in Saigon. These men are worried about their careers, and you don't become a general by sitting behind a desk in Washington." What with the promotion-hunger of the military, the machinations of the CIA, and the habitual deceptions of the Administration, the American people are once more being led by the nose deeper into Southeast Asia.

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November 1971

HEROIN

Peter Arnett has been covering South East Asia and the Vietnam War for more than a decade. His reporting has won such varied accolades as The Pulitzer (1966) and Sigma Delta Chi (1968), prizes, expulsion from Indonesia (1962), and the government closing of his weekly paper based in Vientiane, Laos (1969).

An Associated Press reporter since 1960, Arnett recently wrote a series of articles with Bernard Gavzer about the heroin traffic in South East Asia and the ways that heroin gets to US troops in Vietnam. UR interviewed him shortly after his return to New York, and asked him about the nature of the drug traffic there.

An American GI lights up a cigarette in Saigon. He poured grains of white heroin powder into the menthol cigarette, from which he had first removed some of the tobacco.

Wide World Photos

Everyone is against the use of heroin or at least they say they are. But beyond the basic idea that people take heroin because their life is a bummer, there are only a lot of charges and counter-charges about who is letting/helping/pushing/or profiting from the heroin trade.

We think that the heroin trade is a typical issue of our time. For example, how is it that heroin can be transported thousands of miles over all sorts of obstacles to poison millions, while we cannot possibly figure out how to get food to starving people?

We hope to do a series of articles and/or interviews about heroin presenting a variety of views and evidence. We have started with South East Asia because it is the largest source of opium in the world; and also because the heroin usage by American soldiers in Vietnam has led to increased information on this issue becoming available, such as the confidential government documents that we partially reprint here.

We do not imagine that we can cover this by ourselves and we hope that anyone who has information, documents, or knowledge will help us with this.

UR: Has the CIA been part of the drug traffic in South East Asia?

Arnett: The CIA has indeed been involved, as has the US Government, for years in the drug business, but it's essentially for political reasons — as a political necessity.

Now, why is it a political necessity? At the beginning of the '60's, South East Asia was seen as greatly threatened by Communist China. There was great fear that revolutionary war by people's armies would sweep across South East Asia, to Vietnam, Thailand, Formosa and all the rest. So the American officials out there — the CIA, the American Military, and the Embassy people — figured that any approach would be acceptable if it was in order to resist that great a threat. Eventually, of course, it led to a commitment of half a million American troops in Vietnam. But even before Vietnam, any act to prevent the Communists from taking over the area was considered acceptable, and this included the drug business. Here's an example of how it worked.

In Laos you have this tribe, the Meo. They came down from central China

They farm crops, including opium, and they have a fairly well-developed culture based on silver ornaments and home-made weapons. The CIA and the American Government considered them important because they were the buffer between China and the rest of South East Asia. So it was in the interest of the American Government to win their allegiance. They were just another arm of the American war effort.

However, in the early '60's the Communists started pressing into Laos. Up to that time these people had been growing opium and other little crops, but opium was their only cash crop. The average family could make \$40 or \$50 a year from it, and that would be enough to buy some silver ornaments and to pay for the pigs for the harvest celebrations.

As the Communists started coming through they started to cut the old trails that these people had been using to unload their opium. The Meo were stranded in the mountains and the CIA figured that the least they could do was to help them in harvesting and distributing their crop. So, on the numerous American airfields you had a liaison

DENVER, COLO.

POST

OCT 3 1 1970

E - 252,198

S - 344,155

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Airline Sought Pilots Here for Missions Over Asia

By CHUCK GREEN

Denver Post Staff Writer

A little-known airline, believed controlled by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and paid to fly secret missions in Southeast Asia, has tried to recruit pilots and mechanics in the Rocky Mountain Empire, The Denver Post has learned.

Response to the recruitment efforts couldn't be determined.

The work is being done by Air America, Inc., probably the world's most secretive airline.

According to the Pentagon papers, the company is run by the CIA, but it has a fleet of aircraft almost the size of Pan America World Airways.

Air America pilots flew T28 fighter-bombers on raids in Laos in 1964 before the American public knew of U.S. military involvement there, the Pentagon documents show.

Air America flyers also have played key roles in search and rescue missions beyond the borders of South Vietnam.

Dean Rusk, secretary of state in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, once cabled the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane, Laos, that "Air America pilots can play critically important" roles in the missions.

Some Laotian

In the same cable, Rusk granted "discretionary authority to use Air America pilots in T28s for SAR (search and rescue) operations when you consider this indispensable."

The published version of the Pentagon papers tells of Air America's involvement in the early stages of the air war in Laos:

"The second major segment of the Administration's covert war against North Vietnam consisted of air operations in Laos. A force of propeller-driven T28 fighter-bombers, varying from about 25 to 40 aircraft, had been organized there. The planes bore Laotian Air Force markings, but only some belonged to that air force.

"The rest were manned by pilots of Air America (a pseudo-private airline run by the CIA) and by Thai pilots under the control of Ambassador Leonard Unger."

The parenthetical description is a part of the Pentagon papers published version. Unger was chief U.S. diplomat in Laos at the time.

These brief glimpses into Air America's purpose are in sharp contrast to its superficial character.

The company, believed to operate a fleet of about 175 planes, was formed in 1953 as a wholly owned subsidiary of Pacific Corp., a Delaware corporation.

American Pilots

Air America's executive offices are in Washington, D.C., and it survives primarily on overseas U.S. government contract work.

One of Air America's properties, Air Asia Ltd., owns the most sophisticated aircraft maintenance facility in the Far East on Taiwan.

Air America spokesmen have said they employ about 400 pilots, most of them American.

Air America advertising accounts in Denver date back at least to 1965, although most of the ads don't even mention the company itself. Respondents are supposed to correspond to a Washington, D.C., post office box.

Typical of the ads bought by Air America was this classified in The Denver Post last fall:

HELICOPTER PILOTS

Overseas openings for Helicopter Pilots with H-34 or H-53 Pilot in Command Experience. Applicants must have 1,500 hours Helicopter Pilot Time with 1,000 hours Pilot in Command Time and Instrument Rating in Helicopters. Send letter and resume to P.O. Box 19250, Washington, D.C. 20036. Equal Opportunity Employer.

Both the H34 and H53 choppers are used by the military. The Navy uses the S58 helicopter, and the modified version of that, the H34, is an Army transport craft.

Neither machine has been widely used commercially.

Air America spokesmen have said the company employs about 8,500 persons, and has at times had up to 11,000 on its payroll.

Ads in Denver during the last 18 months have offered jobs for airplane pilots, mechanics, supervisors, electronic technicians, teachers and quality control personnel.

The company did about \$58 million worth of business last year, with almost \$3 million in profit before taxes.

The Pentagon papers came from a Robert S. McNamara to determine how

the United States became involved in the Vietnam war.

The top secret documents were exposed by the New York Times in a series of articles in June and since have been published in paperback form.


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Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600150001-2

6: THE PACIFIC

The First World War ignored it. The Second World War started elsewhere and only ended up here. But the Third World War has several times looked like both starting and ending in this vast no-man's land between the super-powers. The gaping emptiness of the Pacific is deceptive, for, as the pictures below demonstrate, every country in it and around it is raked by the crossfire of the great contenders for world leadership, who snipe from the two sides of the ocean. The Indo-Chinese, Korean and Vietnam wars have been the most tragic results of the confrontation, but there are others — many others. In the sixth instalment of our *Planet Earth* survey of the world, the Pacific is examined by Richard West.

Japan



Japan will outgrow the United States economically by 2000 A.D., according to Herman Kahn, the modish 'futurologist'. World-famous for cameras and transistor equipment, the Japanese economy owes its success to still greater achievements in heavy industry, especially steel, shipbuilding and, more recently, automobiles. With 10 per cent. of her young men at university, Japan is educationally ahead of Britain and the United States, and draws on an army of technologists.

The four giant cartels or *zaibatsu* that dominate Japanese industry have been criticised for crushing initiative and competition. And although Japan pays lip service to free trade and private enterprise, she has entrenched herself behind

tariff walls, and has blocked foreign ownership of her industry. The Americans own a controlling share of only one industry — Coca-Cola. The Japanese regard capitalism, especially the company they work for, with the same fanatical love that they once offered the Emperor and the army. The bigger the company, the more love and respect it commands, so that sometimes the host at a business dinner will seat the guests at table according to the distributed capital of their firms. About half the marriages in Japan are arranged by the bridegroom's boss, who sometimes takes precedence over the parents at the wedding.

In relation to the whole of Asia (excluding the eastern USSR), Japan occupies 1.4 per cent. of the land and has 5 per cent. of the population. Yet the Japanese produce 75 per cent. of Asia's steel output and 95 per cent. of its motor vehicles. Japan has two-thirds of all Asia's telephones, one-third of its radio sets — and 89 per cent. of all the continent's TV sets.

The price of economic growth has been the desecration of a graceful, cultured country. Hills have been flattened and seas filled in to make room for petro-chemical plants, overspill towns, motorways and express railway lines. "All the smoke coming up from the works sends our spirits soaring to the mountain tops," sing the workers at the Yawata Steel company. The rest of the population choke from smog which

has made Tokyo and Osaka airports the most dangerous in the East.

In the uninterrupted urban complex that stretches from Tokyo to Osaka, the human beings exist in noisy, nerve-wracked squalor. Crowded into insanitary homes or the dormitories run by their company, the Japanese seek escape through alcohol, television or *ero-dictions*, the sex films specialising in torture and disembowelment.

Yet although Japan suffers from some of the horrors of capitalistic development, it is extremely little Americanised. Through all the years of American occupation, few Japanese mastered English or wanted to copy the culture of their conquerors.

The traditional Japanese shyness, even a form of suppressed aggression, makes it hard for them to get on with the extrovert and easy-going

Americans. Japanese men, and perhaps some Japanese women, do not envy the sexual equality of America. While Japanese wives stay at home in the evening, Japanese men go from the office to bars, night clubs or, if they are rich enough, geisha houses to flirt with one of the million professional female hostesses. Rush-hour going home starts three hours after the offices close.

The party of business, the Liberal Democrats, have never been seriously challenged during their 21 years of power. Having lost their old reverence for the Emperor, the Japanese are not inclined to seek a political strong man. The Liberal Democrat premier, Eisaku Sato, does not aspire to be more than a chairman of a committee. There is much rivalry within the Government, often involving a conflict of business interests, but the opposition Socialists have never looked menacing. As long as the economy grows and there is no real unemployment, a proportion of the working class will be satisfied with the Government. The ferocious para-military student revolutionaries, who used to run through the streets in chanting, snaking processions, have been quietened down somewhat by the still more ferocious riot police.

There have been recent signs of a right-wing revival of the military and aristocratic tradition. These sentiments have contributed to the electoral success of the Komeito Sokagakkai, a kind of Buddhist Moral Rearmament. Puritanical in its social attitudes, it also plays on the greed of its followers, encouraging them to believe that regular prayer will bring them business, or even improve their averages at baseball. In contrast to Komeito Sokagakkai, which was pacifist in conception, a military, neo-fascist movement has recently sprung into prominence with the sensational suicide, by disembowelment, of the novelist Mishima. His death, which has inspired a morbid cult in a country already prone to sadistic fantasy, may come to be seen as a passing sensation. But this reminder of recent bloody history has influenced current arguments on Japan's defence role today.

The Japanese armed forces are one quarter of a million strong and three times that number of volunteers respond to recruiting posters like that on page 77. There is a grow-

23 OCT 1971

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STATINTL

"We Don't Even Know What We Are Fighting For"

By Flora Lewis

VIENTIANE, Laos--The rains are ending now. According to the old, grim cycle of this no longer secret war, a cycle almost as reliable as the seasons of monsoon and baking sun, the Communists will soon take the offensive.

The situation is not exactly the same as last year, and the year before, and the years before that. The enemy is weaker than usual for this time of year in the Plain of Jars area, north of Vientiane, and stronger than usual in the south. It reflects a North Vietnamese concentration on broadening the Laotian infiltration routes into South Vietnam and Cambodia at the expense of now depopulated and flattened areas farther north.

But as American "advisers" who pretty well run this side of the war don't mind saying, "It's just geography. Taking and losing positions doesn't mean that much. Nothing important has changed."

C-3

LAOTIAN or American, nobody imagines any solution to this long murderous conflict is going to be found inside Laos. The Laotian leaders, rather too optimistically in Laotian eyes, are pinning their hopes now on President Nixon's visit to China for some kind of breakthrough.

There has been evidence from time to time that Peking doesn't want North Vietnam to succeed in overrunning Laos and establishing too dominant a position in the whole of Indochina. The road which the Chinese have built across the tip of Laos just below their southern border is now considered even more a political symbol of their determination to have a decisive part in any settlement here than it is a military threat.

In 1962, when the tenuous Laos accord was reached, it was primarily between the United States and the Soviet Union. The accord was never put into practice, and yet never quite jettisoned. This time the major U.S. negotiating partner will be China. Meanwhile, the subtle beginnings of negotiations among the opposing Laotian factions, which might

have taken most of the country out of the war, have collapsed. South Vietnam's invasions into Ho Chi Minh Trail area ended that round since it convinced Hanoi it would have to hold more Laotian territory to keep the trail open.

So the war goes on. Some 700,000 of Laos' 2 to 3 million population--nobody knows exactly--have become refugees. The Meo fighters, equipped and trained by the CIA, have been decimated. Thais have had to be brought in to supplement Gen. Van Pao's dwindling Meo forces, but again only to keep things standing still, not in hopes of achieving anything decisive.

There is no effort to hide the fact that the basically placed Laotians and the scrappier Meo hillsmen are losing heart for this endless, almost meaningless killing.

Morale has dropped sharply too on the Pathet Lao Communist side. They are suffering substantial defections. But it only seems to mean that, while the United States and North Vietnam remain equally adamant about holding up their side of the fighting, the people whose country is fought over have reached an equilibrium of fatigue.

C-3

MANY SAY it, but it is put perhaps most sharply by Prince Boun Oum, leader in the south.

"We don't even know what we are fighting for," he told me in the airy loggia of his home down in Pakse. "Independence and democracy are invented words for Laos. They have no connection with reality. Elections represent your way of thinking. They are a joke for our people. Most of them live in villages. They don't even understand what government means.

"The Laotians are an easygoing, happy people, poor in material things. We always thought life was about living. Unfortunately, we have an energetic neighbor who understood first that life was a struggle.

"But what does Laos have to be independent with? If the Big Powers go away, it will be a battlefield between the Vietnamese and the Thais."

Boun Oum is 62, gray and vastly paunchy. "I am too fat," he says, "but it's hard to lose weight after 60." He laughs and tells jolly stories about the way things used to be in his youth because, he says, "The future doesn't depend on us. I don't know a way out for Laos."

Neither does anybody else. He rather favors the idea of some kind of unification with Thailand or some confederation since the Laotians are certainly an ethnic group, but Laos isn't really a country. "It's a feudality," Boun Oum says.

An American commentator who visited here recently wrote with indignation that the North Vietnamese had committed genocide on the Meo and that Washington must "uncash" Vang Pao to save the rest. That is a travesty. What has been going on here all these years is countless pointless killing that has nothing to do with the inhabitants. The only way to save them is to stop it.

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STATINTL

ATLANTA, GA.

JOURNAL

E - 257,863

JOURNAL--CONSTITUTION

S - 536,497

OCT 20 1971

CIA Out of Control

The Editors: I have not liked the high command organization in regard to the administration of things in South Vietnam. I have not liked the way in which the Central Intelligence Agency has handled the facts of life. For one thing, the Nixon administration could have moved troops faster from Vietnam than it has accomplished and it has been bombing too much. Better dealings with the National Liberation Front could have taken place at Paris.

The great historians have not favored military offensives in Vietnam. Many escapades in South Vietnam have been run without the knowledge of the American people and the CIA can start small wars without any control by Congress. What the CIA is able

to do is to conceal the motives of a conflict.

Intellectuals believe that the CIA helped put Ngo Dinh Diem out of office. We know that the Kennedy administration did not continue to support the Diem regime so the Diem line could not go on.

I have read reports that contend that the CIA had Prince Norodom Sihanouk removed from office in Cambodia. I think that Prince Sihanouk had a splendid plan for the people of Cambodia. I like his plan better than I like the plan of Richard M. Nixon for military offensives.

I found that John F. Kennedy did well in planning things in Laos.

CHARLES W. SHEPHERD

Atlanta

By Nasrollah S. Fatemi

STATINTL

The Unreported War in Laos Could Become a New Vietnam

The Case for Secrecy

Seldom has the Senate of the United States been so disturbed and distressed as in the case of the secret war waged in Laos by the CIA. This war, which has never been reported to the public or authorized by the Congress, is run in most respects by the American embassy in Vientiane. In fact, this secret war seems to consume most of the time of the senior officers in the mission.

Every single day, including Saturdays and Sundays, Ambassador Godley listens for two hours to the reports and briefings of the Army, the air attache, and the CIA representative covering practically every military engagement of the preceding 24 hours and the plans for future action.

The United States continues to train, arm, clothe, and feed the Laotian army and air force and to train, advise, pay, support, and, to a great extent, organize the irregular military forces under the direction of the CIA. These irregular forces under CIA command are as large as the Royal Lao Army. Their cost has tripled in the past two years, and they have become a state within the state.

As a result of the CIA escalation of the training of the irregulars in the past few months, the Chinese have increased their air defense capabilities along the road they are building in northern Laos.

The road now puts most of northern Laos under Chinese domination and is only 45 miles from Pak Beng on the Mekong in the west. The number of Chinese troops along the road has increased from 6,000 to 20,000.

The concentration of anti-aircraft and associated radar installations along the road, which has been greatly increased in recent months, makes this area one of the most heavily defended in the world. The area around the road, according to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, is off limits to United States' aircraft.

Costs Rise Rapidly

The number of Thais in Laos supported by the United States is about 5,000. The cost of the Thais in Laos is channeled through the CIA.

The so-called neutral government of Laos, the report states, is totally dependent on the United States, perhaps more dependent than any other government in the world, and this dependence appears to be increasing as the war continues and the military situation worsens.

The cost of this secret war in Laos has risen rapidly in the past few months, almost doubling since January. The United States provides not only the equipment and personnel but for the day-to-day cost of the government.

The Lao government's budget for the current year is \$36.6 million. By contrast, the estimated United States expenditures through military, economic, and CIA aid, is close to \$500 million. So far most of the expenses in Laos have been kept secret, seven from congressional committees.

Despite CIA expenditures of close to \$1 billion since 1967, according to the Senate report, most observers in Laos say that from the military point of view the situation is growing steadily worse and the initiative seems clearly to be in the hands of the enemy: "There are apparently no plans for retaking and holding any of the two thirds of the country no longer under government control, but only a hope, not too firmly held in some quarters, that the one third of Lao territory now under government control can continue to be held."

Since the rout of the South Vietnamese at Lam San, more Lao territory has come under Communist control and there are some 10,000 more of North Vietnamese forces in Laos than there were before the South Vietnamese fiasco.

The United States' air offensive has been increased. In spite of the air force efforts, the fact remains that the North Vietnamese are moving sufficient supplies through Laos to sustain their military operations.

Recent new developments affecting the military situation have been the deployment, for the first time, of North Vietnamese surface to air missiles in southern Laos; and the deployment of a road system into the Plain of Jars which will enable the North Vietnamese to operate throughout the rainy season.

Although sections of the committee report have been deleted at the request of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the CIA, it warns us not to fall into another pitfall in Indochina.

The number of the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces in Laos is estimated at 139,000 compared to 91,000 in 1967. The Chinese troops number 20,000 and they have also moved in a heavy new increment of radar-directed anti-aircraft weapons, increasing the number in the last six to seven months to the present total of 399, including for the first time guns of 85mm and 100mm, the latter said to be effective up to 63,000 feet. Since early 1970 they also have had land to air missiles. The Chinese road is a motorable all-weather surface dual lane highway all the way from the Chinese border to Muong Huon.

On Feb. 18, 1970, the United States began B-52 missions against northern Laos. In the first four months of 1971 there were twice as many B-52 sorties in Laos as in all of 1970.

The principal arguments presented by the United States authorities in Laos for the need of keeping the war a secret were these: "First, that Gen. Vang Pao does not want to allow the press to visit because his military security would be compromised. Second, that if reporters were permitted to visit Long Tieng, they would concentrate on the role of the United States. Third, that the CIA is a clandestine organization not used to operating in the open and that its operations in other parts of the world might be compromised. Fourth, that were the United States' activities publicized, the United States would be accused of violating the Geneva Agreement of 1962."

In 1968 United States personnel in Laos totaled 500. In 1969 the number was increased to 891; in 1970 to 1,040, and in the first four months of 1971 to 1,231. According to the United States embassy in Vientiane, the number of United States' personnel missing in Laos as of Jan. 19, 1971, was 232. Since 1964 more than 600,000 persons in Laos have been displaced by the war. In any given year more than 30,000 people become refugees in Laos.

Most people inside and outside the United States government believe that if there is no settlement in Vietnam and the war also continues in Laos, Laos will remain a hostage available to the North Vietnamese should they wish to draw American air power away from Cambodia and South Vietnam, embarrass the United States, threaten Thailand, or bring the Chinese into closer involvement.

Meanwhile the area under government control shrinks steadily, the cost to the United States rises, the Pathet Lao consolidate their hold on territories no longer under government control, and the Lao government's policy of neutralism continues to hang by the single human thread of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma.

He, in turn, seems to be increasingly isolated from other powerful political figures in his country who wish to involve the United States further in the defense of what remains of their country and create another South Vietnam for the people of the United States.

Dr. Fatemi is distinguished professor of international affairs and director of the Graduate Institute of International Studies at Fairleigh Dickinson University.

How the CIA Runs Secret Airline in Asia

STATINTL



SPECIAL REPORT

By JAMES MCCARTNEY
Herald Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — The CIA, in supersecrecy, is running an airline in Southeast Asia with as many planes as Pan American — and about as many employees as the CIA itself — some 18,000.

Although virtually unknown to the U.S. public, which pays the bills, it ranks in numbers of planes among the half-dozen largest U.S. air carriers.

The airline is called Air America Inc., and it probably is the world's most secretive airline.

Its pilots — supposedly "civilians" — have manned T28 fighter-bombers on raids in Laos, according to the Pentagon papers.

THEY OFTEN fly hazardous missions in Laos, carrying troops into battle — and the wounded out.

They play the role of a part-time air force to many "irregular" of guerrilla fighters for a secret, CIA-sponsored guerrilla army in Laos.

Says a former CIA official: "Without Air America there could never have been a Laotian war."

Air America also carries freight, owns and operates Asia's largest aircraft maintenance facility, carries passengers, evacuates refugees, drops rice to the starving — and carefully hides its activities.

THE STORY of Air America, in fact, is one of the most intriguing of the U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, shrouded in Oriental mystery.

Its mysteries, however, have now attracted the attention and concern of congressional investigators.

For the first time they have become fascinated with Air America — as well as with other CIA-related airlines that long have provided "cover" for clandestine U.S. activities.

Air America simply is the largest of a highly complex structure of secret, and semi-secret, CIA-related corporations with interests in air power.

"Nobody on Capitol Hill seems to know exactly what Air America does," says one investigator.

"But I can guarantee you that we're trying to find out."

THE CORPORATION has every outward sign of complete legitimacy — a Wall Street board of directors, thickly carpeted offices in Washington, neatly marked and maintained aircraft in the Far East often doing yeoman service for the U.S. government.

Many of the services of Air America are completely open in Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Japan.

But then there is the covert side.

Says Victor Marchetti, a former special assistant to the CIA's chief of plans, who quit in "disenchantment" and is now cooperating with congressional committees:

"The CIA created Air America. We owned it. It did our bidding.

"The top man of Air America, the man who built it, George Doole Jr., was a CIA man."

MARCHETTI recalls seeing an internal CIO memo in which the officer in charge of Air America's budget complained that the airline had become "so huge."

"The memo complained that Air America had more employees than the CIA — and the CIA had 18,000," Marchetti says.

Marchetti recalls that at one time the CIA made a movie about its activities in Laos — hoping to get public credit for its long-secret activities.

"The big star of the movie was Air America," he says.

"It carried the supplies and weapons into battle, supported the guerrilla army of Meo tribesmen, and evacuated the wounded." The movie was never shown publicly.

THE PENTAGON papers also furnished a flash of insight into Air America's activities.

In talking about the beginning phases of the escalation of the aerial war in Laos, the published version of the papers says:

A force of propeller-driven T28 fighter-bombers, varying from about 25 to 40 aircraft, had been organized there (in Laos).

"The planes bore Laotian Air Force markings, but only some belonged to that air force. The rest were manned by pilots of Air America (a pseudo-private airline run by the CIA) and by Thai pilots . . ."

THE PAPERS also include the text of a cablegram from then Secretary of State Dean Rusk to the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane, granting "discretionary authority" to use Air America pilots in T28 fighter bombers for search and rescue flights.

Rusk mentioned "T28 operations" as "vital both for their military and psychological effects in Laos" — but did not discuss the full scope of Air America's role.

The Pentagon papers make clear that Air America pilots were flying heavily armed combat missions as long ago as 1964.

OFFICIALLY, Air America activities are supposed to be limited to carrying cargo and men on government contracts.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee investigators in Laos in recent months have been puzzled by the fact that T28 fighter, bombers at major airbases have been unmarked except for serial numbers on their tails.

Continued

PHILADELPHIA, PA.

INQUIRER

OCT 18 1971

M - 463,503

S - 867,810

STATINTL

CIA's Super-Secret 'Air Force' in Southeast Asia Employs 18,000

By JAMES MCCARTNEY

Of Our Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON. -- The CIA, in super-secrecy, is running an airline in Southeast Asia, with as many planes as Pan American -- and about as many employees as the CIA itself -- some 18,000.

Though virtually unknown to the U.S. public, which pays the bills, it ranks in numbers of planes among the half-dozen largest U.S. air carriers.

The airline is called Air America, Inc., and it is probably the world's most secretive airline.

Its pilots -- supposedly "civilians" -- have manned F-28 fighter bombers on raids in Laos, according to the Pentagon Papers.

They often fly hazardous missions in Laos carrying troops into battle -- and the wounded out.

They play the role of a part-time air force to many "irregular" or guerilla fighters for a secret, CIA sponsored guerilla army in Laos.

Says a former CIA official:



VICTOR MARCHETTI
...quit CIA

"Without Air America there could never have been a Laotian war."

Air America also carries freight, owns and operates Asia's largest aircraft maintenance facility, carries passengers, evacuates refugees, drops rice to the starving -- and carefully hides its activities.

ties.

The story of Air America is one of the most intriguing of the U. S. involvement in Southeast Asia, shrouded in Oriental mystery.

Its mysteries, however, have now attracted the attention and concern of congressional investigators.

For the first time they have become fascinated with Air America -- as well as with other CIA-related airlines that long have provided "cover" for clandestine U. S. activities.

Air America is simply the largest of a highly complex structure of secret, and semi-secret, CIA-related corporations with interests in air power.

"Nobody on Capitol Hill seems to know exactly what Air America does," says one investigator.

"But I can guarantee you that we're trying to find out."

The corporation has every outward sign of complete legitimacy -- a Wall Street board of directors, thickly carpeted offices in Washington, neatly marked and maintained aircraft in the Far East often doing yeoman service for the U. S. government.

Many of the services of Air America are completely open in Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Japan.

But then there is the covert side.

HUMAN EVENTS
10 Oct. 1971

STATINTL

Secret British Report

Do Chinese Reds Push Drug Traffic?

By DeWITT S. COPP

A shocking British government document has come into this reporter's hands; it is Great Britain's 1969 estimates of the contribution Communist China makes to the world's illicit production of opium. According to the British, as of two years ago the total illegal world production of the drug from which heroin is derived was "5,000 tons, 1,000 tons coming from the Middle East and minor producers," the remaining "4,000 tons" emanating from "Southeast Asia (including Burma, Thailand and Laos)" and the "Chinese Peoples Republic." Of this amount, the official British estimates is "3,500 tons" coming from Red China!

The confidential document goes on to point out that all opium grown in Red China is illicit, that the average yield of opium per hectare of poppy field is seven kilos and that the total area under cultivation is estimated at a half-million hectares or 200,000 acres. The poppy-growing provinces are listed as Yunnan—where production is figured at 1,000 tons, Szechwan, Kwangsi, Kwangtung, Hopei and Honan. The annual revenue to Peking is placed at a half-billion U.S. dollars.

In view of the Nixon Administration's large-scale efforts to curtail illegal drug traffic at the source and the attitude of its experts with regard to Red China's part in this trade, the British figures are astounding and require immediate answers in Washington and London.

Congressional inquiry as well as press efforts to gain information on Peking's role in the most vicious of all trades, have been met at the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics by inconclusive and evasive replies. "No intelligence on the matter, no evidence. People on the spot cannot verify, can only give an opinion."

Mr. Copp, a Washington-based free-lance writer and businessman, is an expert in national affairs and has a particular expertise on the subject of China. A bomber pilot in World War II, he co-authored with Marshall Beck *The Odd Way*, a book dealing with Nationalist Chinese affairs. His cover story for HUMAN EVENTS on March 27, 1971 forecasted the changes in U.S. policy toward

When this reporter approached the U.N. Narcotics Commission recently to discuss a detailed article on Red China's dope trade published in the March 1971 edition of the Taiwan publications *Issues & Studies*, the response could only be described as scoffing. The article had never been heard of and there was simply no evidence whatever that the Chinese Communists were any longer engaged in the production and sale of narcotics.

At an international drug conference held in Ottawa last month the delegate from the Republic of China presented a statement of his government's investigation into Communist China's drug activities. So far as is known, the statement was ignored.

The official attitude was best summed up by a noted British drug authority when he said: "We do not have any information that the Peoples' Republic of China is involved in illegitimate narcotics traffic, but we are not doing any work in Red China. We are, of course, always interested in information about any country."

Because the subject is so important, the contradiction so broad, and the need for clarity so great, the following chronological account of Red China's known involvement in illicit narcotic smuggling is offered. From it, we believe, a conclusion can be reached.

At the time that the Chinese Communists conquered Mainland China in 1949 the production of opium had been outlawed by the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek since 1934.

In 1950 the United States added an annex to the U.N.'s Narcotics Commission report giving an analysis by the U.S. of the illicit drug traffic throughout the world during 1949 and the first nine months of 1950. The analysis said in part:

"It is reported that Chinese authorities are marketing large quantities of raw opium abroad. The Republic of China is attempting to remain out of the picture.

From the account given of raw opium seizures in Burma, it is quite evident that very large quantities of raw opium are smuggled into that country from China."

Earlier Great Britain had informed the commission that Peking representatives had offered to sell 500 tons of opium to a British firm in Hong Kong. When this offer had been declined an attempt was made to sell 300 tons of opium to the U.S. in exchange for cotton.

During the Korean War much evidence was amassed to show that Peking was intent upon injecting the drug habit upon our GIs. Two examples will suffice. In October 1950 U.N. forces in North Korea discovered 300 boxes of opium which had originated in Red China containing several tons of the drug. In 1952 another seizure was made amounting to 6,000 pounds.

Dr. Harry Anslinger, director of the U.S. Narcotics Bureau for many years and a member of the U.N. Commission, stated in 1954 that Red China was spreading narcotics addiction to obtain funds for political purposes. He told the commission that this was the practice of the "entire regime" and that the United States was a key target of illicit traffic from China. The Soviet representative, Mrs. V.V. Vasilyeva, objected and said the accusation was a "slander" calculated to ruin Peking's reputation.

Dr. Anslinger later declared: "As pointed out in my reports to the United Nations over the past several years, trafficking in narcotics for monetary gain and to undermine and demoralize free peoples has been a policy of the Communists in China from the beginning."

Nearly a decade later, in 1963, U.S. Narcotics Commissioner Henry Giordano charged that the Red Chinese were extensively engaged in drug traffic and he saw no reason to believe that this traffic was declining.

continued

October 13, 1971

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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incidents, the investigations were begun as the result of an accident or a complaint outside the responsible chain of command, not because the screening programme worked.

"What can you do?" Pentagon spokesmen say. "Drugs infect the society. They're bound to get into the military." Sadly true. And they are bound to get into units trained to fire nuclear weapons. Terrifyingly true.

ILLNESS OF MARVELLA BAYH, WIFE OF SENATOR BAYH, OF INDIANA

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, the deep sympathy of the whole Senate goes out to our distinguished Senator from Indiana (Mr. Bayh) on the illness of his wife. Special sympathy goes out to Marvella herself, whom we all know as one of the most lovable of the ladies of the Senate.

Our hearts grieve for all in the Bayh family over this unfortunate situation.

PRESIDENT NIXON'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO MOSCOW

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, President Nixon has announced that he will be going to visit Moscow in May for a meeting with the leaders of the Soviet Union.

This step, while independent of the journey to Peking, is another bold decision so typical of a President who has not hesitated to act in controversial matters and to act strongly and move the Nation and the world, so far as within him lies, in the direction of at least a generation of peace.

We do not know what will come out of these two fateful meetings, but we do know that it is far better to continue negotiations and to avoid confrontation, and particularly to negotiate with the other great superpower and with the only potential superpower in the coming two decades.

With regard to the visit to Moscow, it is our turn to return the state visit paid us by Chairman Khrushchev. The invitation comes from the Soviet Union. It is difficult to predict what can happen. Not everything we expect will result.

However, the actions of Soviet leaders lately in visiting so many parts of the world, in their obvious attempts to lessen certain tensions, as exhibited by the seabed treaty, the bacteriological warfare treaty, and the treaty to take steps against accidental nuclear explosions, all indicate that the Soviet Union is desirous of cooling the temperature of the world—I think even in the Middle East, where we do not approve of what they are doing by any means in furnishing arms to some of the nations there, but at least there has been no shooting for 15 months. That in itself is progress of a sort. We hope for eventual peace in that area.

The SALT talks are moving. Progress has been noted there.

Thus, I commend wholeheartedly the President of the United States, and I know that that sentiment is shared by the bipartisan leadership in both Houses of Congress.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I join the distinguished Republican leader in what he has just said about the President's proposed journey to Peking, which

is to be followed sometime thereafter by a journey to Moscow.

It should be stated for the Record that there was bipartisan and unanimous approval at the White House yesterday when the President briefed us on some of the details of his latest acceptance, the invitation to go to Moscow.

As the distinguished Republican leader has pointed out, the last time a high Soviet dignitary visited us was when Chairman Khrushchev came to this country. Thus, in the course of events, the way protocol works, if there were to be a high level conference of this kind, it would be held in Moscow this time.

It should also be stated, and on a bipartisan basis, that President Nixon has made tremendous strides, I think, in the field of foreign policy. Not only have we two agreements on the SALT talks, but two more are in the offing, although they may take longer. Not only do we have a degree of stability—at least in view of what existed in the Middle East until the Nixon-Rogers formula, which I approve completely—but we also have the signing of the Berlin accords by the representatives of the four powers, in which the President played a very important personal part. Those accords are now being considered by the two Germans. If agreement can be reached, it will be stamped finally as an agreement by the plenipotentiaries of the four powers. Then it is hoped it will be possible for Willy Brandt, the Chancellor of Germany, to continue the Ostpolitik policy by the signing of an agreement with Poland and the Soviet Union, this to be followed by an all-European conference, to be attended by the United States and Canada.

These are actions in the right direction. They are moves of great importance.

While I wish we could accelerate our withdrawal from all of South Vietnam, one has to give due recognition to the fact that the policy, while not speedy enough in my judgment, is nevertheless moving in the right direction.

Perhaps when the President addresses the Nation next month, he will have news which will accelerate the withdrawal. However, that is for the President to decide.

I join the distinguished Republican leader by saying what I can in view of the shifts of policies which are occurring throughout the world and the travels which are now underway and will be underway shortly. I hope that out of this new mixture accruing in this new age will come new policies which will satisfy the needs of the times. I look for changes in old policies which have outlived their usefulness and should be consigned to the distant past.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I thank the majority leader for his usual and expected patriotic response and bipartisan ship which illuminates our foreign policy.

PERIOD FOR THE TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, there will now be a period of 30 minutes for the transaction

of business. Each Senator being limited to 3 minutes.

Is there any morning business?

QUORUM CALL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE C-5A SCANDAL

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, the grounding by the Air Force of the entire fleet of C-5A's, the Air Force cargo plane, should outrage every American taxpayer. The Air Force should require the Lockheed Corp. to recall immediately all C-5A aircraft and should itself stop the pernicious practice of accepting delivery of deficient planes.

The C-5A, with its cracked wings, its engines and wheels that fall off, its missing parts, landing gears that do not work, and numerous other deficiencies, is one of the greatest "rip-offs" of the public treasury in defense contract history. This is a plane that cost \$2 billion more than it was supposed to cost.

What is worse, Mr. President, is that under the present contract, the public must pay the cost of correcting every one of Lockheed's bonehead fumbles.

Unless the Air Force acts now to force the contractor to make the necessary corrections at its own expense or without increasing the cost of this program, I intend to do everything in my power to place a ceiling on this endless outpouring of billions of taxpayers' dollars for such pitiful waste.

I do not know what else we can do. We have tried everything else. The situation involving this plane gets worse and worse. It is a nightmare. However, I do think that the Senate should consider very, thoughtfully and carefully, when the appropriation bill involving this matter comes before the Senate, putting a ceiling on the amount that can be spent for that program.

CAMBODIA: THE HANDWRITING ON THE WALL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, a year and a half has elapsed since the military overthrow of Prince Sihanouk and the subsequent U.S. incursion into Cambodia. At the time, these events were hailed as quickening the end of the war in Vietnam. A year and a half later, the war still goes on and this obscure episode of the long tragedy of Indochina is all but forgotten.

It is not forgotten, however, by the families of more than 350 Americans who died in the Cambodian invasion. Nor is it forgotten by the hundreds of other Americans who were wounded in that brief campaign. Nor is it forgotten, I should

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WARREN, PA.
TIMES-MIRROR

OCT 13 1971

M - 12,800

When Will It Stop?

The right hand knows not what the left hand doeth. No truer words than these can be written if one accepts the allegations made by Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri during a speech on October 4, this year. He was alluding to the withholding of facts by the administration about American involvement in Laos.

Symington charged that in addition to the limited information given Congress by President Nixon on March 6, 1971, many other pertinent facts concerning the involvement were uncovered by his subcommittee on U-S-Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad as it took testimony from administration officials.

They discovered that most of the war in Laos is coordinated through and by the American embassy in Vientiane.

They learned that the United States trains, arms, and feeds the Laos army and air force.

That through the Central Intelligence Agency, an irregular army of considerable size is trained, advised, paid, supported, and coordinated, and is deployed in at least four of the five military regions in Laos.

That the CIA is totally responsible for a large number of Thai soldiers serving in Laos through direct cooperation of the Thai government, another

segment of the Laos defenses being financed with American dollars.

All of which adds up, the senator said, to the fact that while Congress and the American public is being kept uninformed as to our total involvement in an unannounced and undeclared war, and dollars needed badly on the home front are being spent to maintain mercenary armies in military activities of questionable value, the Defense Department is seeking additional funding to carry on operations in direct opposition to the will of Congress. Stating that the U.S. had already spent over \$1.5 billion on various military operations in Laos, Symington said, that a cost "in the neighborhood of \$350 million" for a single year was admitted by the Secretary of State in testimony before his subcommittee.

A lot of money, any way you take it. And like the senator, most citizens of the nation will agree that if similar funds were being spent to overcome some of our internal problems the future would look a lot more cheerful. And it would be ironic if future generations could point to the fact that in saving Laos from communism we crippled our own social structure. A possibility that is troubling Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri.

BOSTON, MASS.

GLOBE OCT 1 1 1970

M - 237,967

S - 566,377

CIA denies war veteran's drug claims

In a rare statement issued in Washington, a Central Intelligence Agency spokesman yesterday labeled as "errant nonsense" a statement by an Indochina war veteran that he had purchased large quantities of opium in Laos using CIA funds.

Former Green Beret Sgt. Paul Wilhers, 24, of Cambridge had told an antiwar veterans' panel Saturday that one of his "main functions" while serving in Laos in 1966 was "to buy opium from Meo tribesmen, using CIA funds."

Spies: Foot Soldiers in an Endless War

STATINTL

OUTSIDE London's Marlborough Street magistrates' court one morning last week, a throng of newsmen waited impatiently. The object of their interest, an ostensibly minor Soviet trade official named Oleg Lyalin, 34, failed to show up to answer the charges against him—"driving while unfit through drink." He was resting instead in a comfortable country house near London where, for the past several weeks, he had been giving British intelligence a complete rundown on local Soviet espionage operations. His revelations prompted the British government two weeks ago to carry out the most drastic action ever undertaken in the West against Soviet spies: the expulsion of 105 diplomats and other officials—nearly 20% of the 550 Russian officials based in Britain.

The case generated waves from Moscow to Manhattan. As soon as Soviet Party Leader Leonid Brezhnev returned to the Soviet capital from his three-day visit to Yugoslavia, he took the extraordinary step of convening an emergency meeting of the 15-man Politburo right on the premises of Vnukovo Airport. The high-level conference, which forced a 24-hour delay of a state dinner in honor of India's visiting Premier Indira Gandhi, might have dealt with the still-mysterious goings-on in China. But it might also have dealt with the difficult problem of how the Kremlin should react to the unprecedented British expulsions—a problem that Moscow, by week's end, had not yet solved.


Potato-Faced Fellows

In Manhattan, British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home spent 80 minutes with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. "We have taken our action," said Sir Alec, "and that's all there is to it." Nonetheless, he emphasized that the British step was "designed to remove an obstacle to good relations." Harrumphed Gromyko: "That's a fine way to improve relations." He added that Moscow would be forced to retaliate. But the British apparently knew of some spies among the remaining 445 Russians in Britain. "Yes," said a Foreign Office man, "we have retained second-strike capability."

The British case dramatized the expanse and expense of espionage activity round the world. It was also a reminder that the old spy business, which has received little attention in the past three or four years, is as intense—and dirty—as ever, despite the rise of a new type of operative. Since World War II, espionage has undergone a metamorphosis. For a time, its stars were the famed "Albino" and "Red" agents—the Colonel Abels, the Gordon Lonsdales, the Kim Philbys. Says British Sovietologist Robert Conquest:

embassy operations rather as a skilled armored thrust compares with human-wave tactics in war." Moreover, the growing phalanxes of routine operatives are supported by spy-in-the-sky satellites that can send back photographs showing the precise diameter of a newly dug missile silo. But even as the modern army still needs the foot soldier, so does espionage still need the agent on the ground. "A photograph may show you what a new plane looks like," says a key intelligence expert, "but it won't tell you what's inside those engines and how they operate. For that you still need someone to tell you."

Eric Ambler, author of spy mysteries, has little use for the new species of



BBC FILM SHOWING SOVIET "DIPLOMAT" AT SECRET PICKUP POINT

There was still a roar in the old lion.

spy, particularly the representatives of the *Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti* (KGB), the Soviet Committee for State Security, and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. "KGB men?" he sneers. "They're the potato-faced fellows you see on trains in Eastern Europe wearing suits that aren't quite right and smelling too much of eau de cologne. The CIA people all smell like after-shave lotion. They always look as if they are on their way to some boring sales conference for an unexciting product—and in a way, they are."

In one respect, Ambler is unfair and behind the times. The contemporary KGB man is generally far more polished, more sophisticated, more accomplished in foreign languages and manners than his counterpart of a few years ago. But Ambler is right in

liberately misleading, planted by departments of "disinformation."

It is work that occupies tens of thousands of mathematicians and cryptographers, clerks and military analysts, often with the most trivial-seeming tasks. Yet it is work that no major nation feels it can afford to halt. Says a former British ambassador: "We all spy, of course, more or less. But the Russians are rather busier at it than most. They're more basic too: not so subtle as our chaps. I like to think that we have a certain finesse in our methods—that we don't go at the thing bull-headed. But maybe our tasks are different from theirs, just because this country is so wide open."

While open or not, there remains the question, in Eric Ambler's words: "What on earth has the KGB got to spy on in

THE CIA--An Attack and a Reply

A FORMER STAFF OFFICER CRITICIZES CIA ACTIVITIES

Is the CIA starting to spy on Americans at home—turning talents and money against students, blacks, others? That is one of several key questions raised in a wide ranging criticism. A direct response starts on page 81.

THE ATTACK

The following was written by Edward K. DeLong of United Press International, based on an interview with a Central Intelligence Agency official who has resigned. The dispatch was distributed by UPI for publication on October 3.

Victor Marchetti embarked 16 years ago on a career that was all any aspiring young spy could ask. But two years ago, after reaching the highest levels of the Central Intelligence Agency, he became disenchanted with what he perceived to be amorality, overwhelming military influence, waste and duplicity in the spy business. He quit.

Fearing today that the CIA may already have begun "going against the enemy within" the United States as they may conceive it—that is, dissident student groups and civil-rights organizations—Marchetti has launched a campaign for more presidential and congressional control over the entire U. S. intelligence community.

"I think we need to do this because we're getting into an awfully dangerous era when we have all this talent (for clandestine operations) in the CIA—and more being developed in the military, which is getting into clandestine "ops" (operations)—and there just aren't that many places any more to display that talent," Marchetti says.

"The cold war is fading. So is the war in Southeast Asia, except for Laos. At the same time, we're getting a lot of domestic problems. And there are people in the CIA who—if they aren't right now actually already running domestic operations against student groups, black movements and the like—are certainly considering it.

"This is going to get to be very tempting," Marchetti said in a recent interview at his comfortable home in Oakton, [Va.], a Washington suburb where many CIA men live.

"There'll be a great temptation for these people to suggest operations and for a President to approve them or to kind of look the other way. You have the danger of intelligence turning against the nation itself, going against the 'the enemy within.'"

Marchetti speaks of the CIA from an insider's point of view. At Pennsylvania State University he deliberately prepared himself for an intelligence career, graduating in 1955 with a degree in Russian studies and history.

Through a professor secretly on the CIA payroll as a talent scout, Marchetti netted the prize all would-be spies dream of—an immediate job offer from the CIA. The offer came during a secret meeting in a hotel room, set up by a stranger who telephoned and identified himself only as "a friend of your brother."

Marchetti spent one year as a CIA agent in the field and 10 more as an analyst of intelligence relating to the Soviet Union, rising through the ranks until he was helping prepare the national intelligence estimates for the White House. During this period, Marchetti says, "I was a hawk. I believed in what we were doing."

Then he was promoted to the executive staff of the CIA, moving to an office on the top floor of the Agency's headquarters across the Potomac River from Washington.

For three years he worked as special assistant to the CIA chief of plans, programs and budgeting, as special assistant to the CIA's executive director, and as executive assistant to the Agency's deputy director, V. Adm. Rufus L. Taylor.

"This put me in a very rare position within the Agency and within the intelligence community in general, in that I was in a place where it was being all pulled together," Marchetti said.

"I could see how intelligence analysis was done and how it fitted into the scheme of clandestine operations. It also gave me an opportunity to get a good view of the intelligence community, too: the National Security Agency, the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), the national reconnaissance organization—the whole bit. And I started to see the politics within the community and the politics between the community and the outside. This change of perspective during those three years had a profound effect on me, because I began to see things I didn't like."

With many of his lifelong views about the world shattered, Marchetti decided to abandon his chosen career. One of the last things he did was to tell CIA Director Richard Helms why he was leaving.



Mr. Marchetti

11 OCT 1971

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THE CIA—An Attack and a Reply

A FORMER CIA EXECUTIVE DEFENDS ITS OPERATIONS

STATINTL

Just how valid are the charges against the Central Intelligence Agency? What guarantees do Americans have that it is under tight control? A point-by-point defense of the organization comes from a man who served in top posts for 18 years.

THE REPLY

Following is an analysis of intelligence operations by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., former executive director-comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency:

The Central Intelligence Agency was created by the National Security Act of 1947 as an independent agency in the executive branch of the United States Government, reporting to the President. Ever since that date it has been subjected to criticism both at home and abroad; for what it has allegedly done, as well as for what it has failed to do.

Our most cherished freedoms are those of speech and the press and the right to protest. It is not only a right, but an obligation of citizenship to be critical of our institutions, and no organization can be immune from scrutiny. It is necessary that criticism be responsible, objective and constructive.

It should be recognized that as Americans we have an inherent mistrust of anything secret: The unknown is always a worry. We distrust the powerful. A secret organization described as powerful must appear as most dangerous of all.

It was my responsibility for my last 12 years with the CIA—first as inspector general, then, as executive director-comptroller—to insure that all responsible criticisms of the CIA were properly and thoroughly examined and, when required, remedial action taken. I am confident this practice has been followed by my successors, not because of any direct knowledge, but because the present Director of Central Intelligence was my respected friend and colleague for more than two decades, and this is how he operates.

It is with this as background that I comment on the current allegations, none of which are original with this critic but any of which should be of concern to any American citizen.

CIA and the Intelligence System Is Too Big


This raises the questions of how much we are willing to pay for national security, and how much is enough.

First, what are the responsibilities of the CIA and the other intelligence organizations of our Government?

Very briefly, the intelligence system is charged with insuring that the United States learns as far in advance as possible of any potential threats to our national interests. A moment's contemplation will put in perspective what this actually means. It can range all the way from Russian missiles

pointed at North America to threats to U.S. ships or bases, to expropriation of American properties, to dangers to any one of our allies whom we are pledged by treaty to protect. It is the interface of world competition between superior powers. Few are those who have served in the intelligence system who have not wished that there could be some limitation of responsibilities or some lessening of encyclopedic requirements about the world. It is also safe to suggest that our senior policy makers undoubtedly wish that their span of required information could be less and that not every disturbance in every part of the world came into their purview.

(Note: This should not be interpreted as meaning that the U.S. means to intervene. It does mean that when there is a



Mr. Kirkpatrick

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., now professor of political science at Brown University, joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 and advanced to assistant director, inspector general and executive director-comptroller before leaving in 1965. He has written extensively on intelligence and espionage. Among other honors, he holds the President's Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service and the Distinguished Intelligence Medal.

boundary dispute or major disagreement between other nations, the U.S. is expected to exert its leadership to help solve the dispute. It does mean that we will resist subversion against small, new nations. Thus the demand by U.S. policy makers that they be kept informed.)

What this means for our intelligence system is world-wide coverage.

To my personal knowledge, there has not been an Administration in Washington that has not been actively concerned with the size and cost of the intelligence system. All Administrations have kept the intelligence agencies under tight con-

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CIA funded opium traffic, ex-Beret says

By Joe Pilati
Globe Staff

A former Green Beret asserted yesterday that he regularly purchased large quantities of opium in Laos with funds provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.

His testimony came during the final day of "Winter Soldier Investigation II," sponsored by Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) at Boston's Faneuil Hall.

Former Sgt. Paul Withers, 24, a Springfield native now living in Cambridge, told 300 persons: "When I was in Laos in 1966, one of my main functions was to buy opium from Meo tribesmen, using CIA funds."

He said his orders to buy opium "came down from a contact man" from the CIA and were "only verbal, never on paper." Payment to the Meo tribesmen was made in "gold and silver, which came in on an agency plane," he added.

Withers said opium pickups at a small base camp in northern Laos, which he and two other Green Berets built, were made by "Air America" planes. "It was Americans who picked up the opium" in its raw, unprocessed form, he said.

A report in July by two House Foreign Affairs Committee members, Reps. Robert Steele (D-Conn.) and Morgan Murphy (D-Ill.), alleged that "Air America" aircraft, contracted by the CIA, have been used to transport opium from northern Laos into the capital city of Vientiane and that, once

processed, the drugs are flown into South Vietnam aboard both military and civilian aircraft.

The congressmen's report also alleged that both the Laotian army commander, Gen. Ouan Rathikoun, and South Vietnamese Premier Tran Thien Khiem are involved in the corruption of customs agents and drug trafficking.

Withers said that, after completing basic training at Fort Dix in the fall of 1965, he was sent to Nha Trang, South Vietnam. Although he was "ostensibly" stationed there, he said he was placed "on loan" to the CIA in January 1966 with orders to help "train and equip Meo tribesmen in counterinsurgency" against Pathet Lao guerrillas.

The training was "in fact the main part of my job" in Laos, Withers said, but "there were never fewer than two opium pickups a week" during the year he served there.

Withers said that, after receiving language training in various Southeast Asian dialects while at Nha Trang, he was "stripped of my uniform and all American credentials" before going to Laos.

He said the CIA "wouldn't even let me write my own letters. They gave me blank sheets of paper and told me to sign at the bottom. Then the agency typed out letters sent to my parents and my girlfriend."

Discharged last December after post-Laos service in Cambodia and South Vietnam, Withers was

awarded nine Purple Hearts, the Distinguished Service Cross and Silver and Bronze Stars.

He said he spoke about his involvement in opium trafficking to Sens. Mike Gravel (D-Alaska) and George McGovern (D-S.D.) and to aides of Sess. John Stennis (D-Miss.) and William Fulbright (D-Ark.) in June but was not aware of any subsequent action taken by the legislators.

He said FBI and Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) agents had visited him "three or four times, most recently about a month and a half ago in Cambridge," to question him about his allegations. He said his mother in Springfield and his wife, now living in South Hadley, had also been questioned.

Another participant in yesterday's VVAW panels, Charles Knight of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, called opium "the largest export commodity in the Laotian economy" and commented: "In this sense, it is not at all strange that the CIA should aid and protect its transport."

Other testimony included statements by Indochina veterans who said they were former or current heroin addicts.

STATINTL

STATINTL

BREMERTON, WASH.
SUN

E 25 301 1971
OCT 8

CIA School Closed Over Drug Arrest

Agency (CIA) closed a secret school for training Cambodian army guerrillas in Laos when police arrested a high ranking Cambodian officer at the school on heroin smuggling charges, military sources said.

The officer was a top aide of Lt. Col. Lon Non, brother of Prime Minister Lon Nol, the sources said.

Since his arrest in June, the aide has been released and, dressed in civilian clothes, has resumed duties in Phnom Penh at Lon Non's super secret special coordination committee.

STATINTL

DES MOINES, IOWA
REGISTER

M - 250,261
S - 515,710

OCT 8 1971

Votes Toward Sanity

The United States Senate made no significant cuts in major weapons programs in acting on the \$21-billion military procurement bill. But it did do three constructive things to assert Congressional authority in foreign policy.

- It adopted an amendment putting a dollar limit on the secret war in Laos, including the part carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency. The limit is a fairly high one: \$350 million for the year, not counting the bombing. But this is the first time there has been a limit.

Merle J. Pusey in his new book about American foreign policy, "The U.S.A. Astride the Globe" (Houghton Mifflin), says of the secret war in Laos:

"We have allowed our Presidents to tangle with an assortment of little tyrants in their kind of lethal games, with virtually no accountability to the people between the quadrennial elections. It is not only globalism running riot; it is also personalized, hidden, and irresponsible government running riot. Unless it is brought under control it could lead to destruction of our democratic system."

In Laos, American Presidents recruited, trained, supported and "advised" a secret army made up of hill tribesmen to fight a secret war. When the tribe began to run out of manpower, the U.S.

secretly supported a secret army of Thais there. For even longer, U.S. Presidents have been bombing this poor little country more heavily than America did Germany in World War II, not only along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, but also in and near the Laotian Plain of Jars.

The Senate amendment (if it gets past House and White House) will not stop the bombing and will hold the secret war roughly to present levels. But it is a limit of sorts, voted by one house.

- The Senate also turned down three amendments proposed by a bipartisan group of conservatives to boost the spending for offensive missile developments in the Minuteman and Poseidon systems beyond Administration requests. There were too much for normally conservative and pro-Pentagon Senator John C. Stennis (Dem., Miss.), chairman of the Armed Services Committee, who led the fight against them on the ground that they would interfere with disarmament negotiations.

- And earlier, of course, the Senate had adopted the Mansfield Amendment declaring it U.S. policy to withdraw all its troops from Indochina within six months if U.S. prisoners are freed.

There are three stalwart moves toward sanity in a war-crazed nation.

8 OCT 1971

CIA Closes School After Drug Arrest

PHNOM PENH (UPI) — The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency closed a secret school for training Cambodian army guerrillas in Laos when police arrested a high-ranking Cambodian officer at the school on heroin-smuggling charges, military sources said.

The officer was a top aide of Lt. Col. Lon Non, brother of Prime Minister Lon Nol, the sources said.

Since his arrest in June, the aide has been released and, dressed in civilian clothes, has resumed duties in Phnom Penh at Lon Non's super-secret Special Coordination Committee.

The Cambodian army, in the meantime, has established a new guerrilla training center in southern Laos, and the CIA is once again considering providing American instructors and equipment, the officers said.

The Lon Nol aide was arrested in Pakse, Laos, by local police when he attempted to board a Phnom Penh-bound Air America plane with 22 pounds of heroin in a soapflake box, the sources said.

The heroin would be worth almost \$12,000 on the Vietnam market.

American officials were informed, and concluded after investigation that the heroin was bound for U.S. troops in South Vietnam.

The secret CIA camp, at Nakorn Sin in southern Laos, subsequently ordered out all Cambodian officers and trainees from Lon Non's 15th Infantry Brigade, the officers reported.

STATINTL

NORFOLK, VA.
LEDGER-STAR

E - 106,121

OCT 7 1971

War-making restraint

As a practical matter, the Symington amendment to place a \$350 million ceiling on certain U.S. military expenditures in Laos may not have a lot of impact on the course of American actions in that Southeast Asia land. For the measure merely limits the spending to just what had been proposed. Also, should a development crucial to the United States interest arise, the rider would not likely deter a strong President from finding a way to do what he thought necessary.

But in a larger sense, the Senate's vote the other day—67 to 11 for a compromise version of the amendment—is significant as a further expression of disenchantment with the U.S. involvement in Indochina.

★ ★ ★ ★

The Congress already has imposed restrictions barring the presence of American combat troops in either Laos or Cambodia. Now, the Symington amendment would, if the House concurs, for the first time restrict the Central Intelligence Agency's activities in Laos, where the CIA maintains a large

(and reputedly quite effective) guerrilla force that fights alongside the regular Laotian army against Communist incursions from North Vietnam. (The amendment does not apply at all to air support of the Laotian forces or to bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, operations budgeted at \$140 million.)

★ ★ ★ ★

Thus, the Senate questions the American role in Laos without trying to limit it so drastically as Senator Symington originally proposed when he called for cutting the total expenditure from \$490 million, for both air and ground support, to \$200 million. In effect, the Senators propose to establish the principle of a Congressional ceiling with strict requirements for the Congress to be kept informed about the use of funds.

Whatever the direct impact, or lack of impact, that this may have on events in Laos, it does demonstrate a sharpening concern about holding the U.S. commitment in that country to a minimum while proceeding with the urgent business of ending the U.S. military involvement in Vietnam.

David Packard, has taken the lead on this program. I think Mr. Packard is to be congratulated on this as on other initiatives in the troublesome field of weapons procurement.

The prototyping in this program is not designed to produce complete weapon systems. It does not necessarily involve competition between manufacturers, as in the prototyping of the AX aircraft. Involved here are experimental prototypes, to produce new technology, which would be funded research and development activities.

I stress that no commitment to production is involved in the development of these prototypes. For example, the Air Force wants to explore the technology which might, at some point in the future, lead to development of a lightweight less expensive fighter plane. This program would not produce such a plane ready for production. It would produce experimental prototypes for testing the new technology.

Engineering experts would have a chance to work with hardware and not just with paper studies. When and if the time for prototyping does arrive, proven systems would be ready on the shelf. It will not be necessary to perform research and development concurrently with production.

Many critics of military procurement believe these two factors—excessive reliance on paper studies and concurrency—generate many of the production problems which result in cost overruns and other procurement difficulties.

I believe—and I think other committee members agree—that this prototyping program may be a major step forward.

If successful, it can help put a checkrein on escalating weapons costs.

The various services have identified research and development programs costing \$67 million which could go forward in this fashion. The research and development funds which would finance the prototyping will be a matter for the Senate-House conference on this bill, and no action is required now.

However, I want Senators to know of this program and of the high hopes held for it. Prototyping is surely not a panacea, but it may help us to acquire better weapons at a somewhat lower cost.

Mr. President, I believe, and I think the other committee members agree, that this prototype program may be a major step forward. If successful, it can help put a checkrein on the escalating weapons costs.

These are not mere words. This has been developed through work by Mr. Packard, one of the most able men in the Nation, I think, in the field of manufacturing, as I use the term, industrial production. He has brought together the services, and they are moving together on this.

Mr. President, with respect to the vast sums that are now in the bill for the respective services—and they differ between the House and Senate figures—the committee feels that the conferees might agree on these. This matter that I am discussing can be absorbed by adjustments there and by settlements and compromise in the conference bill.

I have talked about this with the chairman of the House committee who is fully familiar with the program. It has also been presented to him. He is in sympathy with selling it moneywise in this fashion.

I read out a list of the items included for the Army. There is the unmanned surveillance vehicle, the remote attack vehicle, and so forth.

The complete list is as follows:

[In millions]		Fiscal year 1972
Adv med stol transport.....		\$5
Very low RCS test vehicle.....		5
Lightweight fighter aircraft.....		10
Quiet aircraft.....		4
Totals		24

Army prototypes selected

[In millions]		Fiscal year 1972
Unmanned aerial vehicle.....		\$3.0
Remotely controlled attack missile.....		3.0
Air defense effectiveness demonstration		6.0
Clean air engine.....		3.5
Multi-mission missile—M3		3.0
Total		\$23.5

Navy program summary and estimated funding level

[In millions]		Fiscal year 1972
ASW sensors.....		5
Weaponizing of ships.....		4
VSTOL for sea control ship.....		11
Annual estimated funding level.....		20

For the Navy, there is the most effective sonar buoy and so forth, the fixed wing VSTOL aircraft, the advanced Harrier, the Air Force version of the short takeoff and landing, STOL, transport.

This is not a new question of authorization for any new weapons systems or planes. This is merely recognizing the research and development of new planes. It is not planned to go any further than this prototype. And out of that may evolve the selection of some of these to be put in inventory.

I have checked this out. We had all of this matter before the full committee. It was fully discussed. Mr. Packard made a special appearance. There was a uniform agreement that it was worthy and that we would recommend it.

I am not asking for any addition in the bill on the prototypes. All I am talking about is merely with reference to reporting.

I hope that the amendment will be agreed to.

I want to insert in the Record a portion of page 18, the committee report regarding operational testing.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

LACK OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION

In testimony before the committee, representatives of the Army and Air Force testified that new emphasis is being placed on operational testing and evaluation before production. DOI Directive 5000.1 also emphasizes this policy. The Navy representative, however, supported the proposition that the current Navy practice of "suitability testing" after production is sufficient. And the Secretary of Defense testified that he had decided not to accept the President's Blue

Ribbon Panel recommendation of establishing an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Testing and Evaluation; instead a subordinate office has been established under the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel pointed out what it considered weaknesses in operational test and evaluation—lack of testing independent of weapon system developers, service opposition to independent operational test and evaluation, lack of funds and facilities, and lack of high-level attention and management. While the committee hopes that the modified approach will succeed in correcting these weaknesses, other steps along the lines suggested by the Panel may be necessary if the present modified approach does not prove successful. Insufficient operational test and evaluation in the past has meant that we have produced some weapons too complex to be effective. Evidence of this tendency was illustrated by testimony concerning the failures of our air-to-air munitions.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time having been yielded back, the question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Mississippi.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield the floor. The Senator from Wisconsin has been very considerate in waiting to be recognized. I yield the Senator 10 minutes on the bill.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, this is a military authorization bill totaling in excess of \$20 billion. It authorizes expenditures for a range of purposes, including procurement of a wide variety of weapons, deployment of weapons systems and support of combat operations. A substantial amount of the appropriations contained in this measure I would support if they were presented on an item by item basis. That, however, is not our choice. Therefore, I am casting my vote against this measure. It contains a number of appropriations which I cannot support. In particular, it authorizes the continuance of American support involvement in a war in Laos contrary to the specific intent of the Congress.

During the last session of Congress, a bill was passed and signed into law prohibiting U.S. support for Vietnamese or other free world forces to engage "in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the governments of Cambodia or Laos."

It was a clear legislative decision to stop the expanding involvement of the American military forces in war-torn Southeast Asia and to stop the U.S. financing of Thai forces to fight in Laos.

But in total disregard of the law, and in the Executive secrecy we have come to expect, there are thousands of Thai troops fighting in Laos financed by the United States. The executive department now is acknowledging the presence of these forces but claims they are all volunteers serving under the Lao military command.

Few, if any Members, of Congress were made aware of the rapidly mounting cost of our military program in Laos because the actual total program was never presented to Congress, not even to the Armed Services Committees.

Each year, the Senate was told that certain amounts would be needed for

ASHVILLE, N.C.
TIMES

E - 23,995

OCT 6 1971

Where Does The Money Go ?

✓ The Senate, in voting a \$350 million ceiling on military aid to Laos, is only reacting to the recent revelations that the Central Intelligence Agency has been conducting a hugely costly war in Laos whose details have largely been kept from Congress and the U. S. public.

This comes on top of word that a Senate subcommittee has uncovered evidence that billions of dollars in U. S. assistance to South Vietnam and Cambodia, in addition to Laos, have

been subjected to absolutely no controls, and that the Nixon administration has no idea how the money has been spent.

One would have thought that the revelations of the Pentagon Papers on secrecy in the Southeast Asian conflict would have been a sufficient lesson to the White House. Congress should continue to dig out these facts until the whole shameful story has been bared.

8 OCT 1971

\$350 MILLION IS ALL WE CAN
AFFORD FOR A HUSH-HUSH WAR!



CIA 8-Lao 5

CIA 2.04

Washington escalates Vietnam war

By Richard E. Ward

President Nixon is stepping up the U.S. air war and military operations of puppet and mercenary forces under U.S. control in Indochina. This escalation is closely linked to the president's ambitions of gaining a second term in office.

Unwilling to negotiate peace, Nixon has been heating up the war in a desperate effort to avoid the political fate of Lyndon Johnson. Terence Smith reported in the Sept. 24 New York Times that administration officials stated the previous day "that they expected the president would order more such strikes as the American combat strength declined in South Vietnam and the 1972 [political] campaign season approaches."

An unnamed administration official added, according to Smith, that the president is "likely to use American air power to prevent the North Vietnamese from upsetting his political plans." The recent U.S. raids against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, obviously trying to take advantage of the huge floods, one of the heaviest series of attacks since the 1968 bombing halt, make it clear that Nixon has opened his campaign already.

These attacks inspired criticism of the Nixon bombing strategy in the press which now points out what had been long self-evident: that the U.S. raids have nothing to do with protecting U.S. troops. "Protective reaction" and "reinforced protective reaction strikes," Smith noted, are simply phrases used by the administration to disguise attacks "to keep North Vietnam off balance and to prevent a build-up before it develops."

The Times reporter quoted Jerry W. Friedheim, the Pentagon's press spokesman, as having just admitted, "Essentially we are hitting targets of opportunity as they present themselves." That was precisely the policy of the Johnson administration. Contrary to the labored propaganda about carefully targeted bombing sites, much of the U.S. bombing was and is directed against anything that moves, or any sign of human life.

"His last trump"

Iver Peterson writes from Saigon in the Sept. 26 Times that Nixon is using the air attacks as "his last

trump" because "his other strong cards—American ground troops and the threat to keep them there until Hanoi gives up—have been played out and discarded. All but a handful of combat troops are gone and those that remain are dispirited and huddle close to their base camps."

To the extent that anything is being protected by air strikes, it is not U.S. troops but the puppet forces. As of Sept. 22, for example, the U.S. had lost 11 helicopters giving support to Saigon troops in the U Minh forest, 145 miles southeast of Saigon, during the preceding eight-day period, according to A.P. Peterson adds in the Times that Saigon forces ostensibly now protect U.S. troops, suggesting that the bombing basically is an effort to prop up Saigon's army.

A member of the Times editorial board, Herbert Mitgang, observed in a Sept. 27 article that "South Vietnam is one big free-fire zone when required to bail out Saigon's soldiers." The same could be said for Cambodia and Laos which are heavily bombed every day to help the puppet forces in those countries. Mitgang says that there are two types of bombing in Vietnam, air support for Saigon and "pre-emptive attacks."

The pre-emptive attacks consist of massive air attacks, in the North, Laos or Cambodia, designed to prevent supplies and assistance from reaching the fighting fronts of Indochina, especially in South Vietnam. The increase in heavy strikes is the best proof of the failure of "Vietnamization." Various American press reports from Washington and Saigon agree that stepped-up air attacks are being planned by the White House.

Creating refugees

One facet of the U.S. bombing that has not been mentioned in the press is a highly secret program to create refugees. Proof of this was recently obtained in taped messages that are broadcast by aircraft-mounted loudspeakers to residents of Quang Ngai province prior to U.S. attacks. One message, prepared by the Combined Psychological Operations Center (7th Psyop Battalion), whose alleged purpose according to the U.S. military manual is "to protect the lives of GVN supporters," states: "Attention people. You must evacuate this area immediately as the GVN and allied forces are beginning an operation. If you stay you will be considered Viet Cong. Evacuate immediately!" The aim is to drive people out of liberated zones with the choice of going to the refugee camps or being killed by bombs and shells. This policy has been also widely used in Laos and Cambodia.

U.S. bombing of Indochina has been maintained at tonnage levels comparable to or at times exceeding those of the Johnson administration. While the troop withdrawals have been highly publicized, little is said by Washington about the continued bombing and the lack of withdrawal of the Air Force. At least 3500 U.S. combat aircraft of all types, including B-52s, are still being used in Indochina. Although this figure is down from earlier years, a substantial number of aircraft have been transferred to Saigon forces. Also, there has been increased use of B-52s which carry a bomb load considerably greater than a regular fighter-bomber. After saying that U.S. air activities in Indochina, Times editorialist Mitgang concludes: "These activities hardly accord

STATINTL

ST. LOUIS, MO.
POST-DISPATCH

E - 326,376
S - 541,868

OCT 6 1971

Compromise On Laos

The extent to which Congress has become supinely subservient to the Executive Branch despite the branch's almost arrogant defiance of the will of the legislators is well illustrated by the Senate vote, 67 to 11, to provide \$350,000,000 this year for the secret ground war in Laos, an operation that was supposed to have been curbed by legislative action last year.

True, the Senate voted for the first time this year to set a ceiling at \$350,000,000 on expenditures for the Laotian war, not including the estimated \$143,400,000 cost of bombing northern Laos, and also voted to require the disclosure to Congress of details of how the money is spent in Laos.

But the spending curb on the Laotian war finally approved by the Senators was a watered down substitute for the \$200,000,000 ceiling that Missouri's Senator Symington had aimed for. Mr. Symington said he pushed for the substitute only after it became evident that more than a third of the \$350,000,000 had already been spent and that he didn't have the votes for the lower figure.

Understandably, Senator Fulbright, who introduced last year's amendment designed to cut

off U.S. aid for mercenary troops in Laos, found himself unable to accept the compromise. Even though the Senators who voted for the ceiling and the requirement of an accounting by the executive were trying to impose a legislative restraint on the free-wheeling military establishment and the Central Intelligence Agency, which finances the secret ground war in Laos, they were still yielding in effect to the executive's blatant disregard for congressional authority.

A more forthright action, demonstrating the Legislative Branch's determination to assert its proper constitutional powers, would have been to strengthen last year's prohibition in response to the Administration's deceit and dissembling on Laos.

As Senator Symington said on the Senate floor last June: "The executive branch was determined to find a way to circumvent the will of Congress; and under the cover of secrecy, they succeeded." They are likely to succeed again unless Congress draws a harder line against an illegal executive war that is bringing death and destruction to a supposedly neutral country with no offsetting gain for the United States.

Program	Fiscal 1972 spend- ing (bil- lions)	Cut below level (per- cent)	Hold at level (per- cent)	Increase level (per- cent)
1. National defense.....	76.0	57.0	36.0	7.0
2. Foreign aid.....	4.1	81.6	16.4	2.0
3. Space.....	3.3	57.4	34.6	8.0
4. Farm.....	9.6	39.0	47.8	13.2
5. Public works.....	2.3	14.2	54.7	31.1
6. Housing and urban develop- ment.....	3.7	16.7	38.1	45.2
7. Education.....	5.2	13.2	46.4	40.4
8. Health.....	3.1	5.0	40.1	54.9
9. Social security.....	4.3	5.0	43.0	52.0
10. Welfare.....	11.4	48.4	35.2	16.4
11. Veterans.....	10.7	9.0	59.4	31.6

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The time fixed for the transaction of routine morning business has expired.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Berry, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed a bill (H.R. 10880) to amend title 38 of the United States Code to provide improved medical care to veterans; to provide hospital and medical care to certain dependents and survivors of veterans; to improve recruitment and retention of career personnel in the Department of Medicine and Surgery, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATIONS, 1972

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which the clerk will state.

The second assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 8687) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1972 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

AMENDMENT NO. 433

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The pending question is on the amendment of the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL). There is a time limitation of 2 hours on the amendment.

Without objection, the text of the pending amendment will be printed in the RECORD.

The amendment (No. 433) is as follows:

TITLE VI--CESSATION OF BOMBING IN INDOCHINA

Sec. 601. (a) No funds authorized or appropriated under this or any other law may be expended after the date of enactment of this Act to bomb, rocket, napalm, or otherwise attack by air, any target whatsoever within the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Kingdom of Laos.

(b) No funds authorized or appropriated under this or any other law may be expended

after the date of enactment of this Act to bomb, rocket, napalm, or otherwise attack by air, any target whatsoever within the Republic of Vietnam unless the President determines any such air operation to be necessary to provide for the safety of United States Armed Forces during their withdrawal from Indochina.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. I ask unanimous consent that the time be equally charged against both sides.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Who yields time?

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Alaska.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, while we deliberate today in this Chamber American planes will case into the sky over Southeast Asia. They will drop tons of explosives, guided to the flesh of human beings by the most elaborate and impersonal technology.

Hovering over Laotian rice fields, the A-119 Stinger gunship can put a piece of shrapnel into every square foot of an area the size of a football field.

On the ground are 3 million Laotians, the heaviest bombed people in the history of warfare. They will huddle in their caves and field trenches, and some will die. Many will not see the sun for months, fear keeping them in their covered bunkers during daylight hours.

In the name of America the planes come.

Over the past 10 years 700,000 Laotians have been made refugees, tens of thousands have been killed or wounded, and hundreds of thousands forced to live much of the time in caves and trenches.

The bombing raids also come in the name of the U.S. Senate, until we legislate otherwise.

The war is not winding down for the peoples of Indochina. Since the much heralded bombing halt over North Vietnam, the planes have not come home. They have simply shifted their targets into Laos and Cambodia.

The bombing has continued at 100 tons an hour, 2,400 tons a day. The rate of civilian casualties and refugee generation, indicative of the overall level of violence, has if anything increased during the last 2 years.

Recent hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees reveal that since the invasion of Cambodia nearly one quarter of that country's population—1,500,000 people—have become refugees. In the last few months in South Vietnam more refugees have been created than at any time since the 1968 Tet offensive.

The bombing of North Vietnam has been resumed. As recently as September 21 an armada of 250 U.S. planes attacked targets in the North, and this raid was followed on successive days by two more

so-called protective reaction strikes. At present the bombing of North Vietnam has reached an average rate of once every 4 days, and according to North Vietnamese reports 106 villages in addition to missile sites have been struck. The Meatgrinder in Vietnam, which has taken 325,000 civilian lives and wounded more than a million since 1955, is still whirling. As the South Vietnamese Minister of Information commented in 1968, South Vietnam has been devastated by an alien air force that seems at war with the very land of Vietnam.

The amendment I offer is quite straightforward. Let us stop the bombing, not just partially over North Vietnam but in all Indochina—except for those strikes inside South Vietnam demonstrably related to the security of our withdrawing troops. Is it really the desire of the Senate to continue to send out those planes?

An Orwellian transformation is taking place in our military policy in Indochina. Due to public pressure American boys are slowly coming home, but they are leaving an automated war behind. There is every danger, as Noam Chomsky has warned, that we intend to turn the land of Vietnam into an automated murder machine. Computer technology and a small number of troops manning aircraft and artillery are creating a U.S. destructive presence that may literally hover over Southeast Asia for years to come. In the midst of this the public is confused, pacified by the diminishing troop levels, yet vaguely troubled by continuing reports of devastation.

Eluding recognition, hidden in the techno-euphemisms of military speech, is the reality of our policy. "Selective ordnance"—a rather dull and technical sounding term until one realizes it masks the use of napalm against human beings. "Harassment and interdiction"—a rather light-hearted term until one understands that it represents the random hurling of destruction into jungle areas.

These antiseptic words obfuscate horror-filled realities, and thereby circumvent public judgment. "Surgical air strike"—one pictures a diseased cancer benevolently removed from the countryside. But the cancer is the peasantry. In World War II the cancer was the Jews, and the operation was the "final solution." In the name of America, how many executions are taking place from the air in Indochina.

It is the enormity of our mistake that clouds it. If we were wrong, how wrong we were. Nothing will bring back those who have died, or the lost arms and legs, eyes and ears. But let us commit ourselves at least to stop the bombing of those who remain.

How the people of this country, a good people, industrious people and generous people, could have come to visit such destruction on another nation is difficult to comprehend. Orwell in his masterpiece "1984" depicts such carnage as the result of technology gone mad, removed from common experience, giving reality to surrealistic nightmares. We may have intervened in Indochina for commendable reasons—even that is questionable—but at some time the machine got out of control and we could not turn it off.

Senate limits funds for Laotian war

By GENE OISHI

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—The Senate voted yesterday to require the President to give Congress a full accounting of the currently secret war in Laos and to limit expenditures in that country to \$350 million—the amount the administration says it needs for this year.

While the measure would not have any effect on current United States expenditures in Laos, it would establish for the first time a congressional ceiling on the war in Laos, which heretofore has been carried on mostly with secret funds funneled through the Central Intelligence Agency.

The amendment to the military procurement authorization bill, offered by Senator Stuart Symington (D., Mo.), passed 67 to 11.

The Senate also approved by a 65-to-4 vote an amendment to provide a pay increase to members of the armed forces totaling \$381 million a year, in addition to the \$2.4 billion already enacted as part of the draft extension act.

The pay-raise amendment, which could be compromised in a House-Senate conference committee, also would reshape the approved pay raises so that more of the money would go to the lowest grade enlisted ranks.

The amendment pertaining to the war in Laos originally was drafted to cut expenditures in Laos to \$200 million for fiscal 1972. According to both administration and congressional estimates, the amount that the United States expects to spend in Laos in fiscal 1972 for economic aid for CIA-directed military operations and other programs will total \$346.9 million.

In addition, Senator Symington

said, the air war over northern Laos—which does not include the bombing of the Ho Chi Minh trail—will cost \$143.4 million, for a total of \$499.2 million.

As originally drafted, the Symington amendment would have cut the \$499.2 million to \$200 million.

But Mr. Symington modified his amendment to exclude the air war from the spending ceiling and also to raise the limit to \$350 million, a move that enabled him to get the support of Senator John Stennis (D., Miss.), chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and most of the members of the committee.

Mr. Symington said on the floor the reason he modified his amendment was that it did not have a chance of passage in its original form. He further noted that, by the time his amendment becomes law, fiscal 1972—which began on July 1—would be half over and at least half of the currently authorized amounts already will have been spent.

Interpretations mixed

The interpretation of what the modified Symington amendment would accomplish was mixed. Mr. Symington defended it as a step toward placing congressional controls over the war in Laos, which is still being financed largely outside the usual authorization and appropriation processes of Congress.

For example, there never has been any public accounting of how the 30,000-man irregular forces in Laos or the large contingent of Thai "volunteers"—estimated now at 5,000 to 6,000—are financed.

On the other hand, Senator Stennis asserted that passage of the Symington amendment would amount to "legislative recognition that these funds are needed."

It was this point that caused some critics of the war in Laos to back off from the amendment. Senator J. William Fulbright (D., Ark.), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, supported the original amendment but voted against the modified version.

Mr. Fulbright said he was fearful that the Symington amendment would not be viewed as a restrictive amendment, but rather as congressional authorization for conducting the war in Laos.

Senator Harold E. Hughes (D., Iowa) said that, while he supported a cutback in funds for Laos, "the principle of establishing some ceiling is even more urgent than the precise figure."

STATINTL

E - 434,849

OCT 5 1971

STATINTL

Senate votes to curb Laos war

By William McGaffila
Of Our Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON -- The Senate has moved for the first time to try to put a lid on the rising costs of the war in Laos.

It voted Monday, 67 to 11, to put a \$350 million ceiling on U.S. support for ground operations in the Laotian war.

No limit, however, was placed on U.S. air support for the Laotians, which comes to an estimated \$143.4 million a year. Nor is there any limit on the cost of B-52 bombing raids on the Ho Chi Minh Trail undertaken in connection with the war in neighboring Vietnam.

The \$350 million ceiling on ground operations plus the \$143.4 million for air operations -- a total of \$493.4 million -- gives the Nixon administration plenty of leeway. It had only planned an estimated expenditure on these two items in fiscal 1972 of \$490.2 million.

THE POINT of the amendment, sponsored by Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), is that it hopefully would put a curb on a further growth in war costs and thus prevent an expansion of American involvement in the conflict.

Symington had proposed a \$200 million ceiling on ground and air operations exclusive of Ho Chi Minh Trail bombings. This would have meant a saving in fiscal 1972 of \$290.2 million. But he did not have a chance of getting this through the Senate.

The compromise proposal that the Senate approved -- giving the administration everything it wants and a bit more this time -- was worked out between Symington and Sen. John Stennis (D-Miss.), floor manager of the \$21 billion military procurement bill to which the amendment was attached.

IN RETURN for the high

price he paid to get some kind of legislation approved, Symington won agreement to his provision for attempting to make the curb effective.

The provision is that the administration in future years must justify any request for expenditures on ground support operations over the \$350 million ceiling.

The Symington amendment will not have any binding force, however, unless it is also accepted by the House.

THE U.S. money for ground support operations goes to a once-secret guerrilla force in Laos, organized by the CIA, composed of thousands of Laotian tribesmen and "volunteer" soldiers from neighboring Thailand.

Many of the Thai volunteers, Symington disclosed during the debate Monday, actually are professional soldiers from the Thai army, including a general and several other officers.

In 1963, the year in which the United States first got involved in Laos, the bill was only \$11.9 million.

costs

STATINTL

Senate Limits Laos War Spending

BY FRED FARRAR

(Chicago Tribune Press Service)

WASHINGTON, Oct. 4--The Senate today voted, 67 to 11, to impose a ceiling of \$350 million on United States spending in the war in Laos in the current fiscal year.

The cation also requires that in the future the administration report regularly to Congress on how much it spends in Laos and what the money is used for.

The vote came after Sen. Stuart Symington (D., Mo.), sponsor of the amendment to the military procurement authorization bill, altered his amendment to raise the ceiling from \$200 million and exempt the cost of air strikes in northern Laos from the ceiling in addition to air strikes against the Ho Chi Minh trail.

Matches Planned Spending

The change brought the ceiling in line with what the administration had asked for in military spending in Laos for this fiscal year and won for the amendment the support of Sen. John C. Stennis (D., Miss.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and floor manager of the \$21 billion military procurement bill.

In agreeing to the change, Symington said: "I believe the principle in the long run is more important than the amount of the ceiling."

He was referring to the principle of congressional control over the Amount of American military spending in Laos--control which he charged was heretofore been lacking without Congress or the public being aware of exactly how much this country has been spending there.

Costs Disputed

He charged that altho the Nixon administration has said it only planned to spend \$221 million for military assistance to Laos in this fiscal year, the actual figure is \$400 million. He said this included the cost of air strikes in northern Laos,

but not those against the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

The cost of strikes against the trail are considered by the Pentagon to be part of the over-all cost of the Viet Nam War.

Fulbright Opposes Plan

Symington said that the present administration, as well as previous ones, have hidden much of what has been spent in Laos by funneling the money thru the Central Intelligence Agency or using money from other funds. He said that the reporting provisions of his

amendment were designed to prevent this diversion.

Sen. J. William Fulbright (D., Ark.), who voted against the amendment, said that while he was in favor of it in principle, he was not convinced that the administration would abide by either the ceiling or the spirit of the reporting provisions.

The Foreign Relations Committee chairman noted that last year Congress passed the Cooper-Church amendment which banned the use of American money to introduce troops

from another country into Laos or Cambodia, but Fulbright contended that the administration got around this by paying Thai mercenaries to fight in Laos and describing them as "native Laotians."

The Senate is in its third week of debate on the military procurement bill and a final vote is expected Wednesday. Following the vote, the bill will go to a House-Senate conference committee to give the House the opportunity to express itself on the Symington amendment.

STATINTL



Senator hits war escalation

WASHINGTON — Three senators have charged in the past few days that President Nixon has been secretly escalating the war throughout Indochina.

Sen. Mike Gravel (D-Alaska) told a news conference Sunday that Nixon has stepped up the bombings in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

"He wants to achieve by bombing what former President Lyndon B. Johnson failed to do with ground troops. Nixon wants to win the war — through another agency and through mercenaries."

Gravel, who noted that the Senate will vote Tuesday on his amendment to halt all bombing in Southeast Asia, said the U.S. has dropped the equivalent of "several hydrogen bombs" in the war zone.

Stuart Symington (D-Mo) charged Monday that the U.S. has secretly increased its involvement in the "undeclared and uncontrolled" war in Laos. The U.S. Embassy in Vientiane now is directing "most of the war," he said.

The U.S. government, he said, "trains, arms and feeds" the Royal Laotian Army and Air Force while the CIA coordinates and pays a growing force of Thai "volunteers."

Symington made his remarks as he introduced an amendment to the \$21 billion military procurement bill now before the Senate. The amendment would cut spending on the war in Laos by 60 percent.

Another amendment to the bill, introduced by Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-NJ), would impose "an absolute ceiling" of 150 on the number of Americans who could be assigned to the U.S. embassy in Cambodia.

Case said he was "increasingly alarmed" by reports that a military equipment delivery team sent to Cambodia to handle foreign aid shipments had swollen to 50 and that the Pentagon wanted to double that figure.

Senate Votes Ceiling On CIA Funds in Laos

✓ The Senate, disturbed by CIA involvement in a guerrilla war, has voted to clamp a lid on the steadily increasing cost of defending Laos.

In a compromise worked out between the Nixon administration and Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., members voted, 67 to 11, yesterday to impose a \$350 million ceiling on U.S. support for allied forces fighting in Laos — including paramilitary troops who are trained, paid, fed, clothed, advised and supported by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The amendment, a rider to the \$21 billion military procurement bill, does not affect U.S. air support for Laos, which costs about \$140 million annually. Nor does it restrict the bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail that leads through Laos into South Vietnam.

Would Ban Escalation

The administration decided not to fight the restriction since \$350 million apparently was all it planned to spend anyway.

But the Symington amend-

ment, if enacted, would prevent a major U.S. escalation of the war. And it represents the first attempt by Congress to control the CIA's role in the conflict—a role that now has been acknowledged by the administration.

The CIA-directed guerrilla army in Laos includes Lao irregulars and "volunteers" from neighboring Thailand.

Symington said during the debate that many of the Thai volunteers are professional soldiers from the Thai army. He said the cost of supporting them is 25 percent higher than the entire U.S. outlay for the Royal Lao army, the regular force that is supported under the official U.S. military assistance program but that has not proved effective in resisting the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao rebels.

American ground troops have been barred from fighting in Laos since 1969 by act of Congress. But there has been concern that the growing U.S. aid program and CIA involvement—which has increased American costs 20-fold in the last nine years—could escalate into a Vietnam-like war.

CIA Role Unveiled

The CIA expenses, like most of the other appropriations for the agency, normally are disguised by hiding the outlays in padded appropriations for other agencies. The Symington amendment recognizes the CIA's involvement in Laos for the first time.

Sen. J. William Fulbright, D-Ark., warned however, that the amendment may be used by the administration in the future as evidence that Congress was authorizing the CIA to continue its work.

Mr. ALLOTT. Now, Mr. President, I am ready, if the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, the chairman of the committee, is ready, and I am perfectly willing to ask for a quorum call to be taken out of both sides. I want to be sure that we have a recorded vote on this matter, and when we have enough Senators in the Chamber, we can ask for yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas and nays have previously been ordered.

Mr. ALLOTT. If they have been ordered, Mr. President, I think we should have a short quorum call. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ALLOTT. If it is agreeable to the chairman of the committee, the manager of the bill, I am willing to yield back the remainder of my time, if he is willing to yield back his, and we can then proceed, the yeas and nays having been ordered, to vote on amendment No. 430.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if there is no one who wishes time, I am ready to yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. ALLOTT. I yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BENTSEN). All remaining time having been yielded back, the question is on agreeing to the amendment No. 430 of the Senator from Colorado, as modified. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I announce that the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. BURDICK), the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. BYRD), the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH), the Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON), the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. EASTLAND), the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART), the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. HOLINGS), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY), the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. LONG), the Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. MONDALE), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RHEICOFF), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE), the Senator from Alabama (Mr. SPARKMAN), and the Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON) are necessarily absent.

I also announce that the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. McGEE), the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. MONTROYA), and the Senator from Georgia (Mr. TALMADGE) are absent on official business.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. BURDICK), the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL), the Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. McGEE), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RHEICOFF),

the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE), the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY), and the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. MONTROYA) would each vote "yea."

Mr. SCOTT. I announce that the Senator from Utah (Mr. BENNETT) is absent on official business.

The Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. CORRON), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. DOLE), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. GRIFFIN), the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY), and the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER) are necessarily absent.

The Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) is absent because of illness.

The Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BROCK), and the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. WEICKER) are detained on official business.

If present and voting, the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Brock), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Dole), the Senator from New York (Mr. Javits), the Senator from Illinois (Mr. Percy), and the Senator from Texas (Mr. Tower) would each vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 65, nays 4, as follows:

[No. 247 Leg.]

YEAS—65

Alken	Fannin	Nelson
Allen	Pong	Packwood
Allott	Gambrell	Pastore
Anderson	Goldwater	Pearson
Baker	Gurney	Pell
Bayh	Hansen	Proxmire
Beall	Harris	Randolph
Bentsen	Hatfield	Roth
Bible	Hruska	Saxbe
Boggs	Hughes	Schweiker
Brooke	Inouye	Scott
Buckley	Jackson	Spong
Byrd, Va.	Jordan, N.C.	Stefford
Case	Jordan, Idaho	Stennis
Chiles	Mansfield	Stevens
Cook	Mathias	Symington
Cooper	McClellan	Taft
Cranston	McGovern	Thurmond
Curtis	Metcalfe	Tunney
Domnick	Miller	Williams
Ellender	Moss	Young
Ervin	Muskie	

NAYS—4

Fulbright	Smith	Stevenson
Kennedy		

NOT VOTING—31

Bellmon	Gravel	Mondale
Bennett	Griffin	Montoya
Brock	Hart	Mundt
Burdick	Hartke	Percy
Byrd, W. Va.	Hollings	Ribicoff
Cannon	Humphrey	Sparkman
Church	Javits	Talmadge
Cotton	Long	Tower
Dole	Magnuson	Weicker
Eagleton	McGee	
Eastland	McIntyre	

So Mr. ALLOTT's amendment (No. 430) was agreed to.

Mr. DOLE subsequently said: Mr. President, this morning I was unavoidably detained in returning to Washington from Kansas and narrowly missed the rollcall on the amendment sponsored by the distinguished senior Senator from Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT). Had I been present it would have been my privilege to join with the overwhelming majority of my colleagues in approving the Senator from Colorado's proposal to provide substantial pay increases to members of the armed services. Having voted in favor of

the earlier, Senate-passed version of the pay increase, I was gratified that Senate approval of this measure was achieved today.

It is important to keep in mind that raising military pay scales is a matter of high national priority for two very crucial reasons. First, by increasing the pay of our men and women in uniform we fulfill an obligation to recognize and reward the contributions they are making to the maintenance of our national defense. In many cases their pay is woefully inadequate and totally unjustified in terms of the responsibilities they bear and the obligations they owe to themselves and their families. And second, by putting military pay in closer competition with civilian wages we take a significant step toward ending the draft and creating an all-volunteer military force. For, only by making a military career attractive and secure monetarily, can we hope to draw to it the type of individuals needed to fulfill the requirements of modern national defense.

I commend the Senator from Colorado for his leadership in seeking to upgrade the pay scales of the Armed Forces and for his longstanding concern and devotion to the men and women who wear the uniform of the United States so proudly and with such great distinction to themselves and their Nation.

ORDER FOR STAR PRINT OF S. 2620

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a star print be ordered for S. 2620, the East-West Trade Exchange Act of 1971, introduced by the Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON) on Thursday, September 30, 1971. Due to an inadvertence, an incorrect text was attached when the bill was introduced for referral.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BENTSEN). Without objection, it is so ordered.

MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATIONS, 1972

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 8687) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1972 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

AMENDMENT NO. 434

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STEVENSON). Pursuant to the previous order, the Senate will now proceed to the consideration of amendment No. 434 by the Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON), which the clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) proposes amendment No. 434 as follows:

At the end of the bill add a new section as follows:

"SEC. 505. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds authorized to be

E - 28 OCT 63 4 1971
S - 28,219

Congress would like to know

What does the CIA do?

By Jack McWeethy
Congressional Quarterly
Washington

Since Congress created the ultra-secret Central Intelligence Agency in 1947, a growing number of members have been itching to find out more about what their creation does.

The push is on again this year, with impetus being provided by disclosures that the United States is involved in a clandestine war in Laos that Congress didn't know about.

More than a dozen bills have been introduced this spring and summer aimed at removing some of the legal blinders Congress put on itself with respect to the CIA. Some would allow the legislative branch to share more fully in the agency's intelligence information.

In the last two decades, nearly 100 bills have been introduced aimed at easing the tension between an uninformed Congress and an uninformative CIA. Not one bill has passed and only two have been put to a vote. As a result, the CIA remains a mystery even to the body that voted it into existence.

The agency is so secret that some members of Congress who are supposed to know about CIA activities — members of the four highly select intelligence oversight subcommittees — did not know how deeply the CIA figures in the continued existence of the Royal Lao Government. CIA oversight is supposed to be conducted by subcommittees of the Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees.

Much to the irritation of some members, the CIA oversight subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee not only keeps its business with the agency a secret, but also keeps the subcommittee's membership a secret from other members of Congress.

Explanation of Secrecy

Paul Wilson, staff director of the House committee, told Congressional Quarterly the membership was a secret "because that's the way it's always been."



The late Allen Dulles, former CIA director

Missouri Democrat Stuart Symington, a member of the Senate Armed Services CIA oversight subcommittee and chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee on U.S. commitments abroad, had to send two staff members to the jungles of Laos to find out how extensive the CIA program was in that supposedly neutral country.

"In all my committees there is no real knowledge of what is going on in Laos," Symington told a closed session of the Senate June 7.

Nine senators, including Symington, sit on one of the two Senate subcommittees designed to provide legislative oversight of the CIA.

not legally require any review by Congress," said T. Edward Brzezinski, chief counsel for the

requiring disclosure of the "functions, names, official titles, salaries or numbers of personnel" employed by the agency. To the CIA director, the law granted the authority to spend money "without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of government funds."

The Senate Appropriations Committee has a five-man subcommittee with the primary responsibility of reviewing the CIA budget, a figure which later is hidden in the accounts of other government agencies.

According to William W. Woodruff, the one-man staff of the Appropriations oversight subcommittee, the senators discuss more than just the CIA when its director, Richard Helms, testifies.

"We look to the CIA for the best intelligence on the Defense Department budget that you can get," Woodruff said. He said Helms also provided the subcommittee with budget estimates for all government intelligence operations, including those not specifically under the jurisdiction of the CIA.

While the House Appropriations Committee veils its oversight operation in secrecy, the House Armed Services Committee just formed a new subcommittee to deal with all aspects of intelligence.

For the last seven months Rep. F. Edward Hebert, D-La., chairman of Armed Services, used the full committee to weight CIA testimony.

"To say the committee was performing any real oversight function was a fiction," said freshman committee member Michael Harrington, a Massachusetts Democrat. The new subcommittee will be under the direction of Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, D-Mich.

No Quizzing Society

"I find it very difficult to believe the oversight committees could not obtain some pretty accurate information on how much of that CIA money was going into Laos," commented Sen. Jack Miller, R-Iowa, during the Senate's June 7 closed session.

Sen. J. W. Fulbright D Ark., chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, retorted: "It has been said that we all know

continued

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[DCT 4 1971]

E - 110,294

S - 142,020

Central Intelligence Agency Abuses The Privileges Given It By Congress

The Central Intelligence Agency long has enjoyed immunity from the kind of close budgetary scrutiny given other federal agencies by congressional committees serving as watchdogs on the expenditure of public funds. Only a highly select group of lawmakers has been keeping tabs on the operations of the CIA. This arrangement permitted the highly respected Congressional Quarterly to comment: "The CIA remains a mystery even to the body that voted it into existence."

Increasing numbers of lawmakers are upset over the special status given the CIA because of disclosures the agency has been abusing its privileges. It has kept hidden from the subcommittee supposed to oversee it the facts showing just how deeply the CIA has involved itself in the war in Laos.

US Sen. Stuart Symington of Missouri, a former secretary of defense and a member of the Senate armed services subcommittee, who is supposed to be one of the few with access to information about the CIA, is helping to blow the whistle on the agency. He reports the administration's closed session briefing of the Senate last June on Laotian operations reveals the CIA to be playing a far greater role than he had realized.

Said Symington: "Nobody knows the amounts the CIA is spending while under orders from the executive branch to continue to supervise and direct this long and ravaging war (in Laos)."

The CIA has become a law unto itself. Established by Congress only to coordinate the collection of intelligence, the CIA instead establishes its own foreign policies and executes them without bother-

ing to let outsiders, such as the public's elected representatives, know, even broadly, about its activities. This highly dangerous practice is more appropriate to a totalitarian state than a democracy.

Fortunately, there are signs increasing numbers of congressmen, and possibly the White House, too, want to pull in the reins on the CIA. Bills to establish tighter controls on the agency are pending in Congress. And the Nixon administration reportedly is looking for ways of cutting \$500 million and 50,000 employees from the \$5 billion budgets and 200,000-worker staffs of the various intelligence-gathering operations headed by the CIA.

ST. LOUIS, MO.
POST-DISPATCH

OCT 3 1971
E - 326,376
S - 541,868

Planning Attack On Laos War

By RICHARD DUDMAN,
Chief Washington Correspondent
of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, Oct. 2 — A broad, new attack against the largely secret United States war in Laos and Cambodia is to be opened Monday by Senators Stuart Symington (Dem.), of Missouri, and Clifford P. Case (Rep.), New Jersey.

They will try to amend the pending Foreign Assistance Act to put ceilings on the amount that may be spent in Laos and on the number of U.S. military men that may be stationed in Cambodia.

Both have been expanding steadily for several years, but the increases have been concealed from the American people and from Congress until recently.

Five hours have been set aside Monday afternoon for debate on the U.S. involvement in Laos, which has been expanding as the U.S. ground operations in Vietnam have been reduced.

Symington has prepared a revised version of his amendment to put a ceiling of \$200,000,000 on U.S. expenditures in Laos this year for economic aid, military assistance and all other U.S. activities.

That would represent a cut of nearly 60 per cent, because testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee had disclosed that the total planned expenditures there this year amount to \$100,000,000.

That figure does not include about \$200,000,000 or more for U.S. air operations along the Ho Chi Minh Trail system of infiltration routes into South Vietnam.

Nor would Symington's proposed ceiling apply to operations along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. By exempting those expenditures, he seeks to avoid the charge that his proposed limitation would endanger U.S. troops still in South Vietnam or

would otherwise hinder the war program.

The broad language of the amendment would cut the funds spent through the Department of Defense and the aid program as well as expenditures by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The CIA, which gets its appropriations through funds hidden elsewhere in the federal budget, pays for the training and support of a clandestine army of Lao tribesmen and for a growing force of Thai soldiers fighting in Laos under U.S. direction.

Case's amendment would put a ceiling on the number of Americans that could be assigned to Cambodia. It would freeze the number at about the present level.

Symington, Case and other Senators contend that the Nixon Administration has been violating the spirit if not the letter of restrictions written into law last year to curb expansion of the war in Laos and Cambodia.

Symington has been laying the groundwork for several years for this new effort to curb the war. He has demanded repeatedly to know the facts about U.S. operations there, in his capacity as the only Senator who is a member of both the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee.

Last spring, two members of the staff of his subcommittee on United States security agreements and commitments abroad went to Vientiane at about the same time that Defense Department witnesses were asking the Armed Services Committee for a new authorization of \$125,800,000 for military assistance to Laos in the current 1972 fiscal year.

The staff members learned in the Laotian capital that the estimate of the 1972 military assistance program actually being planned for Laos was twice that amount — \$250,100,000.

Other planned expenditures, including \$143,400,000 for U.S. air support in northern Laos and other areas excluding the Ho Chi Minh Trail area, brought the total for the current year to nearly \$500,000,000.

President Richard M. Nixon, after repeated questions on the subject, gave what he called a "precise description of our current activities in Laos" in a statement on March 6, 1970.

He said that the United States was providing regular and irregular Lao forces with equipment, training and logistics support. He said that the United States was conducting operations to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail, reconnaissance

flights in Northern Laos, and, in addition, combat missions for Lao forces.

Mr. Nixon's statement made no mention of the CIA support of the clandestine army and the Thai troops. Nor did it convey any clear impression of the intensive campaign by the U.S. Air Force, including B-52 strikes in northern Laos.

Last year, both houses passed a bill, and the President signed it, prohibiting U.S. support for Vietnamese "or other free world forces" in "actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the governments of Cambodia or Laos."

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MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

TRIBUNE

OCT 2 1971

M - 240,275

S - 674,302

The problems of espionage

It's hard for a Russian spy to make an honest living any time, and it's even harder now that the London intelligence market has suddenly become less rewarding. With 105 of the 550 Russian officials previously assigned to Britain now banned from the country, and with the further restriction that prohibits even their replacement, the message to Moscow is clear: Quit sending spies.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Britain's foreign secretary, put it more elegantly. In an Aug. 4 letter to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, he wrote, after listing specific examples, "I do not accept your contention that, in the interest of Anglo-Soviet relations, Her Majesty's Government should abstain from taking measures to prevent, limit or inhibit the espionage conducted by Soviet officials and other Soviet citizens in this country on such an extensive scale."

Britain's action should not be misconstrued as putting an end to the spy business, even in London. American intelligence experts say that half or more of the officials in most Soviet embassies, trade missions and other delegations are involved in espionage. If that assumption is correct, then even after the crackdown last

week, 100 or so Russian agents will remain in Britain.

But the British move is likely to have an effect in many parts of the world. The number of Soviet officials involved should make people in nearly all capitals think twice about the purposes that visiting Russians might be pursuing.

Unfortunately the same people might also be provoked into second thoughts about Americans. Some will recall that the CIA has been running an air-line and directing a war in Laos and carrying out other operations from the cover of aid missions. They might wonder to what extent they are the beneficiaries — or objects — of the estimated total of \$5 billion spent annually by the United States in its (also estimated) 200,000-person intelligence activities.

Unfortunately, too, the very definition of covert intelligence means that such doubts can't be overcome. The most one can hope is that people of other countries will have greater confidence in American integrity than in that of the Soviet Union. The exposure of Russian activities in Britain ought to help.